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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices contain sensors which allow continuous recording of a user’s
motion allowing the development of activity, fitness and health applications.
With varied applications, the motion sensors present new privacy problems
which require protection. This dissertation builds on previous work with
activity and fitness machine learning techniques demonstrating the ability
to predict medical values from motion data using smartphones. We conduct
two clinical trials collecting a data set of eighty-eight patients and forty-five
hours of monitoring to analyze the privacy implications of releasing motion
data. We extract a comprehensive set of statistical features from all available
smartphone sensors and evaluate feature selection techniques and machine
learning models. We find we can predict user identity, phone identity, speed,
FEV1/FVC, and activity from the motion signal.
Designing a privacy protection mechanism for motion data requires a pre-
cise understanding of how the signal predicts the sensitive information. We
develop algorithms to conduct private feature selection which identifies fea-
tures useful for prediction. We find that simply blocking all private features
significantly reduces the usefulness of the signal for other predictions. We
develop a sensitivity estimation framework to calibrate the noise for each
private feature requiring an order of magnitude less noise than differential
privacy sensitivity. We find adding noise to private features calibrated using
the sensitivity estimate is effective at reducing the prediction of five tested
target predictions. Our methods hide both user and phone identification
while allowing other prediction but cannot hide activity, FEV1/FVC and
speed without significantly lowering the accuracy of other predictions. Our
methods are still effective when the attacker has prior knowledge of the noise
distribution. The methods presented in this dissertation demonstrate the
need for privacy in motion data and provide a framework for protecting sen-
sitive user information in motion readings.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
The rise in popularity of mobile devices presents new challenges to protecting
the privacy of users. While users are enjoying the many added conveniences
mobile devices provide throughout their daily lives, most users are unaware
of the new streams of continuous personal information being collected. Mo-
bile fitness devices are being designed to track a user’s every movement in
order to measure fitness and activity levels. Medical devices are being devel-
oped to track health with the goal of allowing medical practitioners to more
accurately diagnose and treat chronic disease. Even smartphones contain
motion sensors capable of measuring a user’s daily life through the use of
global positioning satellite (GPS) tracking location, motion sensors tracking
actions and of course communication patterns tracking social behavior and
browsing history tracking user behavior. While these devices can gather a
wide array of personal information about their users, we focus on the ability
of mobile devices to monitor a user’s motion using internal motion sensors.
While the privacy leaks from GPS, browsing history, and social contact have
been studied, motion from privacy sensors has gained little attention from
privacy research. The widespread adoption of devices containing motion sen-
sors combined with recent interest from commercial companies to monitor
health, such as Apple’s HealthKit initiative, creates a need to understand
information leaks contained in motion sensor data.
Health trackers, fitness devices, and mobile phones contain motion sensors
including accelerometers, gyroscopes and magnetometers to measure a user’s
motion through space. Motion through space is useful for many applications
including gaming, fitness tracking, and giving the phone context awareness
with new creative applications being continuously developed. Recent work
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has demonstrated that motion sensors may leak potentially private informa-
tion including user identification, device identification, activity recognition,
walking pattern identification, and health status tracking. We expand on
previous work by conducting numerous health studies finding that data from
these sensors can leak medical metrics giving insight into users’ private health
information. Our preliminary studies motivate the need to educate users to
the potential dangers of releasing private information and develop new pri-
vacy architectures which ensure private data is protected.
The methods presented in this dissertation can be used to generally protect
predictions made from machine learning models trained with motion data;
however, we specifically focus on privacy threats which arise while carrying
mobile smartphones. While the privacy threats which arise from carrying fit-
ness and medical devices must be understood, most users are naturally more
conscientious while carrying a fitness or medical device because it is only worn
while the user is either exercising or conducting medical test. Conversely, a
phone is typically always carried for communication purposes and is cur-
rently not viewed as a threat to leaking the user’s identity, activity or health
status through motion data. We demonstrate that the sensors in a phone
are similar or better than sensors contained in popular fitness and health
devices. We develop software to collect sensor readings on Android-based
smartphones. We then conduct two clinical trials to demonstrate the viabil-
ity of collecting both health and activity data using smartphones on a wide
range of patients. The results from these tests demonstrate the viability of
smartphones to collect sensitive health information useful for health diagnosis
from both chronic and healthy subjects using sophisticated machine learning
models. Thus, we demonstrate mobile devices leaking sensitive health infor-
mation which motivates the need to design and develop privacy protection
mechanisms.
In order to design privacy mechanisms for motion sensors, we must under-
stand how raw sensor signals can be useful to make predictions about sen-
sitive fitness, health, and demographic information. We assemble the data
from two clinical trials with fifty-eight subjects and combine it with two years
of continuous collection from thirty volunteers giving a unique data set com-
prising eighty-eight subjects and over two gigabytes of raw motion data taken
from ten unique smartphones. Using this data, we conduct a detailed study
using machine learning to predict thirty pieces of private information includ-
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ing health metrics, fitness metrics, user identification, phone identification
and various demographic information. We design and implement an anal-
ysis pipeline which extracts seventy-four statistical features from thirty-one
sensor streams from each mobile device. Our pipeline generates 2,294 total
sensor features calculated from continuous windows of data. We then train
and evaluate machine learning algorithms to predict each sensor target. We
find motion data useful to predict phone identification, user identification,
walking speed, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) diagno-
sis motivating the need for privacy protection to give a user control over the
release of this information.
Protecting privacy against machine learning analysis requires the devel-
opment of new analysis frameworks. We begin by studying the ability of
standard feature selection routines to identify the set of statistical sensor
features which leak private information. We find that traditional feature se-
lection techniques are not designed nor suited for identifying the complete
set of private features. We propose three algorithms to return the top set of
private features and validate each using machine learning models. We find
a tradeoff between computation power and accuracy. We find an algorithm
which clusters features using normalized mutual information and raw predic-
tion scores during the first round of a sequential forward search mechanism
using a support vector machine/regression correctly classifies most private
features while limiting the number of false positives. However, it also takes
far more computation than using the normalized mutual information score
between the feature vector and target vector which is the most accurate filter
method. We use our algorithm to identify the private features for each of
our thirty prediction targets.
The utility of any privacy mechanism is limited depending on how severely
it degrades legitimate performance. The simplest way to protect motion data
is to block the release of all private features. However, we find many predic-
tion targets have overlapping private features. We investigate the ability to
introduce sufficient noise to obfuscate a sensitive prediction target while still
leaving enough of the signal to be useful by developing methods to estimate
the sensitivity of each statistical sensor feature to added noise. We design
a framework in Python capable of estimating sensitivity for both specific
and generalized machine learning models. For classification, the algorithm
estimates the average distance the feature must change to change the clas-
3
sification output. For regression, the framework estimates the change in
prediction output per change in input feature values. Our framework allows
careful estimation of the required noise needed to obfuscate prediction.
Our analysis of each stage of the machine learning pipeline allows us to
use principles from differential privacy to design obfuscation routines. Using
the private features for each target and sensitivity analysis, we can intro-
duce noise into the signal significantly reducing the predictive ability of the
machine learning while minimizing the collateral impact on the accuracy of
predicting other targets. We test traditional differential privacy noise estima-
tion against our sensitivity routines finding our sensitivity estimates requires
on average an order of magnitude less noise to hide the target prediction.
We find we can add sufficient noise to reduce classification accuracy of phone
identification and user identification without significantly decreasing accu-
racy of health and fitness metrics. We find that our obfuscation techniques
decreases prediction accuracy across all tested machine learning model types
for each prediction target. Knowledge of the noise level can help an attacker
get better prediction accuracy but the benefit to collateral features is higher
than to the protected private feature. Overall, our analysis indicates that
regression is more sensitive to changes in noise with classification being less
sensitive to input noise. However, more testing on larger data sets using our
framework will be required to design a widely deployable system capable of
protecting privacy.
We find that motion sensors can leak sensitive information including health
metrics, fitness metrics, user identification, and phone identification. We find
various demographics more difficult to predict from our data. Our analysis
framework allows us to identify private features, estimate the sensitivity of
those features for each prediction, and add noise to obfuscate the predictive
accuracy to a user configurable threshold. We believe this work motivates
the education of users to the dangers of releasing motion sensor information
and the presented frameworks can be used to develop better access control
capable of selectively protecting sensitive information. Such frameworks will
be necessary to give users control over their personal information while al-
lowing motion sensors to be used for the wide variety of creative applications
currently being deployed on mobile devices.
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1.2 Motivation
Mobile technology has gained widespread acceptance in our society. Mobile
phones provide users internet connectivity from virtually anywhere allowing
open access to information regardless of location. Location-based services
provide instant directions to help users by suggesting places to eat, shop,
relax or work. Fitness devices are gaining popularity to improve health by
allowing a user to track various fitness metrics including step counts, dis-
tances walked, caloric expenditure and other exercise measurements. Dedi-
cated health devices are being developed to track various conditions ranging
from general measures of health such as heart rate, blood pressure, oxygen
saturation to specific disease diagnosis such as cardiopulmonary function or
asthma inhaler use. From phones to dedicated devices, we are seeing vast
usage of mobile platforms to monitor and assess health and fitness in users.
All these devices present platforms capable of continuously collecting data
about their users from a variety of sensors. While this presents unprece-
dented utility for analysis in order to improve health tracking, it presents the
ability for side-channel attacks against a user’s privacy. Therefore, the data
which is returned from these devices must be carefully analyzed in order to
determine the privacy implications to the users.
While the development of fitness trackers and health devices has taken
place in parallel to mobile phones, the phone manufacturers are currently ex-
ploring the capabilities of the phones to mimic the functionality of dedicated
devices. Health apps are gaining popularity in the smartphone marketplaces
with hundreds of new apps appearing in both the Apple and Google Play
stores. Both Apple and Samsung are including health fitness apps in the
base installs of the operating systems making fitness trackers part of the core
phone functionality capable of tracking movement, steps taken, and caloric
expenditure. New phones are also including what have traditional been med-
ical measures including heart rate, blood oxygen level, and respiratory rate
among others. Apple’s Health Kit initiative is designed to make continuously
collected sensor data available in medical records and the Research Kit ini-
tiative has been developed to provide all the collected information to clinical
research teams. These initiatives are moving continuous monitoring to stan-
dard practice on modern smartphones and creating easy ways for researchers
and other apps to access the data.
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Users have been extremely tolerant of giving vast amounts of personal in-
formation to phone apps in order to make their lives easier. While alarming,
this has led to a relatively relaxed privacy policies on most smartphones in
use today. Unfortunately, the access to information on current mobile devices
opens users to unprecedented exposure of all collected private information.
The ability of mobile devices combined with a history of inadequate secu-
rity creates the possibility of a user’s entire life being continuously tracked,
recorded, and analyzed. While the new medical devices will undoubtedly be
carefully protected through strict access control, the phone, which contains
almost identical motion sensors, will probably continue to be considered low
risk when releasing a user’s motion information. It is unclear how success-
ful fitness and medical monitoring will be; however, including health related
measurements continually edges closer to being classified as health informa-
tion which is strictly protected under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA). While the necessary privacy requirements to
protect continuously collected data from mobile devices is currently unclear,
the ability of the phones to match dedicated health devices will probably
warrant better privacy protections. Thus, it is critically important to de-
termine the capability of the smartphones to continuously collect sensitive
health information. Whether classified as protected health information or
not, such data collection introduces the need for higher security and privacy
on mobile devices. At the very least, users must be educated on the po-
tential risks of providing their data to both researchers and other apps. In
order to classify the risks, privacy research must understand and quantify
what types of inferences can be conducted by releasing information from the
various sensors in the devices.
This dissertation hopes to parallel previous research in side-channel attacks
on GPS readings which have led to better understanding for the need to
control access to the GPS. Unfortunately, motion sensors, specifically the
accelerometer, magnetometer and gyroscope, are still easily available to an
adversary due to minimal protection by access control. Motion sensors are
even available through the web browser allowing an attacker to take readings
when a user visits a malicious site. Such policy is dangerous if there is private
information contained in the raw readings themselves. Privacy research must
therefore investigate the possible inferences and design systems to protect
sensitive user information. Such systems are necessary to ensure a user’s
6
Figure 1.1: Various Possible Privacy/Sensitivity Relationships for (G)
Gender and (ID) User Identification
privacy and maintain public confidence in mobile technology.
Access to motion sensors provides access to a wide variety of motion fea-
tures which can be measured as the user carries the device. Protecting pri-
vacy against inferences requires a thorough understanding of what specific
subset of motion features are most important for classifying private informa-
tion. Specifically we wish to find the subset of primary features contained
in the motion sensor data that predicts each private characteristic. It is not
only important to understand what primary features are most useful to pre-
dict a characteristic but also how sensitive the prediction is to variations in
those features in order to design privacy systems. The sensitivity is defined
as the amount of change in a given input to change the output value. As an
example, assume we are analyzing the sensitivity to two classifiers, user iden-
tification (ID) and gender (G). In general, we can envision three outputs to
our sensitivity analysis as shown in Figure 1.1. If the primary features that
identify the user are a mutually disjoint set from the set of primary features
that identify gender, then it should be possible to add noise to the primary
features indicating each characteristic and protect privacy in both without
destroying the other classifier. If the set of two features contains intersecting
primary features, but the sensitivity of features predicting gender is less than
the sensitivity of the features predicting user ID, then it should be possible
to add an appropriate amount of noise to obfuscate ID while leaving enough
information to predict gender. Finally, it may be the case that the features
are intersected and the sensitivity is similar in which case the classifiers are
not separable and it would not be possible to hide one without hiding the
other. Determining what characteristics can be inferred from motion sensors,
what primary features in the motion sensors indicate a target characteristic
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and how sensitive the predictions are to changes in the motion sensor fea-
tures is necessary to design privacy systems for motion sensor data. Once
determined, privacy systems may be developed to introduce various types
and levels of noise into the signal thereby hiding specific characteristics in
the data.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
It is the purpose of this dissertation to establish that raw motion data from
the accelerometer, magnetometer, and gyroscope in smartphones contain
side-channel information warranting careful protection. Chapter 2 will pro-
vide important background in mobile sensing, devices and target character-
istics which have been detected in motion data. Many studies have been
conducted on dedicated medical and fitness devices but fewer have looked at
a smartphone’s ability to track health. Thus, the dissertation will first estab-
lish that smartphones contain similar if not better capabilities than modern
fitness and medical devices. We will build on previous research in using ma-
chine learning to infer motion characteristics from accelerometers and develop
novel work establishing the ability of motion sensors to detect critical health
measures in the readings. This will require conducting multiple clinical trials
in order to collect data from patients during natural walking. The clinical
trials will collect a unique data set of patient data which will be used for the
analysis in the remainder of the dissertation. The validation of smartphone
sensors and clinical trials are presented in Chapter 3.
The clinical trials provide a rich data set to analyze in order to establish
the threat of side-channel information in motion data. Figure 1.2 outlines
the remaining analysis for the dissertation. We will choose a wide variety of
target characteristics to infer from the motion data which will be determined
from a combination of previous work and novel characteristics determined
from the clinical trials. Chapter 4 will outline what sensor streams are avail-
able from testing and what statistical features can be extracted for machine
learning. Chapter 5 will determine the set of extracted input features which
are most predictive of each target characteristics. We will then build sophis-
ticated machine learning models to predict each characteristic in Chapter
6 and determine which characteristics can accurately be inferred from the
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Figure 1.2: Dissertation Outline
motion sensors. We will also evaluate the sensitivity of each inference to the
primary features giving an ordering of which target characteristics are easy
to predict and which are more subtle in the data.
Once the sensitivities of the critical characteristics are identified, privacy
preserving techniques will be developed to hide side-channel information. We
will investigate the use of fine-tuned techniques based on differential privacy
which attempt to hide specific side-channel information without significantly
hampering the usefulness of the sensors for legitimate prediction in Chapter 7.
Such systems will undoubtedly cause degradation in the signal quality which
must be quantified. The analysis will determine the possibility of designing
systems capable of hiding specific inferable characteristics in the signal while
still maintaining use in application which are less sensitive to noise. This
will also produce a list of inferable characteristics and determine the difficult
in obfuscating each characteristic. Finally, we will discuss conclusions and
future work in Chapter 8 outlining how the work presented in the dissertation
can be used to design privacy obfuscation techniques applicable to the signal
in real time.
It is currently unclear how privacy will be handled in a world filled with
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mobile devices. Continuous collection of motion data opens users to unprece-
dented real-time tracking of their behavior. Understanding what character-
istics can be inferred and how noise can be injected to hide each piece of
information will allow systems to be designed with fine-tunable access con-
trol. This will allow users both better understanding of their privacy options
with the added benefit of allowing them to obfuscate if necessary. It is the
goal of this dissertation that this analysis will both promote awareness of
the privacy issues and provide a solution to allow these systems to operate
without fear of privacy loss of their users.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Motion Sensors
Modern electronics use various sensors to record the motion of the devices.
The most popular sensors in use are accelerometers which measure the rel-
ative acceleration of the device, gyroscopes which measure rotation, and
magnetometers which measure the magnetic field strength around the de-
vice. These sensors combined with some signal processing allow the device
to determine the direction of gravity or the downward vector and relative
orientation in the world coordinates (in relation to true north) with some
level of accuracy.
2.1.1 Magnetic Compass
Measuring magnetic fields in a single dimension is fairly trivial by measuring
the Hall effect [1]. When a current is flowing across a conductor, a magnetic
field will cause a charge buildup perpendicular to the magnetic field and
transvers to the flow of electric current as seen in Figure 2.1. By measur-
ing the voltage of the Hall effect, the relative strength of the perpendicular
magnetic field can be determined. While straightforward in one dimension,
measuring the relative magnetic field in three dimensions is more challenging.
The most obvious solution would be to place three Hall sensors perpendicular
to one another; however, minor errors in placement cause large errors in the
final measurement. The solution as implemented in modern devices is shown
in Figure 2.2 [2]. All three directions are measured in one plane thereby
eliminating alignment errors. To accomplish this, a magnetic concentrator is
placed on the X plane which bends the X and Y magnetic fields downward
into the Hall sensors. The Hall sensors then measure the combinations of
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Figure 2.1: The Hall Effect
Figure 2.2: Basic Theory of MEMS
Compass
magnetic fields strengths. Using two Hall sensors on either side of the con-
centrator, each sensor measure X1 = a∗Bx+x∗Bz and X2 = −a∗Bx+c∗Bz
where Bx and Bz are the relative magnetic field strengths in the x and z
directions and a and c are constants defined by the physical parameters of
the Hall sensors. Then to get the relative magnetic field strength the device
simply calculates Bx = (X1−X2)/2a and Bz = (X1 +X2)/2c. Obviously,
the By direction can be measured by using a similar set of equations with
the two Y hall sensors.
2.1.2 Acceleration
Most modern devices measure relative acceleration using micro electro-
mechanical systems (MEMS) accelerometers [3]. Accelerometers measure
the relative acceleration of the sensor in a single direction. Accelerometer
sensors are normally modelled as a mass on the end of a spring. As the
sensor is accelerated, force acts on the mass causing a change in length of
the spring. By measuring the length change, the relative acceleration can be
determined. Figure 2.3 illustrates the basic outline of a MEMS accelerometer.
A moveable plate is attached to a spring with a constant ks. When an
acceleration is applied parallel to the spring, a displacement occurs. The
relative capacitance C1 and C2 change as the plate moves. The chip measures
this capacitance and determines the appropriate acceleration. In modern
chips, three of these systems are fabricated orthogonal to each other allowing
the relative acceleration to be measured in three directions.
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Figure 2.3: Basic Outline of a MEMS
Accelerometer
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Figure 2.5: X-Ray of MEMS
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2.1.3 Rotation
Recently MEMS gyroscopes have gained popularity to increase the precision
of measuring device rotation especially in gaming applications. MEMS gy-
roscopes measure device rotation by measuring the force due to the Coriolis
effect [4]. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate the theory behind a MEMS gy-
roscope. Two masses are put into oscillation in opposition to each other
along the X axes. When a rotation is applied around the Z axis, the Coriolis
effect causes a force in opposite directions along the Y axis. By measuring
the difference of the two forces, the amount of rotation can be determined
independently of the acceleration in the Y direction.
Thus, modern devices can measure acceleration, rotational velocity and
approximate magnetic north; however, there are still significant challenges
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to obtaining precise measurements of motion. For example, the accelerom-
eter gives relative acceleration not velocity. A slight error in determining
the initial velocity of the phone when estimating displacement using the
accelerometer quickly accumulates compounding errors making the measure-
ment incorrect. Gyroscopes are notorious for exhibiting drifting error making
it difficult to obtain true stationary rotational velocity without using either
the compass or accelerometer. The compass while accurate in a clean envi-
ronment, must operate in close proximity to speakers and transmitters which
generate magnetic interference. Thus, each sensor has significant challenges
to overcome when taking measurements. It is also important to note that
device identification is made possible by measuring minute difference in sen-
sor fabrication. For example, the measured capacitance on the accelerometer
as shown in Figure 2.3 depends on the distance of the stationary electrodes
to the electrodes on the movable plate. While MEMS fabrication is fairly
precise, extremely small variation in the fin placement between devices can
yield detectable differences in the measurement of acceleration [5]. Both
MEMS gyroscopes and MEMS compasses can also exhibit minor differences
in readings due to variation introduced during fabrication. Detecting these
differences will become important when analyzing the ability of identifying
the device through this manufacturing “fingerprint.”
2.2 The Rise of Dedicated Health and Fitness Monitors
2.2.1 Fitness Monitors
Fitness monitors have recently gained commercial attention. The Fitbit Flex,
Jawbone Up and Nike Fuel Tracker are currently the most popular dedicated
fitness monitors. These devices track steps taken, raw motion, and caloric
estimates for their users. Marketed as devices suitable for entertainment
purposes only, the devices still have the capability to provide continuous
streams of spatio-temporal motion but limit access to the raw data to their
parent companies. While it is currently unclear how much data is being
collected, liberal terms of use agreements often allow the companies to collect
and analyze a user’s spatio-temporal motion without further consent. This
makes understanding the utility of this data critical to determine if stricter
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permissions should be mandated.
Recently, Fitbit has launched the Fitabase initiative to encourage the use
of Fitbit devices in clinical research. Many medical researchers are gaining
interest in the accuracy of fitness trackers since they are gaining popular
use presenting a potential platform for clinical research without requiring
custom, often expensive, equipment. Recently, Lee et al. investigated the
accuracy of popular fitness devices finding them to be promising to estimate
caloric expenditure [6]. Takacs et al. validated the step counts measured
by Fitbits during treadmill walking [7]. These studies are promising for the
commercial fitness devices but severely limited in scope. The caloric trial
was limited to a short trial within the clinic and the step count trial was
limited to treadmill walking which differs significantly to natural walking.
This dissertation will contribute an accuracy assessment of popular fitness
devices in Chapter 3. Regardless of current accuracy, the motivation for
fitness devices to be used in clinical settings will likely lead to improvements
of the prediction routines. Thus, protecting the user’s data from privacy
attacks will most likely be necessary as the device’s accuracy continue to
improve.
2.2.2 Health Monitors
Health monitors have been a popular topic of research in the custom sensor
community over the past ten years. Systems have been proposed and tested
which measure activity and gait characteristics accurately using custom hard-
ware often containing motion sensors (accelerometers and gyroscopes). Ac-
tivity recognition in particular is an extremely well researched area and iden-
tifying is perhaps the most frequent activity identified [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
These studies demonstrate the interest in the medical community to use ded-
icated medical quality monitors to improve patient care; however, they fail
to consider the privacy implications of the recorded motion data.
Clinical researchers have conducted a number of studies measuring pa-
tients using medically verified accelerometers. Steele et al. performed an
early experiment to classify physical activity using a medical accelerome-
ter strapped around the patient’s chest [15]. Moe-Nilssen et al. provided
medical validation of using professional medical accelerometers to measure
15
gait cycle characteristics [16]. In 2006, Pitta et al. added a motion sen-
sor (accelerometer) along with the more accepted medical questionnaires to
assess daily physical activity among chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD) patients [17]. In 2013, Rabinovich et al. validated the use of med-
ical accelerometers to monitor patients during their daily life at home [18].
Van Remoortel et al. tested and medically validated six popular activity
monitors which are now considered acceptable for use in medical trials [19].
Rabinovich et al. expanded the use of sensor systems by deploying activity
monitors to COPD patients to use in their homes [18]. Recently, most studies
have adopted the Actigraph GT3X as the standard medical accelerometer to
use in clinical trials. The Actigraph give researchers access to the raw ac-
celerometer data opening it to the possibility of side-channel privacy leaks
and motivating the need to understand what side-channel information can
be leaked from motion sensor data.
Systems capable of performing automated diagnosis of patients are cur-
rently being developed due to strong motivation to improve the quality of
care while lowering cost in the healthcare industry. In particular, measuring
activity and gait speed are important to consider since it has been recognized
that a decrease in mobility and motion, especially when walking, is a strong
measure of a patient’s health when they have both COPD and congestive
heart failure (CHF) [20, 21, 17, 22]. All these studies indicate that gait speed
and cadence are valuable indicators for health especially in COPD and CHF.
A slower cadence indicates poor health useful as an indicator for physicians.
As diseases with millions of patients, these two diseases have become the
topic of widespread study due to the high volume of hospital readmissions.
Since hospital readmissions add significant cost to the healthcare industry,
there is a strong desire for automated methods to continually allow diag-
nosis of patients when they are away from the hospital by monitoring the
mobility of the patient while at home. Such systems require strong privacy
analysis to protect sensitive side-channel information during continuous data
collection. While initial research has not considered the privacy implications
of continuous motion monitoring, the final commercial system will need to
be designed to alleviate privacy concerns. This requires an investigation of
potential privacy leaks in order to design secure systems and motivates the
need for the analysis in this dissertation.
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2.3 Collecting Spatial Information from Smartphones
Ubiquitous adoption of smartphones to the general public is now a reality. As
volume increases and prices decrease, sophisticated smartphones continue to
gain market share. Smartphones contain the ability to run moderately sophis-
ticated programs which can interpret various sensor readings including global
positioning systems, tri-axial accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers and
others. New sensor pipelines promise energy efficient monitoring addressing
concerns of battery life. These sensors combined with the computational
power of smartphones provide an ideal platform to deploy widespread moni-
toring systems to the general population. This opens a new opportunity for
medical and health measurement and a new potential threat to a user’s mo-
bile security. The phone’s widespread adoption combined with the ability to
adaptively preprocess data gives it an advantage over dedicated medical and
fitness devices which are currently gaining popularity; however, phones suffer
from questions regarding sensor accuracy. The trials referenced in Section
2.2 have demonstrated the ability of expensive medical grade accelerometers
to infer valuable health statistics for clinicians. Thus, a careful investigation
must be conducted into the ability of smartphones to infer health information
especially compared to dedicated medical devices.
While the analytic techniques used to design private systems in this dis-
sertation can easily be applied to both mobile phones and dedicated devices,
we consider the threat from smartphones greater since they are more widely
adopted and allow an adversary to passively collect sensor information with-
out the user’s knowledge. While privacy is important during data collection
using dedicated fitness and medical devices, it is likely the patients are aware
they are being monitored while carrying a dedicated device. However, if such
measurements are possible using a mere smartphone, it would be possible to
leak this health information by giving access to the smartphone sensors to
downloaded apps. In contrast, dedicated devices are often only worn during
monitoring allowing the user greater control over the release of their motion
data.
For phones to be a threat to a user’s privacy, they must be shown to have
high accuracy similar to dedicated devices. We will demonstrate in Chapter
3 that cell phones contain the same sensor chips as many popular dedicated
health and fitness devices. Unfortunately, fundamental design choices in a
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phone’s firmware can produce difficulties in obtaining a cleanly sampled sig-
nal. Phones return sensor readings at “best effort” which can be slowed by
other processes running on the phone, but any analysis in the frequency do-
main requires a steady sampling rate high enough to capture the motions in
human movement. Studies on human gait characteristics have established
that human walking requires between 3-5 Hz to capture 99% of the signal’s
power from gait wobble contained in the spectra below 15 Hz [23]. Studies
in motion capture have established 15 Hz as ideal to capture hand move-
ments and 7 Hz to capture facial expressions [24, 25]. This requires a sensor
capable of providing a clean reading at 30 Hz to obtain the minimum re-
quired Nyquist frequency. Fortunately, software post-processing can correct
the signal [26, 27]. We will design and develop smartphone software which
overcomes phone firmware limitations and collects human motion with sim-
ilar medical accuracy as the accepted medical accelerometers. We compare
our systems using the accelerometers analyzed by Remoortel et al. as our
baseline for standard medical accelerometers [19].
One final popular criticism to phones is that unlike dedicated devices which
are often affixed to the point of interest on the subject such as the wrist or
waist, phones are often carried anywhere on the user’s body. Thus, various
positions must be considered and corrected in order to infer motion charac-
teristics. Correcting for phone position has been demonstrated using various
machine learning techniques [28, 29, 30]. Thus, correcting for various phone
placement locations is considered a solved research problem which we choose
to not address in this dissertation.
The ability for phones to monitor at similar levels of accuracy as medical
monitors naturally leads to a problem with security and privacy. While
the low quality of access control on smartphones can (and probably will) be
quickly changed to suit best practices, the raw motion sensors are required for
many applications ranging from games to simple apps which wake the phone
upon shaking. Thus, blocking access to the motion sensors is currently an
infeasible solution. Instead, privacy mechanisms must be designed which can
intelligently quantify the possibility of side-channel information in order to
provide a finer level of access control.
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2.4 Inferring Information from Motion Sensors
The popularity of smartphones combined with the richness of the sensors has
motivated a large body of work designing and testing various measurement
systems. We will now give a broad overview of the various categories.
2.4.1 Activity Recognition
Activity recognition is focused on determining what a phone user is currently
doing. The Jigsaw system was built to conduct activity recognition and op-
timize battery efficiency while sampling from the GPS [31]. It combined
accelerometer, microphone and GPS data to attain a user’s motion profile.
The accelerometer classification used twenty-four selected input variables to
various machine learning algorithms. Each algorithm was trained on a spe-
cific device placement with the system deciding the proper training to use
with a binary decision tree. The output of the classification was whether
the user was walking, running, bicycling, in a vehicle, or stationary. The au-
thors report a 95.1% accuracy when testing on a limited trial of college-aged
students. In a similar study, Kwapisz et al. trained a neural net classifier
to recognize walking, running, jogging, going up stairs, going down stairs
and remaining stationary with 91% accuracy on college-aged subjects [32].
In addition to walking, other activities have been classified including driv-
ing [33], drunk driving [34], cleaning, eating, meeting, reading, and watching
television [8]. Thus, previous work indicates a user’s activity information is
contained in accelerometer data.
2.4.2 Gait Characteristics
Gait characteristics can often be inferred using motion data collected from
users as they walk. This includes walking direction [27], step counting [35],
and speed estimation at pre-set walking speeds [14]. Other studies use var-
ious machine learning techniques to infer gait speed with users walking on
treadmills or at set walking speeds including support vector machines [36],
Gaussian process regression [37], linear regression [38], Bayesian linear re-
gression [39], artificial neural networks [40], mechanical models [41, 42] and
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simple statistics [43, 44]. These studies confirm the intuition that gait char-
acteristics can be inferred from accelerometer data.
2.4.3 Location Recognition
Location recognition uses the motion sensors in the phone to track the specific
location of the user. Accomplice tracks a user’s location by using the phone’s
accelerometer to estimate a list of directional displacements. As a user drives
or walks down streets, the system attempts to match the displacements to
roadways on a map in order to infer a user’s travel. This is threatening
to user privacy since most users turn off the GPS to protect their location.
Since Accomplice does not require access to the GPS, the user’s location
information is still inferable [45]. On a smaller scale, multiple dead reckoning
systems designed to establish a user’s location in a constrained area, such
as a building, use accelerometer data to fine-tune their location prediction
[46, 47, 48]. Thus, continuous acceleration data can cause leaks to location
privacy.
2.4.4 Biometric Identification or Continuous Authentication
Biometric identification uses the motion of the phone to uniquely identify the
subject carrying the phone. The idea of using gait as a biometric has been
widely studied in computer vision [49, 50, 51]. More recently, accelerometers
have been proposed to identify subjects based on their unique gait patterns
[52]. Gait-ID identifies subjects with 99% accuracy in limited testing by
using a Mexican-hat wavelet transform combined with a support vector ma-
chine classifier. A number of papers have recently attempted other machine
learning algorithms to also identify users using accelerometer and gyroscopes
using various spatial temporal parameters [53, 54, 55]. Besides identifying a
specific user, it has also been shown that accelerometers can provide a unique
signature for device-specific identification which could allow the device to be
fingerprinted across apps or internet sessions [5].
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2.4.5 Fitness Metrics
Fitness metrics are quickly gaining popularity to help users track their health.
While not considered medical quality, these metrics often can give insight into
a user’s life and therefore present sensitive information which needs added
protection. Note that these characteristics while health related are not med-
ically validated metrics and therefore do not fall under HIPPA’s authority to
regulate the user’s health information. Calorie expenditure is a popular topic
for health management with systems being designed to use smartphone mo-
tion sensors to measure calories burned during walking and bicycling [56, 57].
Other systems have been designed to measure a user’s perceived level of stress
through their cell phones [58, 59]. SpiroSmart attempts to use mobile phone
sensors to measure a user’s lung function [60]. Finally, Rabbi et al. design
and demonstrate a system to measure a user’s perceived overall wellness in
an attempt to correlate this perception with mobility data [61]. While not
medically validated, all these studies demonstrate that mobile sensors con-
tain some useful information relating to the overall status of a subject. This
information must be protected especially if it can be proven to be correlated
with real medical values.
2.4.6 Health Quality Metrics
Limited research has been conducted in utilizing mobile sensor systems to
measure physical health features. Yavuz et al. designed a system to monitor
patients and predict the likelihood of falling down using smartphones [62].
Rabbi et al. study the ability of various mobile sensor’s capability to assess
mental and physical well-being in test subjects [61]. The viability of using
smartphones to analyze clinical gait was presented by Yang et al. but did
not contain extensive trials [43]. A more rigorous investigation of clinical
gait monitoring was presented by Nishiguchi et al. [44]. While both works
contribute to the idea of using smartphones to monitor gait, neither work
assesses the viability of monitoring gait during natural unconstrained walk-
ing. We establish the ability of using phones to measure medical quality gait
characteristics in Chapter 3.
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2.5 Conclusions
Mobile phone sensors show great promise in measuring a variety of infor-
mation. This dissertation will first develop a platform to measure motion
similar to medical grade sensors and validate the platform by measuring gait
speed and COPD status in Chapter 3. The dissertation will then focus on
protecting privacy related to biometric identification, device identification,
activity, fitness metrics, health metrics and demographic information.
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CHAPTER 3
CLINICAL TRIALS: COLLECTING
MEDICAL READINGS WITH MOBILE
DEVICES
In this chapter, we investigate the ability of smartphones to collect high-
quality medical data with similar quality and accuracy as validated medi-
cal devices during unconstrained walking. Previous work indicates sensitive
information including personal identification, device identification, activity
recognition, and location are all contained in the mobile phone motion sen-
sor data. Previous work has successfully used accelerometers to measure gait
in clinical settings comparing the measurements in mobile devices to tradi-
tional medical accelerometers [43, 44, 14]. While useful, these studies are
either treadmill walking studies or nurse assisted walking studies. We are in-
stead interested in unconstrained free walking or walking without a set pace
or speed. This is necessary to determine the information leaks contained in
mobile devices as subjects walk around in their ordinary lives. We therefore
validate the ability of the phone to act as a medical accelerometer and design
software to collect medical quality sensor readings. We then conduct clinical
trials to collect unconstrained free walking and demonstrate the ability of
cell phones to collect measurements relating to the health of the subjects.
3.1 Medical Quality Readings from Smartphones
3.1.1 Hardware Comparison
It might be thought that the sensor chips found in smartphones would not
be comparable to medical accelerometers; however, the accelerometer chips
in smartphones are often similar or better than the accelerometers used in
medical devices. Accelerometers measure the relative acceleration of the
device’s spatial motion. Three parameters are standardly used to evaluate the
capability of the accelerometer: range, sensitivity, and sampling frequency.
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Table 3.1: Physical Accelerometer Chips in Popular Devices
Product Sensor Chip Range (g) Sensitivity (mg) Sampling
Mobile Devices
Apple iPad2 STMicro LIS331DLH ±2,4,8 1,2,4 .5Hz-1kHz
Apple iPad3 STMicro LIS3DH ±2,4,8,16 1,2,4,12 1Hz-5kHz
Apple iPad4 STMicro LIS3DH ±2,4,8,16 1,2,4,12 1Hz-5kHz
Apple iPhone 4S STMicro LIS331DLH ±2,4,8 1,2,4 .5Hz-1kHz
Apple iPhone 5 STMicro LIS331DLH ±2,4,8 1,2,4 .5Hz-1kHz
Apple iPhone 6 Invensense MP67B ±2,4,8,16 .061,.122,.244,.488 400 kHz Max
Asus Eepad Kionix KXTF9 ±2,4,8 1,2,4 25Hz-800Hz
HTC Evo 4G InvenSense MPU-9150 ±2,4,8,16 .06,.1,.25,.5 4Hz-1kHz
LG Optimus Zone Bosch BMA 222 ±2,4,8,16 2,4,8,16 8Hz-1kHz
Motorola Droid 3 Kionix KXTF8 ±2,4,8 1,2,4 25Hz-800Hz
Motorola Droid Mini Kionix KXTF9 ±2,4,8 1,2,4 25Hz-800Hz
Motorola Razr STMicro LIS3DH ±2,4,8,16 1,2,4,12 1Hz-5kHz
Motorola Xoom Tablet Kionix KXTF8 ±2,4,8 1,2,4 25Hz-800Hz
Nokia 808 PureView STMicro LIS302DL ±2,8 18,72 100Hz or 400 Hz
RIM Playbook Bosch BMA150 ±2,4,8 4,8,16 25Hz-1.5kHz
Samsung Beam Bosch BMA220 ±2,4,8,16 .02,4,63,250 32Hz-1kHz
Samsung Nexus I515 Bosch BMA220 ±2,4,8,16 .02,4,63,250 32Hz-1kHz
Samsung Note STMicro LIS3DH ±2,4,8,16 1,2,4,12 1Hz-5kHz
Samsung Galaxy Ace STMicro LIS3DH ±2,4,8,16 1,2,4,12 1Hz-5kHz
Samsung Galaxy SIII STMicro LIS3DH ±2,4,8,16 1,2,4,12 1Hz-5kHz
Samsung Galaxy S4 STMicro LSM330 ±2,4,8,16 .061,.122,.183,.732 10MHz Max
Samsung Galaxy S5 Invensense MPU-6500 ±2,4,8,16 .061,.122,.244,.488 400 kHz Max
Toshiba Thrive Tablet Kionix KXTF8 ±2,4,8 1,2,4 25Hz-800Hz
Medical Devices
Actigraph GT3X ADXL335 ±3 2.93 .5Hz-100Hz
Dynaport Minimod Unknown Piezo-resistive ±2,6 1,4 100Hz
Philips Actical Unknown Piezo-electric ±2 20 32Hz
Zephyr BioHarness Unknown MEMS ±16 16 100Hz
Fitness Devices
Fitbit Flex STMicro LIS2DH ±2,4,8,16 1,2,4,12 1Hz-5kHz
Jawbone Up24 Bosch BMA 250 ±2,4,8,16 2,4,8,16 8Hz-1kHz
The range is the absolute minimum and maximum accelerations the chip can
record in gravity units (g) with 1 g being standard earth gravity. For example,
±2 g means the accelerometer can measure a minimum of −2 ∗ 9.81 m/s2
and a maximum of 2 ∗ 9.81 m/s2. The sensitivity is the amount of change
in acceleration required to produce one bit of change on the output of the
digital reading. Thus, lower numbers are better and a rating of 1 mg means
that the minimum discernable difference in acceleration is 0.001 gravity units.
Sensitivity is usually limited by the analog-to-digital converter embedded in
the sensor chip. Finally, the sampling rate of the accelerometer is how often
the sensor can be sampled in readings per second (Hz). A higher frequency
rating is more preferable.
Table 3.1 lists popular mobile, fitness and medical devices along with their
actual accelerometer chips (if known) and technical specifications. We iden-
tify the chips in commercial devices by combining information from tear-
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downs conducted by chipworks.com with our own forensic analysis of missing
devices [63]. The chip specifications are taken directly from the chip man-
ufacturers website. Medical devices are proprietary, often less popular and
are thus much less likely to be reverse engineered. Thus, the information is
often incomplete; however, the available technical specifications are provided
for four popular medical devices.
Table 3.1 demonstrates some interesting trends among mobile devices. The
table summarizes chips used by each of the most popular phone manufactur-
ers inside the United States including Apple, HTC, Motorola and Samsung.
All the accelerometers used in phones are based on MEMS technology. The
newest phones, including the Apple iPhone 6, the Samsung Galaxy S5 and
the HTC Evo 4g, are utilizing a new chip manufactured by InvenSense which
contains an accelerometer and a gyroscope. This chip is capable of 16 g read-
ings as well as much higher sensitivities to smaller changes in acceleration.
This new chip is being used due to breakthroughs in power requirements. The
chip implements numerous low power collection techniques, interrupt capa-
bilities to wake the device on activity change, and an on-chip proprietary
step counter. Older Apple and Samsung products contain less sophisticated
chips produced by STMicroelectronics capable of reading dynamically at 2
g, 4 g, 8 g, or 16 g with sensitivities of 1 mg, 2 mg, 4 mg, and 8 mg respec-
tively. Older devices including the Beam, and RIM Playbook contain chips
that cannot attain the 16g measurement instead being limited to 8 g. The
accelerometers found in older phones such as the Motorola Droid, Toshiba
and Asus products are manufactured by Kionix and sacrifice the higher end
16 g readings and are limited to lower sampling rates often under the 1 kHz
that most other accelerometers can sample. Not included in the chart are
samples from cheaper less popular phones; however, these phones also uti-
lize MEMS based accelerometers with similar characteristics often in similar
quality to the Kionix chipsets.
Moving on to the fitness devices, we note that the Fitbit uses a STMicro
LIS2DH which is almost identical to the STMicro LIS3DH found in the Sam-
sung Galazy Ace and the Jawbone Up24 uses a Bosch BMA 250 a slightly
newer, lower power version of the BMA 222 used in the LG Optimus Zone.
Thus, the most popular fitness devices are using the same MEMs chips in
their designs which were being used in the mobile devices designed in the
same time period.
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While commercial devices are fairly uniform with the type of accelerometer
chips, medical devices tend to be more proprietary, more closed to disclosing
the enclosed hardware, and more specialized. The bottom of Table 3.1 lists
some accelerometer specifications for devices which actually publish their
specifications. The Actigraph GT3X and Omron Healthcare (not shown)
devices both have embraced the MEMS accelerometers and market their
products as utilizing cutting edge technology. Actigraph uses a ADXL335
chip commonly used in hobbyist robotics. This chip has lower capabilities of
other more expensive chips but markets as a low power alternative. Validated
medical devices use older accelerometer technology such as piezo-resistive or
piezoelectronic accelerometers. The accelerometer used in the Philips health
product Actical is limited to ±2 g with a sampling frequency of 32 Hz. The
McRoberts Dynaport Minimod employs a very impressive piezoresistive ac-
celerometer capable of ±2 g and ±6 g with 1 mg and 6 mg sensitivities. This
device is also limited to frequency sampling at 100 Hz. These devices utilize
older technology that they claim is better than MEMS due to higher pre-
cision. However, recent studies have shown that piezo-based accelerometers
suffer from larger biasing to thermal fluctuations [64]. MEMS accelerometers
are less sensitive to thermal changes but instead suffer from low precision due
to small differences during manufacturing; however, these errors in precision
are singular to the specific chip and can be one-time calibrated away thereby
fixing the manufacturing error and creating a more precise sensor [31].
Even with numerous types of accelerometers now widely available, MEMS
accelerometers are quickly becoming the accepted standard for many med-
ical devices. They offer lower power, greater range, and better sensitivity
than previous technologies. At a fundamental level, the MEMS technology
yields accelerometer devices with similar physical operating characteristics.
Furthermore, many mobile, fitness, and medical devices are using the same
chips from third party manufacturers. Even if older validated medical devices
are not yet using MEMS, the embedded accelerometer chips have inferior
physical operating specifications. Thus, the chips found in mid-high range
smartphones of today should be adequately suited to monitor walking with
the same quality assurance of the medical and fitness devices.
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3.1.2 Medical Monitoring
Even though the underlying sensor chips in mobile devices are compara-
ble to chips in dedicated devices, the software is limited by the design of
the firmware and operating system API. These limitations do not affect the
sensitivity or range of the readings but often limit the sampling frequency.
While Android 4.4 puts increased emphasis on battery efficient continuous
monitoring, the system is not designed to implement a medical quality mon-
itor which requires fixed frequency readings. The design of the firmware
between the hardware and the software API does not expose direct access to
the sensors. Instead, a system wide sensor manager monitors, updates, and
notifies registered applications to changing sensor readings. When an appli-
cation registers a sensor handler, the system sensor event manager spawns a
dedicated system thread to continuously poll the available sensors. Android
defines a number of speeds with various levels of delays in microseconds as
well as a FASTEST setting which is only delayed by the phone’s hardware
limitations. Android leaves it up to phone developers to implement drivers
to access sensors leaving wide variation in maximum polling frequency and
sensor behavior among devices. Thus, the sensor chips themselves may be
capable of sampling at higher frequencies, but the sampling frequency may
be substantially lowered by the phone’s processing capability and driver im-
plementation.
3.1.3 Frequency Sampling Requirements
While the sensitivity and range of the accelerometer readings is unaffected
by the firmware and operating system, the sampling frequency can be sub-
stantially reduced. We therefore design software to implement a medical
health monitor which samples at a frequency sufficient to capture a patient’s
movements accurately. This requires a determination of the necessary sam-
pling frequency to measure human motion. While most medically validated
devices choose to sample at 100 Hz, medical studies tend to put the range
of human motion much lower at 3-5 Hz [16, 65]. Motion capture designed
to capture human motion typically is calibrated to capture from 15-30 Hz
[24, 25].
In order to determine the required sampling frequency, we analyze ac-
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Figure 3.1: Magnitude of Walking
Acceleration
Figure 3.2: FFT of Magnitude of
Walking Acceleration
Figure 3.3: Low-Pass Magnitude of
Walking Acceleration
Figure 3.4: High-Pass Magnitude of
Walking Acceleration
celerometer readings collected while a patient is walking. Figures 3.1 and 3.2
plot the absolute magnitude of acceleration and the corresponding Fourier
transform as measured by a Samsung Galaxy S5 at 60 Hz during walking.
The curve demonstrates a typical noisy signal with peaks indicating the toe-
off stage of the gait pattern. The spectrograph gives little interesting signal
above 15 Hz with primarily noise in the higher bands. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 il-
lustrate the results of running the accelerometer data through a fourth-order
ideal Butterworth 15 Hz high-pass and 2 Hz low-pass filter respectively. The
low-pass filter yields a discernable sinusoidal signal with peaks corresponding
to each step while the high-pass filter demonstrates primarily white noise. We
also compare the amount of noise to good signal by considering a measured
walking signal to a noise signal taken when the phone is stationary. These
two measurements allow us to calculate the signal-to-noise ratio as seen in
(3.1). We filter out the gravity present in the noise and walking signals. The
signal-to-noise ratio of both signals after being filtered with our low-pass fil-
ter is 6.31 dB demonstrating a strong amount of actual walking signal in the
lower-frequency data. The signal-to-noise ratio is calculated to be −6.96 dB
for the high-pass filter. Thus, we confirm that the substantial bulk of the
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walking signal is found in the lower bands and the higher-frequency bands
above 15 Hz primarily contribute noise to a high-quality medical monitor.
Therefore, a monitoring frequency of 60 Hz is more than sufficient to capture
walking characteristics. Sixty hertz yields a Nyquist rate of 30 Hz in the
output signal. This creates a medical device capable of measuring signals
that occur at thirty times a second, the same frequency that the average
hummingbird beats its wings while in flight. While proponents of expensive
medical devices may assert this sampling frequency being too low, there is
little medical evidence that such rapid movements are necessary to measure
a subject’s movement.
SNRdB = PSignal,dB10 − PSignalNoise,dB
= log10
PSignal
PNoise
= 20log10
ASignal
ANoise
(3.1)
3.1.4 MoveSense
We design MoveSense, a middleware designed to overcome frequency sam-
pling limitations on Android devices thereby transforming the phone into a
medical quality monitor. It accomplishes this by implementing its own sensor
reading queue. The overall design is shown in Figure 3.5. The Android sen-
sor manager continuously queries the sensors to access the raw readings and
dispatches OnSensorChanged messages to MoveSense. MoveSense spawns a
high-priority thread to process the accelerometer and gyroscope sensor read-
ings, record the timestamp and magnometer and insert this information into
a first-in first-out queue. MoveSense implements a data handler thread to
continuously poll the queue for new sensor readings. The data handler pops
sensor readings and calculates the interval to the next reading assuming a
fixed sampling frequency. If the readings are coming in at greater than the
fixed frequency, the algorithm will average all readings in the current interval.
If the readings are coming in at less than the fixed frequency, the algorithm
will extrapolate the missing values using a linear approximation algorithm.
The final output from the accelerometer pipeline is a fixed frequency sam-
pling from both the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. Thus, MoveSense
uses the processing power in the phone to get an accurate fixed frequency
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Figure 3.5: MoveSense Pipeline
stream of sensor data at the expense of processor cycles. We note that better
hardware which returns sensor readings at a fixed frequency would alleviate
the need for this design. We also note that a similar port of our MoveSense
system could easily be ported to Apple’s iOS and plan to do so in future
work.
3.1.5 Validating MoveSense Readings
We test MoveSense on three phones from different vendors of various qual-
ity including a high-end Motorola Droid Mini, a mid-range last generation
Samsung Galaxy Ace and a low-end LG Optimus Zone. We are interested in
validating the ability of a cell phone to operate at the same accuracy as the
widely accepted medical grade Actigraph GT3X.
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3.1.6 Performance Benchmark of MoveSense
MoveSense must output sensor readings at a fixed frequency to allow analysis
in the frequency domain. We accomplish this by sacrificing CPU cycles to
attain our fixed frequency readings. The Droid Mini contains a dual core
1.7 GHz processor. Both the Galaxy Ace and Optimus Zone contain similar
CPUs running at approximately 800 MHz. To determine the maximum fre-
quency attainable with MoveSense, we measure CPU utilization while sam-
pling the sensors at various frequencies while tethering the phones to a laptop
running the Linux “top” command through the Android debugger. The top
command allows us to record the CPU utilization of the MoveSense monitor.
During testing, the MoveSense system records the queue length of the sen-
sor pipeline. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 present the results of sampling at various
frequency rates with MoveSense. The maximum attainable frequency is re-
alized at the point when the CPU is fully utilized but the sensor queue does
not yet grow faster than MoveSense can calculate readings. The Ace and
Zone perform similarly with full utilization occurring at 120 Hz on the Ace
and 160 Hz on the Zone. The Droid Mini, operating at 1700 MHz, maxes
out a single CPU core (48% is a full single core utilization) at roughly 520
Hz. We notice that the ability of the phone to take readings is based on
both CPU power combined with the maximum frequency the Android sensor
queue reports the raw readings. When the locked frequency is higher than
the incoming raw readings, more processing is required. Raw readings come
into the Ace at approximately 90 Hz, the Zone at approximately 110 Hz,
and the Mini at approximately 350 Hz. We finally note that the dual core
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Table 3.2: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) between Smartphones and an
Actigraph GT3X
Phone µ2 Avg µ2 Residual Pr(>F) p-value
S5 15.132 1.014 1.114e-4 .001
Ace 15.508 1.014 9.36e-5 .001
processor in the Mini would allow the user to multitask during monitoring.
All phones can easily attain both our target for human motion of 60 Hz and
the standard accepted 100 Hz set by medical monitors.
Finally, we test MoveSense against an Actigraph GT3X on two phones
including a high-end Samsung S5 and low-end Samsung Galaxy Ace. We
are interested in validating the ability of the two smartphones to operate at
the same accuracy as the Actigraph GT3X, a medical grade device [66]. We
measure a subject walking 10 laps on a 10 meter hallway while wearing a
waist belt at the L3 position (at the base of the back) [16] containing the
Actigraph and the two test phones running MoveSense. The 10 laps yield
3329 data points. We conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA) between
each of the signals from the phone and Actigraph using the signal’s Z-scores.
The results are summarized in Table 3.2. We find that the phones pass the
F-test with probabilities of differing of 1.14e−4 and 9.36e−5 for the S5 and
Ace respectively using a confidence interval of .001. Therefore, the readings
from the phones are comparably identical to the readings of the Actigraph.
3.2 Clinical Trials
In order to prove the viability of inferring medical information from spa-
tiotemporal sensor readings collected with phones being carried by patients,
we conduct two clinical field trials. We choose to test patients with chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) since these patients are regularly
assessed by conducting an American Thoracic Society (ATS) standard six-
minute walk test (6MWT). The 6MWT is a timed test conducted on a
straight corridor ranging from 10-100 meters with the ends marked with
cones. Vital signs are taken at the start and end of the test including heart
rate, blood oxygen levels and questionnaires including the modified Borg dys-
pnea and the Borg rating of perceived exertion. The subject then walks back
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and forth on a straight walkway for six minutes being instructed to walk as
much as they can during the test. We make no changes to the standard pro-
tocol [67] except that we make subjects carry phones running the MoveSense
monitor. Subjects are given a waist pack containing the phones and in-
structed to wear it at the L3 position (at the base of the back) throughout
the entire testing procedure.
We now outline results from two clinical trials conducted while collecting
spatiotemporal data from cell phones. Our first trial collected data from
thirty patients with either asthma or COPD tested at the University of Illi-
nois Health and Hospital system in Chicago under the supervision of the
University of Illinois at Chicago Institutional Review Board protocol #2011-
0625. This trial collected data from patients as they walked a 6MWT while
being supervised by a clinician. The second trial measured twenty-eight pa-
tients who had available spirometer data at the Carle Rehabilitation Center
in Urbana Illinois under the supervision of the Carle Foundation Hospital
Institutional Review Board protocol #497221. This trial also collected data
during a standard 6MWT with an additional optional free walk around an
oval course allowing the collection of a second sample of walking while not
under testing conditions. Five healthy subjects contributed walking data to
compare fitness devices to MoveSense in our laboratory in Siebel. Finally,
thirty additional subjects have contributed data by running MoveSense on
their phones.
In each of these trials, we investigate the ability to predict health and medi-
cal values by training machine learning algorithms using eight spatiotemporal
features extracted from the raw signal chosen based on previous kinesiology
research [44]. We calculate these statistical parameters using the absolute
magnitude of the acceleration of the three directions. In the time domain,
we select the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) of acceleration. We also
select the mean crossing rate (MCR) which represents the ratio of above and
below the mean acceleration.
µ =
1
N
∗
N∑
t=0
at (3.2)
σ =
√√√√ 1
N
∗
N∑
t=0
(at − µ)2 (3.3)
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MCR =
1
N
∗
N∑
t=1
It{It = 1|(at−1 − a)(at − a) < 0} (3.4)
The root mean square (RMS) provides a statistical measure on the varia-
tion of signal magnitude.
RMS =
√√√√ 1
N
∗
N∑
t=0
a2t (3.5)
The Autocorrelation coefficient (AC) measures periodical similarity in the
time domain.
AC = max {∀t∈N,i<t (
N∑
t=0
atat−i) (3.6)
The coefficient of variance (CV) is a normalized measure for dispersion of
the discrete samples.
CV =
σa
µa
(3.7)
In the frequency domain, we compute the peak frequency (PF) which repre-
sents the frequency of the peak magnitude in the spectrum.
PF = arg maxf {xf |f = 0, ..., N} (3.8)
Finally, we calculate the Shannon entropy (H) which quantifies the informa-
tion contained in the acceleration spectrum.
H = −
N∑
f=0
xf ∗ log xf (3.9)
We call these eight parameters our feature extraction approach (FEA) and
use these features in each of our trained machine learning models in the rest
of this chapter.
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3.2.1 Speed and Distance during Natural Walking
We investigate the possibility of using the phone sensors to predict both walk-
ing speed and walking distance. The ability to accurately measure walking
distance would allow a standard 6MWT to be conducted outside a clinic.
While previous work in health has primarily concentrated on constrained
walking with patients either walking on a treadmill or walking with a pace
setter (such as walking next to a nurse), we measure free walking during
a 6MWT. We now summarize the results from the trials conducted at the
University of Chicago as outlined in our previous publications [68, 69].
We first attempt to predict gait speed through supervised learning trained
with a support vector machine (SVM) model using a linear kernel to map
features. The model is trained using the FEA as input vectors and the av-
erage lap speed as the target using data from twelve subjects. We train
our first model with six COPD patients from the hospital in Chicago and
six healthy subjects recruited at the Institute of Genomic Biology at the
University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign. The model produces an error
rate of 6.11% with personalized training using leave-one-lap-out training and
9.98% for cross validation with leave-one-subject-out training. The distance
errors are given in Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. Not surprisingly, the person-
alized model performs with high accuracy with the leave-one-out and cross
validation producing higher rates of error.
While initially promising, conducting an automated walk test requires dis-
tance not speed. Once patient testing was complete, we developed a strategy
for walk distance estimation more closely mirroring popular fitness devices.
First, we count the number of steps taken using our novel step detection al-
gorithm [68] then we multiply by an estimation of the patient’s stride length.
We once again develop an SVM model to predict stride length. The model
is trained on the thirty subjects tested in Chicago using the FEA as input
vectors with the target being the estimated stride length found by dividing
the lap length by the number of steps observed over the course of the lap.
The distance model attains a 5.87% error rate without training and a 4.82%
error rate with training when trained and validated on the results from the
6MWT. The Bland-Altman plot in Figure 3.11 demonstrates the error rates
of each test and indicates little bias in the method.
We expand our analysis with the data from the Carle subjects by adding
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Figure 3.8: Gaitspeed Accuracy
Using the Personalized Model with
UIHH Patients
Figure 3.9: Gaitspeed Accuracy
Using Leave-One-Out Validation with
UIHH Patients
Figure 3.10: Gaitspeed Accuracy
Using Cross Validation with UIHH
Patients
Figure 3.11: Bland-Altman Plot of
Distance Estimation with UIHH
Patients
a free walk around a 120 meter oval course in addition to the measurements
of walking speed and distance during a 6MWT [26, 70]. The accuracy of
multiplying the estimated stride length by the number of strides used in
the Chicago experiment is limited since it is not possible to attain the in-
stantaneous stride length per step without some form of motion capture or
gait mat. Instead, we return to using a trained machine learning model for
speed. We then assess two methods to predict distance based on the pre-
dicted speed. We exploit the constraints of the 6MWT by using the compass
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Table 3.3: Error Rates for Speed Prediction (*CV Cross Validation) for
Both FEA and CEA Input Features with Carle Patients
FEA CEA
GPR SVM ANN GPR SVM ANN
Error 5.61% 3.23% 159.3% 9.20% 8.68% 75.73%
RMS 7.15% 4.55% 166.1% 12.45% 12.35% 93.41%
Error CV* 6.67% 3.68% 17.03% 11.33% 11.53% 21.71%
RMS CV* 8.93% 5.11% 21.80% 15.47% 16.06% 28.34%
to determine the beginning and ending times of the individual laps. We can
then use our trained speed model to predict the speed during the lap and
multiply the speed by the total lap time. We call this the laps method. In
the second method, we split the walking into uniform ten second windows,
use our trained speed model to predict the speed for each window and mul-
tiply by ten seconds to obtain the distance. We call this the free distance
method. Since the free estimate does not require laps, it has the advantage of
being usable outside of a 6MWT and can therefore be used for unconstrained
walking.
In order to compare our speed models to previous work, we compare three
commonly used machine learning algorithms to predict walking speed includ-
ing support vector machines (SVM), Gaussian process regression (GPR) and
artificial neural networks (ANN). We train each speed model using a feature
extraction approach (FEA) which uses nine spatiotemporal parameters (our
initial eight in the original FEA plus step counts using our step counting
algorithm) and a component extraction approach (CEA) which uses the top
fifty eigenvalues after conducting a principal component analysis of the mag-
nitude of the Fourier transform, a technique commonly seen in the literature.
The results given in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.12 demonstrate that the SVN
trained using the FEA with an error rate of 3.23% was clearly superior to
the SVN trained using the CEA with an error rate of 8.68%. The SVN and
GPR produced less error than the ANN models. We therefore continue using
the SVN with the FEA in the rest of the experiments in this chapter.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the accuracy and error of each method during
the 6MWT. Overall, the laps method improves accuracy lowering error rates
to 2.33% with healthy subjects and 2.58% for COPD patients with person-
alized training and 3.10% for healthy subjects and 3.47% for COPD patients
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Figure 3.15: Free-Walk Distance
Bland-Altman Plot from Carle Trial
without personalized training. The free method produces higher errors with
a 10.97% error rate for healthy and an 11.35% error rate for pulmonary
patients with personalized training and 11.28% for healthy and 11.92% for
pulmonary without personalized training. Figure 3.15 presents the Bland-
Altman plot for the distance prediction during the free walk around the oval.
The method is biased to predict low by roughly 7.2 meters. The method
results in a 10.2% error rate with a 7.6% standard deviation. Analysis indi-
cates that a majority of the error is occurring due to the decrease in speed
as the patients are coming into the turn during the 6MWT. Since the pa-
tients do not slow down while walking around the oval, the method predicts
lower than the actual distance. This motivates the need for instantaneous
gait speed to train the models. We leave this as an important topic to future
work, but do note that medically valid gait speed and distance does indeed
seem possible using machine learning methods.
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Table 3.4: SVM Gold Classifier
Unified Prediction (22 Patients)
Actual Status GOLD1 GOLD2 More Sever
GOLD1 78.54% 19.51% 1.95%
GOLD2 19.96% 65.18% 17.85%
More Severe 2.96% 23.47% 73.57%
Cohort Prediction (12 Patients)
Actual Status GOLD1 GOLD2 More Sever
GOLD1 99.24% 0% 0.76%
GOLD2 0% 87.63% 12.37%
More Severe 1.23% 11.6% 87.16%
3.2.2 COPD Status
During our analysis of walk speed and distance with the patients tested in
Chicago, we noted that walk distance seemed indicative of COPD status as
seen in Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. We therefore train an SVM binary classifier
using the FEA as inputs with the target being COPD or non-COPD status.
This model attains 100% classification accuracy with an initial sample of
twelve patients providing an early indication that it is possible to extract
COPD status from motion sensors.
After testing was completed on the thirty patients at the University of
Illinois Health and Hospital system in Chicago, we revisited health status
prediction [69]. We develop an SVM trained model to predict GOLD status
classification for COPD patients. GOLD status classifies patients based on
FEV1% values. FEV1% is a measurement of the forced expiratory volume
over the first second of exhalation divided by the standard expected for the
subject’s demographic cohort. The GOLD classification is based solely on
FEV1% values with GOLD 1 being greater than 80%, GOLD 2 being 50-
79%, GOLD 3 being 30-49% and Gold 4 being <= 29%. The results in Table
3.4 yield an overall 71.57% classification accuracy for a single model across
all demographic cohorts and 89.22% accuracy when trained on a specific
cohort. Interestingly, these results do not simply mirror the walk distance
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Figure 3.16: GOLD Prediction Accuracy over Time
in the groups since the average walk distance in the more severe group is
232.8 meters which is greater than the average walk distance in the Gold 2
group of 208.7 meters. Thus, severity prediction by gait parameters produced
better health classification than traditional 6MWT distances. Figure 3.16
demonstrates the amount of monitoring time required to make the GOLD
prediction with close to 85% accuracy after 20 seconds and 90% accuracy after
30 seconds. These tests demonstrate that we can not only train classifiers to
identify the presence of COPD, but we can also train a classifier capable of
determining a three way severity classification of COPD patients. Clearly,
the viability of such a prediction elevates the need to protect motion data
while a COPD patient is walking in order to protect leaking the status of the
patient’s condition.
3.2.3 Blood Oxygen Saturation
Finally, we investigate the ability to predict blood oxygen saturation contin-
uously as the users conduct a 6MWT and free walk during our experiments
at the Carle Pulmonary Rehabilitation Center [71, 72]. We find that we can
predict with an error rate of roughly 1% during the 6MWT and 2% during
free walking using an SVM trained using FEA on fifteen patients. The SVM
using FEA was once again proven superior to Gaussian process regression and
the CEA. We also find no significant difference between using the magnitude
of acceleration versus the three directional components. Using cohorts, we
can reduce the error by roughly one half. Thus, preliminary results indicate
that walking signal contains information correlated to blood oxygen satura-
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Counting Accuracy
Table 3.5: Step Counting Accuracy of
MoveSense vs. Commercial Devices
Device Error Rate
Phone App 0.94%
Omron HJ-720ITC 5.20%
Actigraph GT3X 11.08%
tion, a widely used medically valid metric for patient status and clearly a
medically sensitive metric.
3.2.4 Comparison to Dedicated Devices
We investigate the ability of smartphones against a number of dedicated
medical accelerometers to measure both step counts and distance walked. For
the step counts, we use our novel step counting algorithm as introduced in
our previous work [68]. Figure 3.17 is the boxplot for the measured number of
steps compared to the actual number of steps taken for fifteen patients tested
at the Carle Rehabilitation center and ten healthy subjects all conducting a
6MWT. Overall, we attain 98.7 % accuracy with the COPD patients and 97.3
% accuracy with the healthy controls. Additionally, we conduct a test with
four subjects wearing a phone running MoveSense, an Omron pedometer
and an Actigraph GT3X. Each subject conducts a 500 step walking test.
Table 3.5 presents the results with the phone app attaining 99.04% accuracy
beating both the Omron and the Actigraph. Thus, phones are capable of
recording accurate step counts with greater accuracy than dedicated devices
on healthy subjects.
We now compare the distance estimation from MoveSense against com-
mon fitness and health devices. To directly compare, we conduct testing on
five healthy subjects with one female and four males from the ages of 21
to 60 years old. Due to the cumbersome nature of carrying six devices, the
IRB would not allow us to test on pulmonary patients. The subjects carry
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Figure 3.19: Distance Prediction
Error MoveSense against Commercial
Devices
a Fitbit Flex and Jawbone Up24 on their wrist, an Omron HJ-720ITC pe-
dometer on their belt and an iPhone 5s running Moves (a commercial app
from ProtoGeo now a FaceBook subsidiary), a Motorola Droid Mini running
MoveSense and an LG Optimus Zone running MoveSense in a pack at the L3
position. Subjects walked between two to five laps consisting of 65 meters of
busy hallways to simulate real world conditions. Subjects then stopped and
conducted office tasks for three minutes at a desk and spent two minutes sim-
ulating eating a meal at a table. Finally, the subjects walked through the 65
meters of hallways two more times and ascended and descended a set of stairs.
Each fitness device was calibrated with the subjects personal stride length
and demographic information. We recorded the distance reported from each
device and the distance from our previously trained universal free distance
model for both phones running MoveSense. These were then compared to
the known measured distances.
The results from the experiment are shown in Figures 3.18 and 3.19. Using
the FEA SVM model trained on a mixture of COPD patients and healthy
controls, we attain an error rate of 8.3% from the readings on the Droid Mini
and 7.6% from the readings on the LG Optimus Zone. This is substantially
better than the roughly 50% error using Moves, the Up24, and Omron pe-
dometers and much better than the 400% error produced by the Fitbit Flex.
Thus, our models improve the state of the art at predicting walk speed and
distance using only motion sensors during unconstrained walking with higher
accuracy than the tested dedicated fitness devices.
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3.3 Conclusions
Through careful analysis of the hardware, design of software, and direct
testing, we find that sensors contained within smartphones can attain raw
readings statistically identical to popular medical grade devices. Machine
learning techniques presented in previous work are directly applicable to pa-
tients when re-trained using data from the correct target population. Walk
speed and distance can be inferred from the motion sensors in smartphones
with patients during unconstrained walking. Phones using a trained support
vector machine model using eight input statistical features chosen from the
kinesiology literature is the most accurate model tested in our experiments for
walk speed and walk distance. Our distance model lowers error rates com-
pared to consumer grade fitness devices by nearly an order of magnitude.
Additionally, we can infer health status including a binary classification be-
tween COPD and healthy subjects, a three way classification of severity in
COPD patients, and a continuous prediction of blood oxygen saturation ac-
curate with a mere 2% error. Thus, health status in patients with chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease is classifiable using only the motion sensors
in mobile devices. Of course, all these inferences need validation with larger
training and testing populations. This future work is currently in progress;
however, the initial proof that the models work clearly motivates the need
to investigate privacy protection to mitigate the threat of leaking sensitive
medical information.
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CHAPTER 4
A DATA SET TO STUDY MOTION
PRIVACY
Previous work indicates it is possible to infer various activity, fitness, health
and demographic properties by using machine learning models with data
from motion sensors. We now leverage all the phone data we have collected
over a four year period of clinical trials to investigate the privacy implica-
tions of sharing motion data. Our data set includes roughly forty-two hours
of readings from ten different phones testing eighty-eight subjects. It con-
tains thirty subjects tested at the University of Illinois Health and Hospital
System in Chicago and twenty-eight subjects tested at the Pulmonary Re-
habilitation Center in Urbana. The remaining thirty subjects are healthy
controls recruited from our lab at the Institute of Genomic Biology and sup-
port staff at Carle Hospital. Many data sessions were conducted with three
phones collecting simultaneously allowing us to compare the phone classifica-
tion independently of the subject and particular test. We now outline what
prediction targets we will investigate and how we will extract features for the
machine learning in the subsequent chapters.
4.1 Prediction Targets
Determining the vulnerabilities created by a user sharing motion data re-
quires a careful analysis of what can be inferred from the data. We compile a
list of all known information we have about the subjects in our master data
set. This includes some new demographic predictions such as height, weight
and age as well as revisiting previously confirmed classifiers such as phone
and personal identification. While we expect to be able to confirm previous
work with these classifiers, it is necessary to conduct our own analysis in
order to determine the relative privacy leaks for each sensor and feature used
in the analysis.
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Table 4.1: Available Data per Prediction Target
Target Subjects Phones Sessions Segments Time
B
io
m
et
ri
cs
PhoneID All 88 10 242 1120 42:49:15
PhoneID Walking 88 10 242 455 23:50:36
PhoneID Idle 86 10 240 665 18:58:39
UserID All 88 10 242 1120 42:49:15
UserID Walking 88 10 242 455 23:50:36
UserID Idle 86 10 240 665 18:58:39
F
it
n
es
s
Speed Walking 79 9 178 265 18:27:24
Speed Waking (Laps) 79 9 178 5956 18:18:10
Steps Walking 8 6 24 24 2:23:00
Steps Walking (Laps) 8 6 24 804 2:23:00
Activity 88 10 242 1120 42:49:15
Activity (Laps) 88 10 242 6883 42:50:37
D
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s
Gender All 88 10 242 1120 42:49:15
Gender Walking 88 10 242 455 23:50:36
Gender Idle 86 10 240 665 18:58:39
Age All 86 10 239 1089 42:24:24
Age Walking 86 10 239 441 23:33:55
Age Idle 84 10 237 648 18:50:29
Height All 78 10 216 992 36:52:44
Height Walking 78 10 216 404 22:25:03
Height Idle 76 10 214 588 14:27:41
Weight All 78 10 216 992 36:52:44
Weight Walking 78 10 216 404 22:25:03
Weight Idle 76 10 214 588 14:27:41
M
ed
ic
al
M
ea
su
re
s
FEV1 All 64 9 123 590 20:33:25
FEV1 Walking 64 9 123 250 13:23:57
FEV1 Idle 62 9 121 340 7:09:28
FEV1/FVC All 26 7 80 401 13:02:45
FEV1/FVC Walking 26 7 80 167 9:35:04
FEV1/FVC Idle 26 7 80 234 3:27:41
GOLD All 85 10 237 1087 42:24:04
GOLD Walking 85 10 237 441 23:33:56
GOLD Idle 83 10 235 646 18:50:08
Our data set contains twelve labeled targets summarized in Table 4.1. We
manually labeled the data in order to provide ground truth for each prediction
target. We split certain labels between walking and non/walking segments
allowing us to measure the accuracy of classifiers both when the subjects are
stationary and moving. Additionally, speed and steps contain the notion of
laps in order to use the speed and step algorithms presented in Chapter 3.
Due to the varied nature of the data set, each target characteristic may have
45
various amounts of available data. The number of subjects, testing sessions,
testing segments and total recorded time for each target characteristic is
also recorded in Table 4.1. We consider both phone identification and user
identification as our biometrics. We have walking, non-walking, speed and
steps for our fitness metrics. We consider various demographics including
gender, age, height, and weight. These targets will be used to assess the
ability of classifiers to use motion data to divide subjects into demographic
cohorts. Finally, we look at the percentage of vital capacity expired in the
first second of forced exhalation (FEV1/FVC), normalized FEV1/FVC to
the standard value for the subject’s demographics (FEV1%), and standard
COPD status classification (GOLD) as targets for our medical evaluation.
4.2 Sensor Streams
We extract every sensor stream available from current generation mobile
phones giving thirty-one streams of sensor input as presented in Table 4.2.
Values 1-19 are obtained directly from the phone’s sensors by MoveSense.
MoveSense queries each value from the Android API. The Accelerometer,
Magnetometer, Gyroscope and Gravity X, Y, and Z values come directly
from the built-in sensor chip. The gravity reading is the DC component of
the acceleration from a low-pass filter. The rotation vector is calculated by
the Android API using the gravity and magnetometer sensors to estimate the
orientation of the phone in 3d space using (4.2). The rotations are calculated
using a world coordinate system with the positive X direction pointing east
and the rotation about X in the clockwise direction given by θ. The Y
direction points north with rotation around Z in the clockwise direction given
by ψ. The Z direction points up perpendicular to the ground with positive
rotations in the clockwise direction given by φ. Note that this is different
from the traditional right-hand coordinate system used in aviation. These
sensors are standard sensors as implemented by the Android API and are
collected at maximum speed and sampled at a fixed 60 Hz frequency by our
MoveSense system as outlined in Chapter 3. We also add to this list the
continuous streams of heart rate and blood oxygen level that was collected
through a wireless pulse oximeter during the clinical testing.
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Table 4.2: Sensor Streams
1 AccX Acceleration in X Direction (Phone Coordinates)
2 AccY Acceleration in Y Direction (Phone Coordinates)
3 AccZ Acceleration in Z Direction (Phone Coordinates)
4 AccMag Magnitude of Acceleration (4.1)
5 MagX Magnetic Field Strength in X Direction (Phone Coordinates)
6 MagY Magnetic Field Strength in Y Direction (Phone Coordinates)
7 MagZ Magnetic Field Strength in Z Direction (Phone Coordinates)
8 MagMag Magnitude of Magnetometer (4.1)
9 GyroX Rotational Velocity around X (Phone Coordinates)
10 GyroY Rotational Velocity around Y (Phone Coordinates)
11 GyroZ Rotational Velocity around Z (Phone Coordinates)
12 MagGyro Magnitude of Rotational Velocity (4.1)
13 GravX Magnitude of Gravity in X Direction (Phone Coordinates)
14 GravY Magnitude of Gravity in Y Direction (Phone Coordinates)
15 GravZ Magnitude of Gravity in Z Direction (Phone Coordinates)
16 MagGrav Magnitude of the Gravity Vector (4.1)
17 RotX Rotation Azimuth (World Coordinates φ (4.2))
18 RotY Rotation Pitch (World Coordinates θ (4.2))
19 RotZ Rotation Roll (World Coordinates ψ (4.2))
20 HR Heart Rate Measured via BlueTooth PulseOx
21 POx Blood Oxygen Saturation Measured via BlueTooth PulseOx
22 AccV Acceleration in Vertical Z Direction (World Coordinates)
23 AccE Acceleration in the East X Direction (World Coordinates)
24 AccN Acceleration in the North Y Direction (World Coordinates)
25 AccF Acceleration in the Forward Walking Direction
26 AccSw Acceleration Perpendicular to Forward Walking Direction
27 AccPCA1 Acceleration in Direction of Maximum Variance
28 AccPCA2 Acceleration Perpendicular to Maximum Variance
29 DirF Rotation from North of Walking Direction in Degrees
30 DirP Rotation from North of Maximum Variance in Degrees
31 DirOff Absolute Difference between DirF and DirP
4.2.1 Calculated Sensor Streams
Sensor streams 22-31 are calculated from the other sensor readings collected
from MoveSense. For each of the raw sensor streams, we calculate the Eu-
clidian distance for the accelerometer, magnetometer gyroscope, and gravity
readings (4.1). We also conduct three projections of the accelerometer read-
ings. We project the accelerometer values to a standard world coordinate
system. We also project the accelerometer values with the X axis in the
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forward walking direction. Finally, we apply a transformation with the X
axis aligned with the vector of maximum variance during walking. We also
calculate the forward walking direction and maximum variation in degrees
from magnetic north.
We project the accelerometer readings from the local phone coordinate
system to the world coordinate system. This transformation uses the values
of the magnetometer M which give the vector north and the gravity reading
G which gives the vector up opposite of gravity (4.2). The gravity vector is
assumed to be more accurate at pointing up than the magnetometer is at
pointing north. Thus, the cross product of the gravity vector and magne-
tometer are first taken to estimate the heading east H. The eastward vector
and gravity are normalized. The direction north is then taken as the cross
product of the gravity and the eastward vector to get the north vectors.
The local to world coordinate systems can then be transformed by simply
multiplying the given direction by the rotational matrix. The order of ro-
tation for the yaw, pitch and roll are to first rotate about the Z (gravity)
axis, then about the X (eastward) axis and finally about the Y (northward)
axis. The final definition of the rotation vector in terms of the roll pitch and
yaw and the equations to obtain them directly from the rotation vector are
given in (4.2). The values of AccV, AccE, and AccN are then the output
from multiplying the AccX, AccY and AccZ by the rotation matrix giving
the acceleration in the vertical, east and north directions respectively.
|V | =
√
VX
2 + VY
2 + VZ
2 (4.1)
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Rot =
R0 R1 R2R3 R4 R5
R6 R7 R8
 =

HX
|H|
HY
|H|
HZ
|H|
MX
|M |
MY
|M |
MZ
|M |
GX
|G|
GY
|G|
GZ
|G|
 =
 cosφ sinφ 0−sinφ cosφ 0
0 0 1
 =
1 0 00 cosθ sinθ
0 −sinθ cosθ
 =
 cosψ 0 sinψ0 1 0
−sinψ 0 cosψ

 cosφcosψ − sinφsinψsinθ sinφcosθ cosφsinψ + sinφcosψsinθ]−(sinφcosψ + cosφsinψsinθ) cosφcosθ −sinφsinψ + cosφcosψsinθ)
−sinψcosθ −sinθ cosψcosθ

φ = tan−1
(
R1
R4
)
θ = sin−1(−R7)
ψ = tan−1
(
−R6
R8
)
(4.2)
A majority of the data in our data set is collected while the subject is
walking. Measuring the amount of acceleration relative to the walking direc-
tion of the subject may allow the phone to more closely track and classify
the characteristics of the gait pattern. The method we base our algorithm
to estimate walking direction was first proposed by Roy et al. [27]. The
forward walking direction is observed to be the average of the horizontal di-
rection during the swing phase over an entire gait cycle. The swing phase
is determined using the heel strike, which is easily identified as a spike in
the acceleration magnitude, as an anchor point. Once identified, the direc-
tion measured over successive heal strikes can be averaged giving a forward
walking direction.
To identify the walking direction, we filter the vertical component of accel-
eration through an ideal second-order Butterworth low-pass filter with cutoff
frequency set at 2 Hz. This yields a roughly sinusoidal signal with the neg-
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Figure 4.1: Walk Direction Test
ative magnitude roughly corresponding to the swing phase of the gait. We
therefore calculate the average direction of the acceleration in the horizontal
plane (AccN and AccE) while the vertical acceleration is negative to get the
average forward direction per step. We average this direction over four cy-
cles to obtain the direction per step. Figure 4.1 plots the results from a test
conducted with the walk direction detection. The graph plots the relative
absolute magnitude of the directional components in the AccE (X) and AccN
(Y) directions during walking. In this experiment, the subject walked a two
mile course with segments pointing due south, north-east, west, and finally
north. We see that while the signal is noisy, we can clearly identify the direc-
tion with the south portion of walking from 0 to 850 seconds, the north-east
from 850 to 1200 seconds, the west from 1200 to 1450 seconds and the north
walking from 1450 seconds to the end of the experiment. The noise in the sig-
nal is trivially removed via another low-pass Butterworth filter. Finally, we
implement a rotational matrix RW to represent the transform from horizontal
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north and east acceleration to forward walking direction (4.3). Multiplying
the north and east directional components gives the relative acceleration in
the forward walking direction accF and the acceleration in the perpendicular
direction parallel to the sway during the subject’s walking accS.
RotW =
[
FX
|F |
FY
|F |
FY
|F | −FX|F |
]
(4.3)
We transform the acceleration in the horizontal plain to the direction of
maximum variance and the orthogonal component by conducting a principal
component analysis (PCA). The direction of maximum variance is interesting
because it is related to the stability of the subject throughout the gait cycle.
In particular, a healthy stable individual has a tendency to have maximum
variation parallel to the forward walking direction. Conversely, an unstable
subject has more variance off the primary walking direction. Thus, investigat-
ing the relative direction of maximum variance during walking may provide
insight into the gait cycle. We therefore assemble a rotation matrix RPCA
from the output of the PCA. Multiplying the acceleration in the horizontal
direction yields accP1 and accP2.
Finally, we add the direction of the horizontal transforms in the horizontal
plane. We calculate the directions using standard coordinates with 0◦ being
north and the rotation going clockwise i.e. 90◦ is east. We calculate the
direction of the forward walking direction dirF and the direction of the PCA
dirP using θ = arctan(R0,1
R0,0
) (taking the quadrant into consideration to get
an angle between 0◦ and 360◦). Finally, we calculate the difference between
the forward walking direction and the PCA direction called dirOff.
4.3 Feature Extraction
We now have thirty-one sensor streams which can be used to predict the
target characteristics of interest. To use machine learning models, we must
extract useful features from each of these streams. While there have been
a variety of proposed features in previous work, we attempt to extract the
most comprehensive list of features in order to investigate potential privacy
leaks. We note that some of these features may seem redundant and/or ill-
suited for this data. However, these features should demonstrate low utility
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during the feature selection analysis conducted in Chapter 5. We process the
data by first assembling sessions of readings with a specific target. We then
iterate over every session, group the data into 512 reading sliding windows
(8.5 s) with a 256 reading overlap (4.25 s). For each window, we extract
74 features in the time and frequency domain using a combination of the
LibXtract toolbox [73] and custom code written in python to fill in gaps
missing from the library and sometimes correcting for minute errors in the
libraries. The final output is a list of windows with the target and 31 sensors
multiplied by 74 features giving 2,294 sensor features for further analysis.
The first fifteen features are calculated directly from the time domain over
a window X containing N samples from (x0, x1...xN) as shown in Table 4.3.
This includes standard statistics of the window estimating the average and
spread of values including the mean (4.4), the variance (4.5), the standard
deviation (4.6), and the average deviation (4.7). The skewness is a measure
of the asymmetry of the window’s data with positive values indicating a ma-
jority of the signal is to the left of the window and a negative skew indicating
a majority of the signal is to the right of the window (4.8). The kurtosis is a
measure of the peakedness or sharpness of the peak of the window (4.9). A
kurtosis of zero indicates the distribution is close to normal while a negative
kurtosis is flatter than normal and a positive value demonstrates a distribu-
tion with a peak greater than a normal distribution. We also extract the
signal minimum (4.10), signal maximum (4.11), and sum of all values over
the window (4.12). The number of non-zero entries are also calculated (4.13).
The root-mean-square gives another approximation of the average strength
of the signal (4.14). The fundamental frequency (f0) is estimated using the
Average Magnitude Difference Function (AMDF) (4.48). If the signal con-
tains periodicity, the shift at the fundamental frequency should be close to
zero difference plus some error term caused by noise. In this method, we
first extract an estimate of the baseline noise as AMDF1. We then find the
minimum shift τ which produces the AMDFτ < AMDF1. This value of τ
is approximately the period. We estimate the contribution of the error by
dividing the AMDFτ by AMDF1. The fundamental frequency is therefore
the sampling frequency FS divided by the period (4.15). We also calculate
the signal’s mean crossing rate which is the average number of times the
signal crosses the mean across the window (4.16). We calculate the standard
Shannon entropy giving an estimate of the uncertainty in the signal (4.17).
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Table 4.3: Standard Features Extracted from X Containing (x1,x2...xN)
1 Signal Mean (x¯) x¯ =
1
N
N∑
n=1
xn (4.4)
2 Signal Variance V ar(X) =
1
N − 1
N∑
n=1
(xn − x¯)2 (4.5)
3
Signal Standard
Deviation (σx) σx =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
n=1
(xn − x¯)2 (4.6)
4
Signal Average
Deviation AvDev(X) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
|xn − x¯| (4.7)
5 Signal Skewness Skew(X) =
1
N
∑N
n=1(xn − x¯)3
( 1
N−1
∑N
n=1(xn − x¯)2)3/2
(4.8)
6 Signal Kurtosis K(X) =
(
1
N
∑N
n=1(xn − x¯)4
( 1
N−1
∑N
n=1(xn − x¯)2)2
)
− 3 (4.9)
7 Signal Minimum min(X) := argmin∀n∈N(xn) (4.10)
8
Signal
Maximum
max(X) := argmax∀n∈N(xn) (4.11)
9 Signal Sum Sum(X) =
N∑
n=1
xn (4.12)
10
Signal NonZero
Count nzc(X) =
N∑
n=1
I{xn 6= 0} (4.13)
11
Signal RMS
Amplitude RMS(X) =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
n=1
x2n (4.14)
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Table 4.3: Standard Features Extracted from X Containing (x1,x2...xN)
(Cont.)
12
Fundamental
Frequency
τ = min(τ |AMDFτ < AMDF1)
P = τ +
AMDFτ
AMDF1
f0 =
FS
P
(4.15)
13
Signal Mean
Crossing Rate
zcr(X) =
1
N
N−1∑
n=1
I{(xn − µ) ∗ (xn+1 − µ) < 0}
(4.16)
14
Shannon
Entropy H(X) = −
N∑
n=1
P (xn)log2P (xn) (4.17)
15
Coefficient of
Variation
cv(X) =
σx
x¯
(4.18)
Finally, we calculate the coefficient of variation (4.18).
Sk =
N−1∑
n=0
xne
−i2pik n
N ∀k = 0, ..., N − 1 (4.29)
Features 16-42 are extracted from the Fourier transform of the time do-
main signal conducted over the window. We apply a fast Fourier transform
to give the Spectrum Sk (4.29). We then define A = (a1, a1, ...aN) to be
the real component of the transform or the amplitude of the spectrum and
F = (f1, f2, ..., fN) to be the imaginary or frequency of the spectrum. We
extract the similar corresponding basic features listed in Table 4.4 in the fre-
quency domain as the time domain but weight the amplitude by the relative
frequency. These features include the spectral mean (4.19), the spectral vari-
ance (4.20) and the spectral standard deviation (4.21). The spectral skewness
demonstrates the relative proportion of the distribution in the spectrum with
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Table 4.4: Standard Spectrum Features
16
Spectral Mean
(s¯) s¯ =
1∑N
n=1 an
N∑
n=1
fnan (4.19)
17
Spectral
Variance V ars =
1∑N
n=1 an
N∑
n=1
(fn − s¯)2an (4.20)
18
Spectral
Standard
Deviation (σs)
σs =
√√√√ 1∑N
n=1 an
N∑
n=1
(fn − s¯)2an (4.21)
19
Spectral
Skewness
SSkew =
∑N
n=1(fn − s¯)3an(
1∑N
n=1 an
∑N
n=1(fn − s¯)2an
)3/2 (4.22)
20
Spectral
Kurtosis SK =
 ∑Nn=1(fn − s¯)4an
( 1∑N
n=1 an
∑N
n=1(fn − s¯)2an)2
−3 (4.23)
21
Spectral
Minimum
Amplitude
mina = arg min∀n∈N(an) (4.24)
22
Spectral
Maximum
Amplitude
maxa = arg max∀n∈N(an) (4.25)
23
Spectral
Amplitude Sum Suma =
N∑
n=1
an (4.26)
24
Spectrum
Amplitude
NonZero Count
nzca =
N∑
n=1
I{an 6= 0} (4.27)
25
Spectrum RMS
Amplitude RMSa =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
n=1
a2n (4.28)
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a negative value indicating a majority of the distribution to the right of the
middle, a positive value indicating a majority of the spectrum is to the left of
the middle and a value of zero showing an approximately normal distribution
(4.22). The spectral Kurtosis once again measures the relative strength of
the peak of the spectrum compared to a normal distribution (4.23). We also
extract the minimum and maximum amplitudes of the signal (4.24), (4.25)
and the sum of the amplitudes in the window (4.26). The RMS of the signal
measure the approximate strength of the amplitude (4.28).
Table 4.5 lists the additional features we extract from the frequency spec-
trum. We extract two estimates of the irregularity in the spectra (4.30) and
(4.31). The irregularity estimates the amount of noise between peeks in the
spectra of the amount of jitter (deviation from periodicity). The Centroid
is equal to the spectral mean (4.32). The smoothness is another measure of
the amount of noise between peaks with the individual amplitudes being log
scaled (4.33). The spectral spread measures the amount of variance around
the spectrum’s centroid (4.34). The roll-off frequency is the frequency at
which a certain percentage of the spectral power is contained. For our anal-
ysis, we choose the roll-off frequency to contain 95% of the signal’s power.
Thus, 95% of the signal’s power is contained below the roll-off frequency
leaving 5% of the power above the roll-off frequency (4.35). The flatness
measures the distribution of the energy over the spectrum. Low values of
flatness indicate a majority of the energy is concentrated in a low number of
frequency bands while a higher value indicates the energy is uniformly dis-
tributed across the bands (4.36). The power is the total power in the window
(4.37). The sharpness is a perceptual measure used in sound which measures
the relative amount of high-to-low-frequency components in the signal (4.38).
A higher sharpness indicates a high number of frequency components with
relatively few low-frequency components. The spectral slope also measures
the relative strength of low-frequency to high-frequency components with a
negative slope demonstrating more low-frequency components and a posi-
tive slope demonstrating stronger high-frequency components to the signal
(4.39). The Tristimulus measures the ratios of power between bands of har-
monics. Each harmonic is a multiple of the fundamental frequency estimated
in the signal. Tristimulus 1 measures the ration between the first harmonic
to the total (4.40). Tristimulus 2 measures the ratios of harmonics two, three
and four to the total and Tristimulus 3 measures the ratio harmonics 5 and
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Table 4.5: Other Spectrum Features
26
Irregularity
Jensen IJ =
∑N
n=1(an − an+1)∑N
n=1 a
2
n
(4.30)
27
Irregularity
Krimphoff IK =
N−1∑
n=2
|an − an−1 + ak + an+1
3
| (4.31)
28 Centroid C =
∑N
n=1 fnan∑N
n=1 an
(4.32)
29 Smoothness
Smooth =
N−1∑
n=1
|20log(an)−
20log(an−1) + 20log(an) + 20log(an+1)
3
|
(4.33)
30 Spread Spread =
√√√√ N∑
n=1
(
(fn − s¯)2 an∑N
n=1 an
)
(4.34)
31
Rolloff
Frequency
fr = argmin(r)∀r ∈
{
N |
r∑
n=1
a2n ≥ 0.95
N∑
n=1
a2n
}
(4.35)
32 Flatness
F =
N
√∏N
n=1 an
1
N
∑N
n=1 an
(4.36)
33 Power P =
1
N
N∑
n=1
a2n (4.37)
34 Sharpness
Sharp = .11 ·
∑N
n=1 n · g(n) · a.23n
N
g(n) =
{
1 n < 15
.066e.171n n ≥ 15
} (4.38)
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Table 4.5: Other Spectrum Features (Cont.)
35 Slope
slope =
1∑N
n=1 an
·N
∑N
n=1 fnan −
∑N
n=1 fn ·
∑N
n=1 an
N
∑N
n=0 f
2
n − (
∑N
n=0 fn)
2
(4.39)
36 Tristimulus 1
Trist1 =
h1∑N
n=1 an
hk =
∑
n
an∀n ∈ {N |k − .5 < fn
f0
< k + .5}
(4.40)
37 Tristimulus 2 Trist2 =
h2 + h3 + h4∑N
n=1 an
(4.41)
38 Tristimulus 3 Trist3 =
∑N
n=5 hn∑N
n=1 an
(4.42)
39 Inharmonicity
inharm =
2
f0
∑N
n=1 |fn − h(fn)f0| · a2n∑N
n=1 a
2
n
h(f) = floor(
f
f0
+ .5)
(4.43)
40
Odd to Even
Ratio OER =
∑
n<H∀n∈{2k+1|k∈N} hn∑
n<H∀n∈{2k|k∈N} hn
(4.44)
41
Signal
Entropy Hs = −
N∑
n=1
P (an)log2P (an) (4.45)
58
greater to the total (4.41) and (4.42). The inharmonicity estimates the de-
viation from a purely harmonic signal. It calculates the ratio of energy not
contained in a strict harmonic increments (4.43). The odd-to-even harmonic
ratio gives the ration of power in the odd harmonics to the even harmonics
(4.44). Finally, the spectrum entropy is the Shannon entropy contained in
the amplitude distribution of the spectrum (4.45).
Ak =
1
(N − k)σ2
N−k∑
n=1
(xn − µ)(xn+k − µ)∀k < N (4.46)
AMDFk =
1
N
N−k−1∑
n=0
(x[n]− x[n+ k])2∀k < N (4.47)
AMDFk =
1
N
N−k−1∑
n=0
x[n]− x[n+ k]∀k < N (4.48)
We also extract three common vector features from the signal windows
which measures various statistics of the spectrum with a shifted version of
the spectrum. These include the Autocorrelation, which measures cross-
correlation of the signal with itself (4.46), the average squared difference
function (ASDF) which measures the average squared distance of a signal
with a shifted version of itself and the average magnitude difference function
(AMDF) which measures the average difference of a signal with a shifted
version of itself. For each vector quantity, we calculate the first 11 signal
statistics presented in Table 4.3. This gives 11 features for the Autocorre-
lation (features 42-52), the ASDF (features 53-63) and the AMDF (features
64-74) giving a total of 74 statistical features extracted from each sensor per
window of raw sensor data.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has presented the methodology behind our sample data set. We
have a vast data set collected from two clinical trials and continuous labora-
tory testing. This data set has been hand labeled with twelve targets split
between walking and non-walking and laps versus free yielding 30 distinct
target data sets. We collect every possible stream of raw sensor data from our
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phones. Additionally, we transform the coordinate systems of acceleration
for forward walking and maximum variance and calculate the walking direc-
tion and direction of maximum variance during walking giving a total of 31
continuous sensor streams. Finally, we split the sensor streams into discreet
512 sample windows with 256 sample overlap and present a comprehensive
list of 74 statistical features we extract from each sensor. This provides a to-
tal of 2,294 sensor features providing an exhaustive, inclusive list of features
to train machine learning algorithms in the subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
IDENTIFYING IMPORTANT INPUT
FEATURES
Our analysis pipeline allows us to investigate 31 sensor streams. For each
sensor stream, we extract 74 statistical features. This gives a total of 31∗74 =
2, 294 continuous sets of data collected throughout the monitoring periods.
Investigating the correlation between 2,294 input variables and target out-
comes directly using machine learning methods requires that the set of inputs
be reduced to the important or most correlated sensor stream and statistic
feature pairs. This chapter presents an analysis of input feature reduction.
The goal is to identify which sensor and statistic pairs have high correlation
with a given target inference, which pairs have no correlation and should
be discarded and which streams could potentially provide information and
would therefore require obfuscation to maintain privacy.
Reducing the input variable space before applying machine learning is a
well-studied topic [74]. In general, methods can be divided into three broad
categories. Filter methods seek to identify the input vectors independent of
the machine learning algorithm used. These methods often use an estimate of
covariance and mutual information among variables to identify the variables
most useful in prediction. Wrapper methods use a trained machine learning
algorithm as a black box to build models and select the input variables which
yield the highest accuracy score. Finally, embedded models are specific to a
certain subset of machine learning models which can score the input vectors
during iterative learning. Filter and embedded methods are generally faster
than wrapper methods when calculating with a large set of input variables.
Wrapper methods are slower because many iterations of training must be
conducted for large sets of possible features. However, since wrapper methods
use the same machine learning algorithm to score the features, they generally
give the most accurate determination of the feature’s value.
In addition to determining the top input feature vectors, we must de-
termine which features contribute meaningful information to prediction re-
61
quiring protection to maintain privacy. This problem is notably different
from the traditional problem of determining the BEST features since the set
of BEST features may exclude related highly correlated redundant features
which would not necessarily be most predictive. For example, if two features
A and B are highly correlated, the list of BEST features will choose the
feature with the highest predictability, A while discarding B as a redundant
feature. However, when protecting privacy it is important to consider the
predictive ability of B since obfuscating A may not diminish the predictive
ability if an adversary instead uses B. We therefore develop methods to de-
termine what subsets of input features allow accurate prediction. We will see
that methods generally have a design tradeoff between scalability limited by
runtime and accuracy. The final output from our analysis will be a list of
highly correlated subsets of features and a list of safe features which when
used in predictive models do not allow prediction accuracies above a user se-
lectable privacy threshold calibrated relative to the random noise threshold.
5.1 Selecting the Top Features
We evaluate two broad methods to select top input features used to train
our models. We conduct filtering of input variables using the FEAST tool-
box, a popular framework which implements a number of filter methods for
feature selection [75, 76]. We also implement a sequential forward selection
method (SFSM) using both a k-means classifier and a support vector ma-
chine/regression as the internal statistical method to score the features. To
score the features, we use the F1-score for the classifiers and the lowest mean
absolute error score (MAE) for the regressions.
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x) (5.1)
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y
p(y)
∑
x∈X
p(x|y) log(p(x|y)) (5.2)
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log
(
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
)
= H(X)−H(X|Y )
= H(Y )−H(Y |X)
(5.3)
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I(X;Y |Z) =
∑
z∈Z
p(z)
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y|z) log
(
p(x, y|z)
p(x|z)p(y|z)
)
= H(X|Z)−H(X|Y, Z)
(5.4)
norm(I(X;Y )) =
I(X;Y )√
H(X)H(Y ))
(5.5)
Various information theory metrics are useful in evaluating feature selec-
tion routines. Central to information theory is the concept of entropy. The
entropy H of the distribution X, formally given in (5.1), is determined by the
sum of the discrete probabilities of each value of X. The more uncertainty
that X is in a distinct state, the higher the value of the entropy H. As with
most probability functions, we can also condition the entropy as shown in
(5.2). Intuitively, this formula gives the amount of uncertainty in X given
that we know Y . The mutual information score given in (5.3) is a measure-
ment of the amount of information that each individual distribution reveals
about the other. Its definition can be manipulated in terms of entropy as
seen in the right side of the given equation. Intuitively, this states that the
mutual information score gives the amount of uncertainty in Y minus the
amount of uncertainty in Y that is known if we know X. Thus, we are left
with a measurement of the amount of uncertainty in Y if we do not know X.
We can condition the mutual information as shown in (5.4). This equation
represents the amount of mutual information between X and Y given we
know Z. For convenience, we can normalize this metric into a range from
0 to 1 by dividing by the square root of the product of the entropy in each
distribution as shown in (5.5). Thus, a score of 1 means that we know all of
the unknown from X if we have Y or perfect mutual information and a score
of 0 indicates X tells us nothing about Y .
Machine learning models are evaluated by a standard set of metrics. We
use the F1-score to evaluate the accuracy of classification machine learning
models as shown in (5.8). The F1-score provides a scoring of the accuracy
of the classifier from a scale of zero to one. The score takes into account
the precision (5.6) which measures the percentage of correct, true positive,
classifications out of all positive classifications. The score also takes into
account the recall (5.7) which measures the percentage of positive classifi-
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cations out of all the classification that should be positive. The F1-score
is basically the weighted average of these two values with equal weight to
each value. In multi-label classifications we use the average F1-score over
all binary one-versus-one classification scores. Regression models use two
standard measures of error. The first is the mean average error (5.9). Given
a prediction ŷ and a known correct value y, the mean absolute error is the
average absolute difference between the two values. The mean squared error
is simply the average squared difference between ŷ and y (5.10). We prefer
the mean absolute error as the evaluation metric in our experiments.
precision =
true positives
true positives + false positives
(5.6)
recall =
true positives
true positives + false negatives
(5.7)
F1−score = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision + recall
(5.8)
MAE =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
|yn − ŷn| (5.9)
MSE =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(yn − ŷn)2 (5.10)
5.1.1 Filter Methods
Filter methods rank the input feature’s ability to classify a target indepen-
dently of the machine learning algorithm used. These methods use infor-
mation theory to estimate the amount of information in each input vector
compared to the prediction target. We use the FEAST toolbox to test eleven
popular filter techniques as outlined in the following sections [75, 76]. Since
the techniques from information theory produce relatively simple formulas
to estimate the relevance, the filtering is generally useful in situations where
computational resources are limited or the input vector is too large to con-
duct wrapper or embedded methods. However, the empirical estimate of
mutual information is only accurate if the number of samples is large enough
to estimate the underlying distribution. If the number of samples does not
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accurately reflect the underlying distribution, the estimate can be wrong
causing error in the filter methods.
We now evaluate eleven feature selection techniques which have been pro-
posed in previous work and have been recently evaluated for accuracy [76].
Each method attempts to solve the problem of scoring the inclusion of a given
feature XC from the total set of features X. The scoring in each method de-
fines a score based on the selection of XC taking into account the rest of the
currently selected features S to maximize the notion of information about the
target distribution Y . The filtering methods themselves attempt to optimize
the feature selection by trading off three primary pieces of information. First,
they look at the mutual information between the chosen input vector and the
target of the classification I(XC ;Y ). Maximizing this value intuitively gives
a set of inputs XC which contains all the information in Y . To reduce redun-
dant variables, many methods introduce a penalty for mutual information
between chosen features and remaining features which can be represented
as I(XC ;Xs)∀s ∈ S. Thus, the methods would seek to minimize redundant
terms. The last term attempts to limit the penalty for redundant terms by
adding to the score if the redundancy is only apparent given knowledge of
the target distribution Y represented as I(XC ;Xs|Y )∀s ∈ S. Intuitively, if
the redundancy is only apparent given the target distribution Y , then the
mutual information between the input variables may still be relevant when
predicting Y .
MIM(XC) = I(XC ;Y ) (5.11)
MIFS(XC) = I(XC ;Y )− β
∑
s∈S
I(XC ;Xs) (5.12)
mRMR(XC) = I(XC ;Y )− 1|S|
∑
s∈S
I(XC ;Xs) (5.13)
CONDRED(XC) = I(XC ;Y ) + γ
∑
s∈S
I(XC ;Xs|Y ) (5.14)
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CMIFS(XC) =
∑
s∈S
I(XCY |Xs) ≈ I(XC ;Y )−
∑
s∈S
I(XC ;XS)+∑
s∈S
I(XC ;XS|Y )
(5.15)
JMI(XC) =
∑
s∈S
I(XC ;Xs;Y ) = I(XC ;Y )− 1|S|
∑
s∈S
I(XC ;Xs)−I(XC ;Xs|Y )
(5.16)
BG(XC) = I(XC ;Y )− β
∑
s∈S
I(XC ;Xs) + γ
∑
s∈S
I(XC ;Xs|Y ) (5.17)
The first seven filtering methods use linear weights among the three met-
rics. The simplest filtering method is the Mutual Information Maximization
(MIM) [77] which scores the input feature using the mutual information be-
tween the input feature and the target distribution (5.11). The Mutual Infor-
mation Feature Selection (MIFS) [78] introduces a penalty term for mutual
information between the current feature and list of selected features with
the penalty controllable by adjusting the β weighting value (5.12). Max-
Relevance Min-Redundancy (mRMR) [79] weights the penalty term by the
inverse of the size of the selected feature set (5.13). The conditional re-
dundancy method introduces a term to maximize the conditional mutual
information between the current input vector and list of selected input vec-
tors with the weight of the term being controlled by the constant γ (5.14).
The Conditional Mutual Info Feature Selection (CMIFS) [80] method max-
imizes the score of the current input feature by mutual information given
the set of already selected features. Interestingly, this method implements
a combination of the mutual information, the penalty term and the condi-
tional redundancy terms plus a few constants which do not affect the final
ordering of features (5.15). The Joint Mutual Information (JMI) [81] method
also scores based on the mutual information with a penalty term for mutual
information while dismissing the effect of the conditional mutual informa-
tion. Similar to the mRMR method, it weights the penalty term based on
the inverse of the size of the number of selected input features (5.16). Fi-
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nally, the beta gamma method scores the input feature by maximizing the
mutual information, penalizing the mutual information and maximizing the
conditional mutual information. The weighting of the penalty for redundant
information can be adjusted by varying β and the weighting of the scoring
of the conditional mutual information can be controlled by varying γ (5.17).
CMIM(XC) = mins∈S[I(XC ;Y |Xs)]
= I(XC ;Y )−maxs∈S[I(XC ;Xs)− I(XC ;Xs|Y )]
(5.18)
IF (XC) = mins∈S[I(XCXs;Y )− I(Xs;Y )] (5.19)
ICAP (XC) = I(XC ;Y )−
∑
s∈S
max[0, {I(XC ;Xs)− I(XC ;Xs|Y )}] (5.20)
DISR(XC) =
∑
s∈S
I(XCXs;Y )
H(XCXsY )
(5.21)
Additionally, we evaluate four methods which introduce non-linear weight-
ings into their scoring criteria. While this makes the intuitive sense of the
methods less straightforward, we include them for completeness of testing.
The Conditional Mutual Information Maximization (CMIM) [82] method
scores using the mutual information between the current feature and the
target distribution with the penalty being the maximum of the difference be-
tween the mutual information and conditional mutual information of each of
the previously selected features (5.18). The Informative Fragments method
(IF) [83] considers the minimum over all previously selected features of the
difference between the mutual information of the whole set of selected fea-
tures with and without the currently scored feature included (5.19). Intu-
itively, this will select the feature with the largest gain in mutual information
over the previous set of selected features. The interaction capping (ICAP)
[84] method is similar to JMI and CMIFS but caps the contribution of the
penalty term to positive values (5.20). Finally, the Double Input Symmetrical
Relevance (DISR) [85] method normalizes the conditional mutual informa-
tion by the total entropy in an attempt to offset any inherent bias toward
rare features (5.21). All of these methods will be used to select input features
to train and evaluate our machine learning models.
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5.1.2 Wrapper Methods
Wrapper methods use a machine learning algorithm as a black box to de-
termine the set of input features which yield the highest scoring model. We
implement a sequential forward selection method [86] which begins by scoring
every feature using a selected machine learning model. The highest scoring
feature is then chosen and models are built with a combination of that fea-
ture and every remaining feature. This process repeats greedily choosing the
input feature with the highest score each round. The algorithm continues
for a maximum of ten rounds or until the score is not improved by selecting
another input feature. We conduct two wrapper experiments with the first
experiment using a k-means clustering algorithm to score features and the
second experiment using a support vector machine or regression with a radial
basis kernel. Each round, the feature with the highest mutual information
score is chosen as the best feature for the k-means wrapper and the feature
with the highest F1-score or lowest mean absolute error is chosen for the
support vector classification or regression wrapper.
The first wrapper method uses a simple k-means classifier to identify input
features which naturally form clusters with high correlation with a given
prediction target. The k-means algorithm organizes data points into one
of k cluster sets to minimize the mean distance between data points and
cluster centers. K-means naturally identifies the ability of an input vector to
distinguish between labels. Intuitively, if the input feature has distinct values
for a given target, the clustering should identify a cluster for that target. The
algorithm begins by assigning a set of k cluster centers. It then assigns each
data point to the clusters to minimize the mean as shown in (5.22). The
initial centers are then adjusted to the center of mass for each cluster. The
algorithm repeats the assignment of points and cluster centering until a local
minima is reached. Obviously, finding the global minima of (5.22) requires
the correct initial choice of cluster centers. We use the kmeans++ algorithm
shown to increase the efficiency of choosing the initial cluster centers [87].
The k-means algorithm is run for a minimum of 10 iterations per trial with a
stopping condition of a delta of 0.1 for the inertia for each trial. The clustered
data is then compared with the label ground truth using the normalized
mutual information score. While limited to identifying distinct groups of
similar input feature values, k-means clustering is fast and efficient allowing
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quick investigation of all 2,294 input vectors for all 30 prediction targets by
brute force giving us a first approximation of the correlation of each feature
to each target.
argmin
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Si
‖x− µi‖2 (5.22)
Given a set of n observations (x1, x2, ..., xn) cluster each observation into
one of k sets S1, S2, ..., Sk to minimize the average distance to the center of
the clusters.
The second wrapper method uses a support vector machine (SVM) or sup-
port vector regression (SVR) with a radial basis kernel. The SVM classifier
is introduced in detail in Chapter 6. The model used as a black box here uses
the default hyper-parameters to increase running efficiency over the whole
space of input vectors. For targets with discreet values, a support vector
classifier is used trained with one-versus-one classifiers choosing the classi-
fication with the most votes. For target with a continuous distribution, a
support vector regression is used to predict the value. The round scoring for
the SVM is conducted by choosing the feature yielding the highest F1-score.
The round scoring for the support vector regression uses the mean absolute
error to score each round (5.9). The item with the lowest mean absolute
error is chosen as the top feature.
5.1.3 Evaluating Feature Selection Methods
In total, we have 15 feature selection methods with 11 filter methods pro-
duced by the FEAST toolkit and 4 wrapper methods. We include the results
of the full sequential forward analysis for the k-means and SVM called KMFS
and SVMFS respectively. We also include the ordered list of first round scor-
ing of all sensor features for the k-means and SVM called KM1 and SVM1
respectively. We are interested if the first round scoring is correlated enough
to predict feature utility without requiring the full computationally expensive
SFSM. This gives 15 lists of top features for evaluation.
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Similarity among Feature Selection Techniques
Given 15 top feature selection techniques, it is natural to ask how similar
the feature selection techniques choose top features and if it is necessary to
evaluate all 15 methods simultaneously. Each filter selection routine returns
an ordered list of most predictive features. Classical methods of ranking sim-
ilarity of ordered lists are problematic since each list of top features contains
a different subset of the entire list of 2,294 selectable features. We therefore
use normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG) due to its ability to rank
ordered lists when the two lists do not necessarily contain the same features.
We define the ground truth to be an ordered list of N top features. We define
a relevance ranking rel defining the scores N,N − 1, ..., 1 for all N features
in the list. Thus, the top feature has score N down to the last feature with
a score of 1. Given a list to evaluate, the discounted cumulative gain scores
the ordering of the new list as the relevance of the top feature in the list
plus the sum of each subsequent relevance divided by the log of the position
of the item in the list (5.23). Features in the evaluation list not present in
the ground truth list are given relevance scores of zero. We then normalize
the score by dividing the discounted cumulative gain by the ideal discounted
cumulative gain. The ideal cumulative gain is the cumulative gains score at-
tainable if the ideal list is perfectly ordered. Thus, we have a metric capable
of evaluating feature ordering with a range of zero to one for ordered lists
with differing sets of members.
DCG = rel1 +
N∑
n=2
reln
log2(n)
(5.23)
nDCG =
DCG
IDCG
(5.24)
We calculate the top forty features using the filter methods and the first
round of the SVMFS and KMFS wrapper methods over all 30 prediction
targets. We consider a maximum of 10 features from the full SVMFS and
KMFS noting that 16 of the targets terminate in fewer than 10 iterations.
The remaining, features see little improvement from further features. We
calculate the normalized discounted cumulative gain for each combination of
features. Figure 5.1 plots a heat map of the scores between each top feature
selection method. Of course, the scores between the same methods yield a
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Figure 5.1: Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain Scores between All
Tested Feature Selection Techniques
perfect NDCG. The filter methods largely produce better orderings with less
variation than both the KMFS and SVMFS which differ significantly from
the orderings returned from the filtering methods. To better illustrate this,
we look at the intersection of top features returned from the methods. For the
top feature, every filter method returns the same number one feature. The
filter methods only agree with the KMFS for 9.6% of the targets and agree
with the SVMFS a mere 6.5% of the targets. The first round SVMF1 and
KMF1 agree 100% of the time. We extend our analysis to the top 10 features
as shown in Figure 5.2. We notice that even among filter methods, the highest
agreement rarely surpasses 50%. The agreement with the KMFS and SVMFS
is abysmal with many targets containing a single target in common. Figure
5.3 shows both the NDCG and average proportion of shared features. We
see that most selection methods contain a mere 10% of shared features with
mRMR giving the top score of 26.9%. Of course, this is rarely the top
feature as demonstrated by the NDCG which is higher for the SVMI score
since it always returns the same top feature. Filter methods return different
top features in different orders than the wrapper methods using SVMFS.
This motivates the need to evaluate the accuracy and utility of each method
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Figure 5.2: Intersection of Top Features between All Tested Feature
Selection Techniques
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Figure 5.3: Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain and Intersection of
Top Features of All Feature Selection Compared to SVMF
individually. Thus, we continue evaluate all feature selection routines in the
remainder of the dissertation.
Highly Correlated Features
We surmise a significant portion of the variation among top feature selection
algorithms can be explained by the variation in rating highly correlated fea-
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Figure 5.4: SVMFS First Round F1-score versus Normalized Mutual
Information between the Feature and Target with Labels Indicating the
Top SVMFS Features and Clustered Features Using Feature-Feature
Normalized Mutual Information
tures. Consider two highly correlated, highly predictive features A and B.
Feature selection methods are designed to choose what it deems the highest
predictive feature (often determined as the feature with the highest normal-
ized mutual information). Assuming it chooses feature A, most filter methods
will then discard feature B. However, if feature B scores higher during the
SVMFS, then it will be chosen even though it is discarded by the filter meth-
ods. We investigate how well the normalized mutual information calculated
between feature vectors can cluster the feature scoring both in terms of nor-
malized mutual information with the target of the classifier and with the
SVMFS classification score shown in Figure 5.4. This figure plots every fea-
ture considered during the SVMFS routine. The top feature chosen by the
classification score each round is labeled one through nine corresponding to
the round the feature is selected as optimal. Each round, features with a
NMIS greater than 0.5 with the optimally chosen feature are clustered into
a per-round cluster. Each feature is then plotted by the NMIS with the tar-
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Figure 5.5: Feature NMI versus SVMFS Scores
get on the y-axis and the classification score improvement during the first
round of the SVMFS on the x-axis. Interestingly, we see that the feature
with the top classification score was not the feature with the highest normal-
ized mutual information with the target. Thus, demonstrating why the filter
methods return a different set of top features than the SVMFS method. We
do see that features with high NMIS with other target features do seem to
have similar classification scores and NMIS with the target. However, there
are outliers in both cases.
Interestingly, we find that the optimal features chosen each round are rarely
contained in an existing cluster from a previous round. We surmise this is
due to correlated features containing redundant information. Thus, search-
ing through the similar features unnecessarily wastes time in the sequential
search. We therefore investigate the possibility of clustering features into
similar groups using the normalized mutual information between features.
Figure 5.5 shows the average correlation between the differences in SVMFS
for all rounds of the SVMFS versus the NMIS of the features. We see that
most features have little NMIS however for the ones that have high NMIS,
the difference in scores during the SVMFS search is decreased. Thus, it seems
that a high NMIS indicates a similar feature vector. It is also important to
note that the converse is not necessarily true. A small difference in relative
scoring between SVMFS rounds does not necessarily indicate a high NMIS.
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Figure 5.6: Average Feature NMI
versus SVMFS Scores
0 50 100 150
Cluster Size
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
Cluster Sizes
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Figure 5.6 plots the average difference between SVMFS scorings against the
NMIS score averaged over all target features. We see the difference in delta
SVMFS scores diminish as NMIS increases and choose 0.5 as the cutoff to
consider features similar for clustering. Figure 5.7 demonstrates the cluster
sizes formed by considering a NMIS cutoff of 0.5. We see that roughly 40% of
features are independent of all others. The remaining features are contained
in clusters with a large cluster at 77 and 179 features. These feature clusters
can be reduced to a single feature thereby simplifying analysis during an
SVMFS search.
We combine the clustered features and again compare the similarity of
feature selection routines. Figure 5.8 shows the NDCG scores with the clus-
tered features. We see overall improvement of scores. This is especially
apparent in Figure 5.9 which plots the intersection of the top 10 features.
While the intersection of the top 10 features had a maximum of 26.8% in
the first experiment, using clustering, the maximum intersection increased
to 60.6%. However, we still find that the feature selection methods contain
enough different features to continue to investigate their top feature predic-
tions. The analysis of highly correlated features presents the opportunity to
reduce the set of features considered when classifying private features which
will be explored in Section 5.2.
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Figure 5.8: Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain Scores between All
Tested Feature Selection Techniques with Clustering
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Figure 5.9: Intersection of Top Features between All Tested Feature
Selection Techniques with Clustering
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Table 5.1: Top Five Features Returned from Selected Feature Selection
Methods
SVMFS mRMR JMI DISR
A
ct
iv
it
y
AccMag SpFlx AccMag SpFlx AccMag SpFlx AccMag SpFlx
AccX AMDFSkew AccX ASDFSkew AccZ AMDFSkew dirF SigNZC
GyroX SigKurt AccZ SpVar AccX SpFlx AccMag SigEnt
AccV SignMCR AccZ SpKurt AccMag SigEnt AccMag ASDFSkew
AccE SigKurt AccV AcKurt AccMag AMDFMax AccMag SpEnt
F
E
V
1
/
F
V
C
W GravZ SigMin AccZ SigRMS AccZ SigRMS AccZ SigRMS
AccZ SpRMS AccX SigSkew AccX SigSkew AccX SigSkew
AccX SigSkew AccMag SigCoV AccZ SigMax RotZ ACMean
AccY SignMCR AccZ SigMin AccMag AmdfMean RotZ SigMin
AccY SigMax AccZ SigMax RotZ SigRMS AccMag SigSkew
p
h
o
n
eI
D
N
W GyroY SigMean AccMag SigMean AccMag SigMean AccMag SigMean
AccMag SigRMS AccF SigMean RotZ SigMin AccX SigSum
AccY SigSum AccP2 SpEnt AccX ACVar AccMag ACSD
RotZ SigMean AccV SpVar RotZ SigMax AccF SigMean
AccMag AcSD AccMag AcAvDev AccMag SigSum AccMag SigSum
u
se
rI
D
W
AccSw AMDFMax RotZ SigMean RotZ SigMean RotZ SigMean
AccZ SigMean AccMag AMDFMax AccMag SigMin AccY SigSum
AccMag SigSkew AccZ SigRMS AccZ SigRMS AccZ SigRMS
AccY SignMCR AccY SigSum AccX ACVar AccMag SigEnt
AccX ASDFSkew AccZ SigMin AccZ AMDFMean RotZ SigMin
sp
ee
d
W
AccMag AMDFMax AccZ SigRMS AccZ SigRMS AccZ SigRMS
GyroX AMDFMax AccMag AMDFMean AccMag AMDFMean AccMag AMDFMean
AccMag SignMCR AccX SigMax AccX SigMax AccZ SigMin
AccE SigAvDev AccZ SigMin AccZ SigMean AccX SigMax
AccZ AcSkew AccMag SigSkew AccMag SigSkew AccZ SigMean
Top Ranked Features
Both of the forward selection methods give a base estimate of the accuracy of
each classification. While the data is presented in this section, it is important
to remember that the model’s hyperparameters will be optimized in Chapter
6. However, the top selected features and relative scoring is presented here
both for completeness and to motivate the need for privacy aware feature
selection.
Table 5.1 shows the top selected features for the SVM forward selection,
and the three filter methods with the highest feature intersection. As repre-
sentative examples, we present the activity, FEV1/FVC while walking, phone
identification when the user is not walking, user identification while the user
is walking, and the walking speed of the user. We note wide variation in
the features returned. As noted earlier, the filter methods tend to return
similar features with the top feature often being identical. Unfortunately,
these feature selection techniques differ greatly from the SVMFS method
which is most likely the most accurate method to score the features. We
finally note that most returned features are from the accelerometer, gyro-
77
scope and change in rotation all features we would expect to be important
for classification and regression models.
We next present the relative classification accuracies of the KMFS and
SVMFS. Each k-means model is fit to the set of input features with k being
set to the number of target features. Regression models are fit by binning the
target of the regression into ten distinct bins. The output from the trained
model is then compared to the correct answers using the normalized mutual
information scores. The silhouette score is also recorded. The silhouette score
is measure of how distinct the clusters are in the model (5.25). Intuitively,
more distinct clusters indicate a better model fitting to distinctly separable
data. Table 5.2 shows the overall scoring of all classification and regression
models. We see a range of NMIS scores with activity, speed, phone identi-
fication, and FEV1/FVC getting the highest scores. Unfortunately, we find
these scores rather inaccurate as can be seen by the relatively low silhouette
scores indicating the clustering is not creating unique clusters. This demon-
strates the weakness of the k-means methods to score the features which can
be overcome by higher-dimensional SVM models.
silhouette score = average
(
b− a
max(a, b)
)
(5.25)
Here a is the distance from the point to its assigned cluster and b is the
distance from the point and the nearest non-assigned cluster.
Table 5.3 presents the top F1-scores for each SVM classification model
using a radial basis kernel. We see higher accuracy scores for activity clas-
sification closely followed by high scores for phone identification and COPD
classification. We see lower scores for gender and user identification with
little indication that users can be identified while stationary. Intuitively,
this result makes sense since we expect the users to not be identified while
stationary. Conversely, we expect phones to be identified with more accu-
racy through sensor fingerprinting while stationary. The mean absolute error
rates for the regression models are given in Table 5.4. As expected, we can
identify each characteristic with better accuracy while the users are walking.
We can predict age within 10 years. The FEV1% seems difficult to predict
directly from the raw features confirming the results from our previous work.
The FEV1/FVC value, however, does have potential to be predictable. The
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Table 5.2: Top Wrapper k-Means
Cluster Scores
Target NMIS Silhouette
Score
Activity 0.91 0.546
SpeedW 0.801 0.368
PhoneIDNW 0.777 0.896
FEV1/FVCW 0.744 0.456
UserIDW 0.736 0.333
PhoneIDW 0.719 1.0
PhoneIDAll 0.716 1.0
FEV1W 0.71 0.43
WeightW 0.701 0.427
FEV1/FVCAll 0.636 0.498
FEV1/FVCNW 0.623 0.476
AgeW 0.601 0.356
FEV1All 0.591 0.462
FEV1NW 0.573 0.619
UserIDAll 0.572 0.423
WeightAll 0.547 0.353
StepsW 0.547 0.296
WeightNW 0.544 0.481
CopdNW 0.54 0.472
UserIDNW 0.519 0.465
SpeedWLaps 0.453 0.393
AgeNW 0.451 0.561
AgeAll 0.445 0.278
HeightW 0.444 0.404
HeightNW 0.403 0.764
HeightAll 0.296 0.455
CopdAll 0.262 0.718
GenderW 0.225 0.919
CopdW 0.199 0.735
GenderAll 0.18 0.607
GenderNW 0.164 0.677
Table 5.3: Top Wrapper SVM
Classification Scores
Target Max F1-score
Activity 0.9948
PhoneIDNW 0.9402
PhoneIDW 0.9396
CopdW 0.9376
PhoneIDAll 0.9246
GenderW 0.9234
UserIDW 0.8814
CopdNW 0.8728
CopdAll 0.832
GenderNW 0.8157
GenderAll 0.7639
UserIDAll 0.4827
UserIDNW 0.459
Table 5.4: Top SVM Regression
Scores
Target Minimum MAE
AgeAll 10.5766
AgeNW 12.3722
AgeW 7.9577
FEV1All 15.0327
FEV1NW 17.1854
FEV1W 13.2044
FEV1/FVCAll 8.5551
FEV1/FVCNW 10.9753
FEV1/FVCW 7.3196
HeightAll 2.2185
HeightNW 2.0513
HeightW 1.7693
SpeedW 0.0574
SpeedWLaps 0.0671
StepsW 0.5812
WeightAll 25.3018
WeightNW 26.8351
WeightW 23.4036
speed and steps appear to be predictable with high accuracy. All regres-
sion and classification models will be optimized and scored in the Chapter 6.
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Figure 5.10: F1-score per Round of SVMFS
However, the prediction scores and wide variations in selected top features
across feature selection methods demonstrate the need to further investigate
which features are important to protect privacy.
5.2 Privacy Aware Feature Selection
Ideally, one of the top feature selection routines would return the set of top
private features. However, we have seen that feature selection techniques
provide wide variation in the top predicted features. To protect privacy, we
must understand to what extent an individual feature can be used to leak
information. This is particularly problematic since combinations of individ-
ual features can yield predictions not attainable from the separate features.
Additionally, the top feature selection algorithms will discard features with
high mutual information. A typical example of the score improvement per
round for an SVM sequential forward selection routine is plotted in Figure
5.10. The selection of the first features establishes the highest improvement
of F1-score with diminishing returns for each subsequent round. In the brute
force case, we could simply evaluate every possible subset of feature combi-
nations; however, this would quickly become impractical for large numbers of
input features. In this section, we will develop techniques to classify features
given a privacy score cutoff. We will also measure relative computation time
and accuracy of various feature selection techniques to classify the privacy
level of the features.
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Result: Privacy Sensitive Features
searchFeatures = allFeatures
privateFeatures = []
topFeature, topScore = SFSMScore(searchFeatures)
while topScore > privThreshold do
privateFeatures.add(topFeature)
searchFeatures.remove(topFeature)
topFeature, topScore = SFSMScore(searchFeatures)
end
return privateFeatures
Algorithm 1: Full Base Algorithm for Identifying Privacy Sensitive Fea-
tures
5.2.1 Identifying Private Features
Algorithms to Search for Private Features
We develop three algorithms to identify the privacy sensitive features in our
data. We want to evaluate the predictive capability of each input feature
using an SVM or SVR model with radial basis kernel. The brute force method
for feature selection would be to evaluate every possible combination of input
features; however, this would result in the training and evaluation of 2N
machine learning models. Since the training of machine learning models is
non-trivial for our large data set, we must optimize this procedure.
We first reduce the number of required models with our base algorithm by
implementing a sequential forward search method at the core of our search
as given in Algorithm 1. The full base algorithm begins with the set of all
features. With each loop, it conducts a SFSM. If the feature with the top
score is above the privacy threshold, it is removed and the SFSM is conducted
again with the set of features minus the last optimal feature. While it is
possible this method could miss features, SFSM has been shown to rank
features with high accuracy. However, this algorithm still suffers from high
computation time. On the full data set, we have seen it take up to two
weeks to conduct a full SFSM search during our tests running on a single
core of an AMD Opteron 8431 for a single target. This can be improved with
parallelization, but for larger data sets, runtime must be improved.
We have seen that certain features can be clustered by computing the
normalized mutual information between the feature vectors. Using these
clusters, we can optimize the runtime of the algorithm by removing entire
clusters of feature scores instead of single features after each round of the
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Result: Privacy Sensitive Features
searchFeatures = allFeatures
privateFeatures = []
topFeature, topScore = SFSMScore(searchFeatures)
while topScore > privThreshold do
privateFeatures.add(topFeature)
searchFeatures.remove(topFeature)
for each MIScore do
if MIScore > 0.5 then
privateFeatures.add(MIFeature)
searchFeatures.remove(MIFeature)
end
end
topFeature, topScore = SFSMScore(searchFeatures)
end
return privateFeatures
Algorithm 2: The MI Algorithm for Identifying Privacy Sensitive Features
Optimized with Mutual Information
SFSM search. We implement this in our MI algorithm as given in Algorithm
2. The MI algorithm also searches for the top feature found each round of the
SFSM search; however, upon identifying the top feature of interest, it also
removes all features with high normalized mutual information scores to the
identified optimal feature. This greatly decreases the runtime by decreasing
searches depending on the cluster sizes of the top feature, but may introduce
false positives if the features with high NMIS are not actually predictive of
the target.
We consider Algorithm 1 as the baseline for accuracy when identifying
private features. The MI algorithm, Algorithm 2, decreases runtime but may
introduce false positive due to some features with high NMIS actually having
a low correlation of predictability. We finally present the MIS algorithm given
in Algorithm 3 which adds a second check before eliminating features with
high NMIS. This algorithm also requires clustered features have less than a
0.01 difference in the first round of the SVMFS for the given target to be
considered private. This should ensure that a feature not only has high NMIS,
but also has similar predictive accuracy when predicting the target during
the less computationally expensive first round of the SVMFS. We finally
implement a shorter version of the full SVMFS search which terminates as
soon as the maximum prediction score is surpassed during the SVMFS search
lowering the number of iterations required during the SVMFS search for top
features which are highly predictive.
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Result: Privacy Sensitive Features
searchFeatures = allFeatures
privateFeatures = []
topFeature, topScore = SFSMScore(searchFeatures)
while topScore > privThreshold do
privateFeatures.add(topFeature)
searchFeatures.remove(topFeature)
for each MIScore do
if MIScore > 0.5 and DeltaSVMF1 < 0.01 then
privateFeatures.add(MIFeature)
searchFeatures.remove(MIFeature)
end
end
topFeature, topScore = SFSMScore(searchFeatures)
end
return privateFeatures
Algorithm 3: The MIS Algorithm for Identifying Privacy Sensitive Fea-
tures Optimized with Mutual Information and SVMF First Round Delta
Scoring
ϕ 
ftθ α 
β 
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O
S
Figure 5.11: Latent Dirichlet Allocation Plate Diagram
Advanced Clustering with Latent Dirichlet Allocation
While k-means has classically been used to cluster individual samples into
obvious groups, the method is simplistic. We investigate the ability of an
advanced clustering method to predict the usefulness of a feature. Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) was originally designed to classify the topics as-
sociated with words in a document. It is a generative model which given a
set of observations attempts to establish unobserved clustering that explain
the similarity seen across sessions. It has recently been found useful in nat-
ural language processing, genetics, and image processing. LDA models are
trained through Gibbs sampling [88, 89]. We use the LDA implementation
in Python to build the LDA models [90].
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We adapt our problem to LDA by defining an individual testing period
with a specific target as a session. Each sensor reading is discretized with
the value being binned into a feature word encoded with the sensor, feature
and binning value. The number of topics is set to the number of classification
targets or the number of bins in the discretization of the regression targets.
LDA takes as input the sessions, word vocabulary, and number of topics
generating both a set of unique topics and probability that a specific word
in the vocabulary indicates that a session should be classified as one of the
identified topics. The plate representation seen in Figure 5.11 demonstrates
how the observed feature words f is annotated for each observation o ∈
O. The hyperparameters α and β are priors for Dirichlet distributions θ ∼
Dir(α) and φ ∼ Dir(β) representing distributions of topics per session S
and topics over feature words respectively. For each session s ∈ S, a topic
classification t ∈ T is drawn from θ to define the topics assigned to the
session with probability θ
(s)
t = P (t|S). Similarly, for feature word f , a topic
t ∈ T is sampled from φ and assigned to the feature word with probability
φ
(t)
f = P (f |t). The LDA algorithm uses Gibb’s sampling to estimate the topic
assignment to features as shown in (5.26). Then, the assignment distributions
can be trained by (5.27) and (5.28).
P (ti = j|t−i,f ) ∝
n
(f)
−i,j + β
n
(·)
−i,j + Fβ
n
(si)
−i,j + α
n
(si)
−i + Tα
(5.26)
θ
(s)
j =
n
(s)
j + α
n
(s)
· + Tα
(5.27)
φ
(j)
f =
n
(f)
j + β
n
(·)
j + Fβ
(5.28)
Since we set our number of topics as the number of unique targets, we
would ideally like the algorithm to map an individual set of observations to
an individual target. This is accomplished by choosing a small number for
the α prior. We therefore set α to 0.001. We would like the number of feature
words considered for each topic to be large in order to classify the relative
importance of each feature word to the topic. Thus, we set β relatively large
at 0.1. The LDA analysis provides us with a ranked probability of topics
per session and ranked probability of topic probabilities per feature word.
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The ranked probability of topic probabilities allows us to determine how
important each feature word is to predict the topic thus giving us another
way to rank features.
Classical Feature Selection Techniques
We investigate the relationship between the privacy of features and the nor-
malized mutual information score with the target of the predictions. The
normalized mutual information score is often the most widely accepted in-
formation metric when designing filter methods, thus we would expect the
NMI score to approximate the privacy value of the features. We will also
evaluate how well the 15 top feature selection routines eliminate the top
private features as identified by our three algorithms including the 11 filter
methods and four wrapper methods.
5.2.2 Private Feature Evaluation
Evaluating the ability of all methods to determine the private data set with
the full set of sensors would take a significant amount of computation. To
keep the experiments manageable, we limit our input features to the features
extracted from the magnitude of acceleration, magnitude of the gyroscope
and the orientation in the Z direction. We choose these sensors as a sampling
of the three main types of sensors available to the models including a motion
sensor, a rotational velocity sensor and an orientation sensor. We investigate
five targets including the identity of the phone collecting the motion readings,
the identity of the user, the activity, the FEV1/FVC of the subject, and the
walking speed. This gives us a data set with 222 continuously collected
features over 45 hours of readings tested on three classification targets and
two regression targets.
Private Feature Algorithms
We first compare the results from the three private feature selection algo-
rithms. Each algorithm is run five times with various privacy thresholds. For
the classification, we use the F1-score to determine the privacy threshold.
Thus, the algorithms iteratively remove features until the forward selection
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Figure 5.13: ROC Curve of SVM
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cannot attain a F1-score higher than the threshold. We test at F1-score cut-
offs of 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8. Since the regression returns variable absolute
errors depending on scale of the prediction target, we must define a privacy
metric that is comparable across regressions. We first calculate the interval
from the best classification score attained during the optimal forward search
and the noise threshold or level of prediction when the regression algorithm
is given purely random noise. This represents the interval between the best
prediction and worst prediction. We define our privacy metric as the per-
centage from the optimal prediction to the noise level. We test the regression
with privacy thresholds set at 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 on this interval i.e. for 0.2
features are removed until the best MAE score is greater than 20% of the
difference between the maximum MAE score and the noise threshold.
We consider our base algorithm, Algorithm 1, as the standard for identi-
fying the private features. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 show the ROC curve for
predicting the phoneID both with and without the identified sensitive fea-
tures with a privacy level of 0.7. The figures clearly demonstrate that with
all features, the phone classification attains high accuracy but with the fea-
ture elimination, the remaining features still cannot accurately predict the
phone above roughly 70% combined accuracy. The three algorithms return
slightly different sets of private features. Figure 5.14 gives the average num-
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Figure 5.15: False Positive and False
Negatives for MI and MIS Private
Feature Selection Compared to the
Full Algorithm Averaged over All
Privacy Levels
ber of private features identified for each of the three algorithms over the five
experiments. The MI and MIS algorithms returned more features than the
full method with the straight MI returning more than the MIS for the phone
identification, FEV1/FVC, and user identification. We found that the MI
and MIS performed similarly for the activity and speed predictions. Over-
all, we see many more features identified as private for activity especially
for lower privacy levels. This is hardly surprising since activity is a binary
classifier and is the easiest classification for the motion sensor. We find that
health and user identification contain the lowest number of private features
in our sample data set. In most tests, the baseline returned the lowest num-
ber of private features followed by the MIS method and the MI methods.
This is expected since the baseline method only eliminates one feature at a
time, the MI method eliminates all clustered features, and the MIS method
eliminates all clustered features that have a similar first round SVMFS score.
Figure 5.15 shows the average false positives and false negatives compared
to the baseline private feature identification algorithm. Since most features
are identified as private for activity, we see a small number of false positives
and negatives. For the rest of the targets, we see the MI algorithm returning
the most false positives with the MIS algorithm correctly filtering a majority
of false positive with both the FEV1/FVC capacity and the phone identifi-
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Figure 5.17: Walking Speed Privacy
Sensitive Features versus Privacy
Level (Higher = More Private)
cation. We see that the MIS is fairly successful at lowering the features with
high NMIS but low similarity in predictive utility. There are relatively few
false negatives for each method. For each false negative, we carefully retrain
the classifier to identify the attainable accuracy compared to privacy thresh-
old and find that the classification scores with the added false negative tests
never surpass 0.01 above the target privacy threshold. The analysis indicates
the clustering is most likely to assign false negatives to features which are
close to the privacy threshold.
Figures 5.16 and 5.17 present the number of private features for the phones
and walking speed over various privacy thresholds. The phones followed the
ideal case with the MI yielding the highest number of features, followed by the
MIS method with the base method yielding the smallest number of private
features. As expected, the number of private features increases as the privacy
threshold is lowered (becomes more strict) and the number of private features
decreases as the privacy threshold is raised. For a privacy threshold of .6,
46 features are identified as private by the full privacy search with the MIS
yielding 60 and MI algorithm yielding 93 features. Interestingly, the MI and
MIS methods yields similar results for features. Thus, the MIS methods does
not always eliminate the false positives from features with high NMIS. Once
again, we see the number of private features rise as the privacy threshold is
lowered. We surmise 0.4 as a reasonable level of privacy for the regression
with 84 features being identified as private by the full algorithm and 103 being
identified as private by the MI and MIS methods. Finally, Figures 5.18 and
88
0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
Privacy Threshold
0
10
20
30
40
50
#
 F
e
a
tu
re
s
MI FP
MI FN
MIS FP
MIS FN
Figure 5.18: Phone Identification
Sensitive Features Identification
False Positives and Negatives
(Lower = More Private)
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Privacy Threshold
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
#
 F
e
a
tu
re
s
MI FP
MI FN
MIS FP
MIS FN
Figure 5.19: Walking Speed Sensitive
Features Identification False Positives
and Negatives (Higher = More
Private)
5.19 illustrate the false positives and negatives for the phone identification
and walking speeds at various privacy levels. We do not observe any patterns
across the five experiments in false positives; however, we do note that the
false negatives seem to be more prevalent at stricter privacy thresholds. We
surmise that a privacy level which is too strict begins to be affected by more
subtle combinations of less predictive features. As the classification score
requirement decreases, it becomes more likely that combinations of features
with little predictive utility can combine to edge over the threshold. This is
encouraging since false negatives with low predictability will not substantially
hurt the privacy of the user.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 give the runtimes in hours of each of the private feature
identification algorithms. It is important to note that all runtimes are con-
ducted on a single core of an AMD Opteron 8431. The algorithms do conduct
a large search of machine learning training which can be run in parallel; how-
ever, to compare the overall runtime, we limit our analysis to a single core.
We find that higher privacy thresholds which identify more features tend to
finish more quickly. Lower privacy thresholds have a tendency to have more
features on the boundary thus lengthening the search. Regression searches
are generally shorter since the underlying machine learning SVR model only
needs to be trained once. The FEV1/FVC models with lower number of
private features finished in as little as 36 minutes with the worst case only
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Table 5.5: Privacy Feature Selection Runtime Comparison for Classification
Targets
Activity PhoneIDNW
Method Base(h) MI (h) MIS (h) Base(h) MI (h) MIS (h)
Best .14 .08 .09 3.4 2.3 3.1
Average 15.06 7.3 9.0 6.4 2.7 4.0
Worst 44.9 21.8 26.7 8.2 3.2 4.6
UserIDW
Method Base(h) MI (h) MIS (h)
Best 11.0 9.0 10.6
Average 142.3 35.0 44.1
Worst 165.5 55.3 62.7
Table 5.6: Privacy Feature Selection Runtime Comparison for Regression
Targets
FEV1/FVC SpeedW
Method Base(h) MI (h) MIS (h) Base(h) MI (h) MIS (h)
Best .6 .6 .6 23.2 7.9 8.3
Average 6.3 1.8 3.4 32.3 9.9 9.6
Worst 13.8 3.3 7.0 45.0 12.8 11.6
reaching to 13.8 hours. Of course, regression trials with more private features
can take almost 2 days for the base algorithm. We do see substantial speed
improvements by using the MI and MIS algorithms. The classification takes
much longer since the SVM classifier is composed of many one-versus-one
classifiers. This makes the user identification with 88 targets particularly
computationally expensive. With the base case, the privacy algorithm takes
roughly two weeks to complete. The MI and MIS algorithms cut that down
to 2-3 days. The number of private feature also increases the computation
of the activity models. The shortest classification runtime was seen in the
phone identification which has a relatively low number of sensitive features
and targets compared the activity and user identification classifiers.
Overall, we see two primary effects which determine the total computation
time. The number of classification targets greatly increases the complexity
of an SVM classifier. We therefore recommend using a classifier which scales
better with a high number of prediction targets. We will investigate other
possible classifiers in Chapter 6. The number of features which yield pre-
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diction rates close to the privacy threshold also increase the runtime since
the forward selective search must search more rounds at the threshold. Since
more features tend to be included with tighter privacy thresholds, a lower
security threshold seems to increase the runtime. Overall, we see non-trivial
performance gains for the MI and MIS algorithms with the MI performing
the fastest followed by the MIS. Thus, we find a design trade-off between the
accuracy of identifying the complete set of private features and computation.
Filter Method Top Features and Private Features
The private aware features selection routines presented in Section 5.2.1 quan-
tify the relative privacy risk of features by conducting repeated forward se-
lection searches using a machine learning model. This procedure is still
computationally expensive requiring hours to days of computation. Ideally,
filter methods could be used to select features since the methods carry far
less computational overhead and therefore scale to higher number of features.
We look at the ability of the filter methods implemented in FEAST to
predict the most sensitive features for various classification and regression
targets. We conduct our analysis with a privacy threshold F1-score of 0.6.
To compare all features, we conduct the FEAST search returning the ordered
ranking of all 222 features. We then compare the top features returned from
FEAST to the base private feature identification algorithm. If the FEAST
feature is identified as a private feature, it is considered a true positive identi-
fication. If the FEAST feature is not a private feature, it is considered a false
positive. Figures 5.20 and 5.21 plot the ROC for various filter methods iden-
tifying the private features for regression models including the FEV1/FVC
and walking speed estimation respectively. Figures 5.22 and 5.23 show similar
ROC curves for classification models including the phone and user identifi-
cation models. The filter selection techniques perform similarly for the range
of privacy thresholds tested with similar number of false positive and nega-
tives for each particular classification target. We see that the top perform-
ing filter methods are the mutual information maximization, max-relavance
min-redundancy, joint mutual information and double input symmetrical rel-
evance methods. Both the conditional mutual information maximization and
conditional redundancy perform similarly to random guessing with the re-
maining features actually performing worse than random guessing. Interest-
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Figure 5.21: Walking Speed Filter
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Figure 5.22: Phone Identification
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Figure 5.23: User Identification Filter
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ingly, the same top features perform well for identifying the private features
necessary to conduct the user identification classification. However, the fil-
ter methods perform quite poorly for the phone identification task with all
methods tending to follow the diagonal best guess line.
Overall, we find that the filter selection techniques perform fairly well for
the private features identified during regression analysis. The MIM method
actually identifies 60% of the top private features before generating a false
positive. All methods do generate false positives and negatives; however,
they significantly reduce the computation time from days to mere minutes
with total runtime of the FEAST algorithm taking 8 minutes per target
feature. Unfortunately, the methods perform extremely poorly for phone
identification tasks and reduced accuracy for user identification.
Other Metrics to Predict Private Features
Ideally, a low computation metric would be useful to identify private fea-
tures eliminating the necessity of calculating an expensive feature elimina-
tion with forward selection search. We investigate three basic methods to
classify private features including k-means clustering, NMIS with the target
of the classifier, and a latent Dirichlet allocation feature scoring. The re-
sults are presented in Figures 5.24 and 5.25. We see that overall, the simple
normalized mutual information score is most effective at identifying private
features. The LDA scoring does an extremely poor job of classifying private
features giving results similar to random in the best case and actually order-
ing features in the inverse order in the worst case. The k-means also does
fairly well at classification actually beating the NMI for the phone ID. We
find that using the k-means clustering and normalized mutual information
with the target provide the best alternative to an expensive iterative search.
While the search is guaranteed to provide ground truth, algorithms which
require less computation are highly desirable for larger data sets with more
possible features. We finally note that the results from the filter analysis
agree with our recommendation to user the straight normalized mutual in-
formation. The top scoring filter method is actually the mutual information
maximization function. Furthermore, the max-relavance min-redundancy,
joint mutual information and double input symmetrical relevance methods
all scale the penalty term by 1
S
where S is the number of samples consid-
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ered. Since we are considering on the order of 10 k-1 M samples, this term is
negligible when calculating the scores. Thus, the top scoring filter methods
are simply using the normalized mutual information with the target of the
model.
Overall, we find the basic algorithm for private feature identification re-
turns the best estimate of the features important for the prediction models,
but require high computation. Computation time can be reduced by consid-
ering eliminating groups of features which have high NMIS inside the group.
However, this can lead to false positives. We reduce these false positives
giving a hybrid MIS method by only grouping features with high NMIS and
similar scoring during the first round of a forward sequential search using
a SVM/SVR classifier. If computation is extremely limited, the best non-
wrapper method to implement private feature selection is using the NMIS
with the target directly. This is computationally efficient at the expense of
a higher misclassification rate especially for models with many classification
targets such as user identification.
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5.2.3 Features Relevant to Privacy
We now identify the set of relevant private features out of the set of 2294
features contained in our full data set. We use the MIS algorithm outlined in
the previous section. The algorithm searches for the set of private features by
repeatedly searching for and removing the most predictive feature returning
the set of safe features which cannot provide a classification score higher than
the privacy threshold. The algorithm scores features using the highest F1-
score for classification models and the lowest mean absolute error attained
by removing the feature. We run for all target classification and regression
targets returning an ordered list of important sensor features. We adaptively
determine our privacy cutoff by calculating the point between the maximum
prediction accuracy determined during the forward sequential search and the
noise threshold. The sequential forward search is conducted using an SVM for
classification or an SVR for regression both using a radial basis kernel. The
noise threshold is determined by training the model with randomly generated
noise and averaging the prediction scores over all available testing data.
We investigate what features appear useful and must be hidden to protect
privacy. Table 5.7 lists the top 5 first identified private features per predic-
tion target. We see that each prediction target returns different top private
features. We break down the top features by sensor, features and sensor fea-
tures and compare the intersection of top features between prediction targets
in the subsequent sections.
Important Sensors
Figure 5.26 shows the percentage of sensors which were selected as top sensor
features for each classification target. We see three primary classes of results
for each target from the model. For targets with low prediction scores, the
distribution of chosen sensors has a tendency to be more uniform than models
with higher accuracy. This is unsurprising since models with lower accuracy
will be more likely to over fit to sensors which may not be highly predictive.
This is especially apparent in the COPDNW and FEV1NW which have a
nearly uniform distribution of selected sensors. We see two primary types of
useful information from the sensor linear motion and rotational motion. The
FEV1%, FEV1/FVC and weight models have higher accuracy when training
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Table 5.7: Top Five Private Features over All Prediction Targets
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Figure 5.26: Private Feature Rates per Sensor
on sensors related to rotation of the device as measured by the gyroscope.
Most other models attain higher accuracy looking at the linear motion sen-
sors. We see models for speed and activity showing little preference for which
reference frame used for the model. Interestingly, we see both user identifica-
tion and age choosing acceleration streams in the walking reference frames.
We finally note that the direction of walking and difference statistics of rela-
tive motion between forward and sway accelerations are almost never chosen
as private features. Intuitively, the walking direction should not help predict
these targets. Thus, not choosing the direction provides a nice sanity check
for the methods. We note that these three streams can be safely eliminated
for the remaining privacy analysis DirF, DirP and DirOff.
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Important Statistical Features
Figure 5.27 shows the percentage of chosen statistical features across all sen-
sors. We observe a wide variety of sensor features chosen as private features.
Overall, prediction targets with low overall scores once again have a tendency
toward a uniform distribution of statistical features. The important contri-
bution of this analysis are what statistical features do not leak significant
privacy leaks. The most noticeable features which contribute little to the
privacy include the signal fundamental frequency, signal covariance, spectral
minimum, spectral flatness, the three spectral tristimulus values, the spec-
tral inharmicity, spectral odd/even ration, ASDF kurtosis, ASDF minimum,
AMDF kurtosis and AMDF minimum. Identifying the features with little
contribution to privacy allows us to further reduce our set of total sensor
features from 31 * 74 = 2294 down to 28 sensors times 61 features for a
total of 28 * 61 = 1708 thus eliminating 26% of the sensor features from
consideration.
Important Sensor Statistical Features
Figure 5.28 lists the relative selection position of every sensor feature under
consideration. We notice that the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors con-
tribute greatly to most predictions. The gyroscope is particularly useful for
predicting COPD, FEV1%, phone identification, and weight. Gender, a pre-
diction with low classification accuracy, has the most uniform distribution of
sensor features. Prediction targets including activity, speed and steps have
higher prediction accuracy when using the accelerometer sensors. The dia-
gram more clearly illustrates that the direction, heartrate, and pulse oximeter
sensors give little predictive information. The rotation, magnetometer, and
gravity sensors give less information than the gyroscope and accelerometer.
However, as expected, many features give redundant information useful for
prediction requiring a wide consideration for the necessary noise to maintain
privacy in the raw data signal.
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Figure 5.27: Private Feature Rates per Feature
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Figure 5.28: Top Scoring Private Features per Sensor Feature
100
A
ct
iv
it
y
A
g
e
A
ll
A
g
e
N
W
A
g
e
W
C
o
p
d
A
ll
C
o
p
d
N
W
C
o
p
d
W
FE
V
1
A
ll
FE
V
1
N
W
FE
V
1
W
FE
V
1
/F
V
C
A
ll
FE
V
1
/F
V
C
N
W
FE
V
1
/F
V
C
W
G
e
n
d
e
rA
ll
G
e
n
d
e
rN
W
G
e
n
d
e
rW
H
e
ig
h
tA
ll
H
e
ig
h
tN
W
H
e
ig
h
tW
P
h
o
n
e
ID
A
ll
P
h
o
n
e
ID
N
W
P
h
o
n
e
ID
W
S
p
e
e
d
W
S
p
e
e
d
W
La
p
s
S
te
p
sW
U
se
rI
D
A
ll
U
se
rI
D
N
W
U
se
rI
D
W
W
e
ig
h
tA
ll
W
e
ig
h
tN
W
W
e
ig
h
tW
Target
Activity
AgeAll
AgeNW
AgeW
CopdAll
CopdNW
CopdW
FEV1All
FEV1NW
FEV1W
FEV1/FVCAll
FEV1/FVCNW
FEV1/FVCW
GenderAll
GenderNW
GenderW
HeightAll
HeightNW
HeightW
PhoneIDAll
PhoneIDNW
PhoneIDW
SpeedW
SpeedWLaps
StepsW
UserIDAll
UserIDNW
UserIDW
WeightAll
WeightNW
WeightW
T
a
rg
e
t
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
%
 C
h
o
se
n
 o
v
e
rl
a
p
p
in
g
 T
o
p
 F
e
a
tu
re
s
Figure 5.29: Intersection of Private Features among Targets
Comparing Private Features among Prediction Targets
Figure 5.29 gives a clearer picture of the intersection of private sensor fea-
tures between predictions. We see that overall overlap varies per prediction
target. Unsurprisingly, many prediction targets demonstrate strong corre-
lation of private features between walking, non-walking and combined data
sets. Optimistically, the overlap between user identification and other pre-
dictions is relatively small. This is primarily due to user identification having
a smaller number of private features. Overall, we see a high rate of overlap
between phone identification and health classification including FEV1% and
COPD classification. Activity also overlaps with most predictive targets due
to the high number of private features. Figure 5.30 demonstrates the relative
number of private sensor features per predictive target. We see that many
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Figure 5.30: Number of Private Features per Target
predictive targets contain fewer than 500 private features removed to lower
the predictive power below the 0.5 threshold. We notice that targets with
an extremely high number of private features also attain low prediction ac-
curacy. We surmise this is an indication of over fitting in the models which
will be addressed in Chapter 6.
5.3 Conclusions
We have analyzed various feature selection routines in this chapter finding
that filter and wrapper methods differ significantly in the top features identi-
fied. We investigated the effect of redundant features in top feature selection
algorithms finding that subsets of features with high correlation can be iden-
tified and classified with similar levels of predictability. We then developed
algorithms to identify the set of all private features which can be useful to
conduct a prediction. While effective, our initial algorithms are computa-
tionally expensive requiring optimization. We therefore use NMI clustering
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to reduce computation time evaluating the optimized and unoptimized algo-
rithm for accuracy and runtime. We also evaluated the ability of traditional
feature selection and feature evaluation statistics to identify private features.
We find that using the original NMIS between features and target variables
is the most accurate low computation method to identify the set of private
features but still produces false positives and negatives against our baseline
algorithm.
We determined the private features for all thirty predictive targets in our
data set. We find significant overlap in both sensors and features requiring
further analysis of the relative sensitivity between features for each target to
determine the ability of obfuscating one prediction while leaving the other.
We do identify thirteen features and three sensors not useful for predictions
allowing us to reduce our total number of sensitive features by 26% to 1,708
sensor features. We determine the relative sensitivity of each sensor feature
to give accurate predictions and design privacy obfuscation methods using
this identified set of private features in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 6
PREDICTION MODELS
In this chapter, we consider various classification and regression models and
evaluate their ability to predict sensitive information when trained with the
top selected features presented in Chapter 5. Each classification model is
trained using a given set of features X to predict a given target Y. For
optimization, each model’s hyperparameters are chosen using a grid search
for the highest scoring model with reasonable boundaries depending on the
model type. Once the ideal hyperparameters are found, the model is trained
and cross validated using standard ten-fold cross validation. Once the model
accuracy is determined, the chapter will finish by presenting novel methods to
estimate the sensitivity of each feature in X to the target predictions Y. This
analysis will be used in Chapter 7 to design privacy obfuscation techniques.
6.1 Classification Models
Classification models are designed to predict what class a group of input data
belongs to or indicates. Each model is trained with a set of input parame-
ters and target values. The model then determines cutoff points in the data
to later classify unknown input as one of the previously trained classes. We
now evaluate various classification models in their ability to predict classes in-
cluding phone identification, user identification, gender, activity, and COPD
status.
6.1.1 K-Nearest Neighbors
K-Nearest Neighbors or k-NN classification is perhaps the simplest algorithm
in classification [91]. All training points are retained as a set of feature
vectors with corresponding target values. When a new input feature vector
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is presented, the algorithm searches for the k closest input feature vectors and
predicts the target class using simple a majority vote of the most represented
target in the set. The k parameter can be adjusted to optimize prediction
accuracy to the underlying feature distribution.
6.1.2 Naive Bayes
Nave Bayes seeks to choose a classification target which reflects the prior
observations used for training by defining an estimator ŷ which estimates
the most likely y given an input feature vector x [92]. Formally, it looks for
the best target y satisfying P (y|x1, x2, ..., xN) where the feature vector X
contains N observations. We can represent this conditional probability using
Bayes theorem (6.1). Of course, estimating the joint probability distribution
given in (6.2) is not trivial. Thus, the “Naive” assumption of independence is
assumed between all input features (6.3). This yields the simplification of the
numerator with the conditional probability being replaced with the product
of the independent conditional probability of each feature given the output
target y. For our prediction of the best y, we can drop the denominator since
the numerator is proportional to the joint probability (6.4). This yields the
final estimator ŷ as the y that yields the maximum product of the probability
of Y and the joint distributions of each feature value conditioned on the
trained targets (6.5).
P (y) is estimated using maximum a posteriori estimation which conve-
niently simplifies to the number of times the target y is observed divided by
the total number of observations. The conditional probability can be mod-
eled by a few distributions. Since the feature vectors in our training set are
sampled from continuous distributions, we will model the conditional prob-
ability using the Gaussian distribution (6.6). This assumes the observations
are sampled from a normally distributed continuous distribution. The para-
maters µy and γy are calculated using maximum likelihood for each feature
xn for each target y.
P (y|x1, x2, ..., xN) = P (y)P (x1, x2, ..., xN |y)
P (x1, x2..., xN)
(6.1)
P (xn|y, x1, ..., xn−1, xn+1, ..., xN) = P (xn|y) (6.2)
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P (y|x1, x2, ..., xN) = P (y)
∏N
n=1 P (xn|y)
P (x1, x2..., xN)
(6.3)
P (y|x1, x2, ..., xN) ∝ P (y)
N∏
n=1
P (xn|y) (6.4)
ŷ = arg max
y
P (y)
N∏
n=1
P (xn|y) (6.5)
P (xn|y) = 1√
2piσ2y
e
− (x−µy)
2
2σ2y (6.6)
6.1.3 Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
Quadratic discriminant analysis uses the covariance between variables to es-
timate the particular class of a given set of inputs [93]. Once again, the
variables are assumed to have a Gaussian distribution; however, no assump-
tion is made of the independence of the features. We are again looking for
the probability of a given target y given a set of x inputs. This can be rep-
resented by Bayes theorem (6.8). The probability of x, P (x), is constant to
all the comparative classifications and can be ignored. The probability of
y, P (y), is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation to be the rela-
tive frequency counts of the target y divided by the total observations (θ).
The conditional probability distribution P (x|y) is given by the multivariate
Gaussian distribution (6.7) where k is the number of samples, µ is the mean
of each feature x for the given target and
∑
is the covariance.
We can then define an estimator ŷ to predict the class. This corresponds
to the maximum logarithmic a posteriori given by taking the logarithm of the
multivariate Gaussian distribution multiplied by the prior. Once again, the
(2pi)−
k
2 term is a constant to all estimates and can be ignored. This gives the
final terms of the estimator which includes a multiplication yielding an x2
quadratic term (6.9). Classification is once again conducted by calculating
(6.9) for every value of y and choosing the class with the greatest value (6.10).
f(x) = (2pi)
k
2 |
∑
|− 12 e− 12 (x−µ)′
∑−1(x−µ) (6.7)
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P (y|x) = P (x|y)P (y)
P (x)
=
fy(x)θy
c
(6.8)
δy(x) = ln(((2pi)
− k
2 |∑ |− 12 e− 12 (x−µy)′∑−1(x−µy)) ∗ θy)
≈ −1
2
ln|∑ |− 12 − 1
2
(x− µy)′
∑−1(x− µy) + ln θy (6.9)
ŷ = arg max
y
δy(x) (6.10)
6.1.4 Decision Trees
Decision trees conduct classification by constructing a binary search tree
with splits at each node made based on the input vector and the target of
the classification in the leaf nodes [94, 95]. The algorithm iteratively builds
the tree by recursively splitting the nodes until either the leaves only contains
a single target or the tree reaches the maximum depth parameter. For each
potential split, the algorithm calculates the fraction of targets which are
contained in each potentially created leaf (6.11). The split is chosen with
the minimum Gini impurity score (6.12). Intuitively, the Gini impurity score
maximizes the number of unique targets contained in the split with an ideal
score of zero having the split contain the complete subsets of each labeled
target in the new leaf nodes.
fi =
1
N
∑
k∈N
I(yk = i) (6.11)
H(f) =
N∑
n=1
fn(1− fn) =
N∑
n=1
(fn− f 2n) =
N∑
n=1
fn−
N∑
n=1
f 2n = 1−
N∑
n=1
f 2n (6.12)
Classification is conducted by traversing the tree with the input vector X.
The nodes are traversed according to the corresponding training rules and
the predicted target ŷ is chosen at the reached leaf node. Decision trees work
well at fitting the data exactly in noisy environments, but suffer severely
from over-fitting in the presence of noise. Thus, two ensemble methods are
often used in conjunction with decision trees including bagging and random
forests [96, 97].
Bagging attempts to average the effect of over-fitting by training numer-
ous decision trees on randomly sampled subsets of the training data with
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replacement. The final classification is then conducted by taking the average
probability for the answer from the generated trees.
Random forest decision trees also train multiple decision trees to reduce
over-fitting. The training data is subsampled similarly to bagging, but the
random forests train multiple decision trees per sample with each tree only
training on a subset of the total number of input training vectors. Once
again, the classification is conducted using the average probability of the
answer over all the trees. This method also allows the importance of the
individual features to be assessed by returning the score of the sub-trees
which are trained on the individual features.
6.1.5 Support Vector Machines
Support vector machines are a class of machine learning algorithms which al-
low classification by remapping training data into a higher dimensional space
and determining sets of hyperplanes that separate classes [98]. These hyper-
planes called “support vectors” are calculated to maximize the separation
between data points in the given space. Formally, the algorithm searches
for the set of hyperparameters given by w which satisfies (6.13) subject to
(6.14).
min
w,b,γ
1
2
wTw + C
N∑
n=1
ξn (6.13)
yn(w
Tφ(xn) + b) ≥ 1− ξn, ξ ≥ 1, n = 1, ..., N, y = {−1, 1} (6.14)
Here w is the matrix of optimal support vectors. The mapping of the input
vector of length N to higher dimensions is conducting by the φ operator.
Outliers from the training data which may not be separable are handled
with an error term ξ with C as an input parameter to the model controlling
the penalty for incorrectly separated data points. This optimization problem
is solved by introducing Lagrange multipliers and forming the dual (6.15)
subject to (6.16). The decision function is then reduced to (6.17), where
a positive sign indicates a predicted Y classification of 1 and a negative
sign indicates a predicted Y classification of −1. While various choices for
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kernels are possible, the two investigated in this dissertation are the linear
kernel K(xn, x) = 〈xn, x〉 and the radial basis kernel K(xn, x) = e−γ|xn−x|2 .
min
α
1
2
N∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
αmαnymynk(xm, xn)−
N∑
n=1
αn (6.15)
N∑
n=1
αnyn = 0, 0 ≤ αn ≤ C ∀n = 1, ..., N (6.16)
sgn(
N∑
n=1
ynαnK(xn, x)− ρ) (6.17)
Obviously, the formulation given is a binary classifier. To conduct classi-
fication with more than two groups, a one-versus-one classification strategy
is conducted with the final classification being the majority vote from the
classifiers. Specifically, if there are k distinct targets, the classifier with train
k∗(k−1)
2
classifiers or one for each pair of unique targets. The prediction will
then be the target that gets the most votes from among the classifiers.
6.2 Regression Models
Regression models predict the value of a continuous variable based on a given
input vector. We will consider multiple types of regression models to predict
the continuous targets in our data set including the age, weight, height,
distance walked, FEV1% and FEV1/FVC.
6.2.1 Classical Regression
The simplest form of regressions fit a line directly correlating the inputs
x and outputs y. These methods have the advantage of being extremely
fast; however, input features that do not have linear relationships cannot
be properly represented. Additionally, the linear methods can be extremely
sensitive to noise in the input data. Thus, the simplicity often severely limits
the utility of the linear regression methods. We evaluate a simple linear
regression which chooses coefficients to minimize the ordinary least square
problem as shown in (6.18).
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min
w
||Xw − y|| (6.18)
Since we have noisy data, we also evaluate ridge regression which attempts
to limit the effect of noise in creating unreasonably large coefficients by in-
troducing a penalty as shown in (6.19) [99].
min
w
||Xw − y||+ α||w|| (6.19)
Our final classical model is the Bayesian ridge regression which assumes
the output y is represented by a multivariate Gaussian distribution centered
around X and w (6.20) [100]. The values of the w coefficients are estimated
using a prior of independent coefficients estimated from the data during train-
ing (6.21). The Bayesian ridge regression has the advantage of allowing for
error during the training and estimation of the regression since the param-
eters are drawn from Gaussian distributions. This gives the model more
versatility to fit the training data.
p(y|X,w, α) = N (y|X,w, α) (6.20)
p(w|λ) = N (w|0, λ−1I) (6.21)
6.2.2 k-Nearest Neighbors Regression
The k-nearest neighbors regression retains all points used during training
[101]. To predict the output value, the k nearest training points are selected
with the prediction being the average value among the k points. Similar to
the k-NN classifier, the value of k is a user selectable hyperparameter.
6.2.3 Regression Trees
Regression trees are constructed in a similar manner to decision trees. Both
methods construct a binary search tree with splits made at each node based
on the target values in the training data for a given input vector [95]. Unlike
the decision trees which split based on Gini impurity score, the regression
trees choose the split to minimize the mean square error for each set of
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training data represented in the new nodes (6.22). The final leaves hold the
average values seen in the training data for their respective branches in the
tree. Regression is conducted by traversing the tree choosing the split based
on the given input vector X with the predicted output y being the averaged
value in the leaf node. Regression trees can also be susceptible to over-fitting.
As with decision trees, both bagging and random forest trees are ensemble
methods which can help generalize the models.
H(f) = 1
N
∑
n∈N(yn − cf )2
cf =
1
N
∑
n∈N yn
(6.22)
6.2.4 Support Vector Regression
Support vector regression (SVR) uses the same underlying theory used for
support vector classification to predict value from a continuous distribution
[98]. Instead of predicting the exact output value, the SVR predicts values
within a margin of ε basically grouping output values within this margin to
similar classes. Since the prediction predicts either above or below the mean,
the margin of error term ξ is expanded to misclassification above the mean
ξ and below the mean ξ∗. Once again, the method seeks a set of coefficients
to minimize (6.23) under the constraint that the linear fit must be within
the error term ε with C setting the penalty for misclassification. The dual
optimization problem introduces the terms α and α∗ (6.24). The prediction
function is then given in (6.25) giving the estimate for the output value y.
minw
1
2
||w||2 + C∑Nn=1(ξn + ξ∗n)
yn − wxn − b ≤ ε+ ξn, ξn ≥ 0
wxn + b− yn ≤ ε+ ξ∗n, ξ∗n ≥ 0
(6.23)
minα,α∗
1
2
(α− α∗)TK(xi, x)(α− α∗) + εeT (α− α∗)− yT (α− α∗)
eT (α− α∗) = 0, 0 ≤ αn, α∗n ≤ C, n = 1, ..., N
(6.24)
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y =
N∑
n=1
(αn − α∗n)K(xn, x) + b (6.25)
6.2.5 Gaussian Process Regression
Gaussian process regression predicts the output target by modeling the in-
put features as sets of normally distributed random variables [102]. Gaussian
process regression defines an estimator ŷ to estimate the output y after trans-
forming the input features using a Gaussian function h(). It is assumed that
the ŷ is also Gaussian with noise  (6.26) giving a Gaussian ∼ N (h(xn), n)
leaving the mean of the estimator h(xn). This assumes that h() is also Gaus-
sian such that ∼ N (0, k) where k is the specified kernel function estimating
the covariance between x values. K(X,X∗) is defined to be a m by m kernel
matrix such that (K(X,X∗))ij = k(xi, x∗j). Using these assumptions, we
can define the Gaussian estimate of the distribution of input variables, the
Gaussian estimate of the noise, and combine the estimates into an estima-
tor of the output variables ŷ (6.27). Equation (6.28) follows directly from
rules conditioning Gaussians. Therefore given an training set X and a set of
corresponding kernel functions, we can obtain an estimate for the value of ŷ.
ŷi = h(xn) + n, n = 1, ..., N (6.26)
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[
h
h∗
]
|X,X∗ ∼ N
(
0,
[
K(X,X) K(X,X∗)
K(X∗, X) K(X∗, X∗)
])
[

∗
]
∼ N
(
0,
[
σ2I 0
0T σ2I
])
[
ŷ
ŷ∗
]
|X,X∗ =
[
h
h∗
]
+
[

∗
]
∼ N
(
0,
[
K(X,X) + σ2I) K(X,X∗)
K(X∗, X)) K(X∗, X∗) + σ2I
])
(6.27)
P (ŷ∗|ŷ, X,X∗) ∼ N (µ∗, σ∗)
µ∗ = K(X∗, X)(K(X,X) + σ2I)−1ŷ
σ∗ = K(X∗, X∗) + σ2I−
K(X∗, X)(K(X,X) + σ2I)−1K(X,X∗)
(6.28)
6.3 Optimized Models and Prediction Accuracy
Previous work has used each of the presented models to conduct both clas-
sification and regression. We now evaluate each of our classification and re-
gression targets using each model and feature selection method. While many
previous works have been vague in presenting details about hyper-parameter
selection and cross-validation methods, we seek to optimize each model type
both in terms of hyperparameter selection and cross-fold validation. We will
then present the results of the best feature selection and models which have
been carefully optimized and trained.
6.3.1 Model Optimization
We test nine classification algorithms and nine regression algorithms for all
targets. Each model is evaluated using a ten-fold cross validation which
divides the data into ten equal pieces, trains on nine pieces, and evaluates
on the held out piece. This process is repeated so every set of pieces is used
once as evaluation and the results are averaged to attain the final F1-score
(for classification) or mean absolute error (for regression). This process helps
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to reduce overly optimistic estimates due to over fitting of the model.
Additionally, many models have various hyperparameters which need to be
chosen. These parameters yield better models depending on the underlying
data distributions of the training data. Since the distributions are largely
unknown, it is common practice to train multiple models while sweeping
over reasonable hyperparameters. The model with the best score is generally
chosen and the same hyperparameters are used for further training. To reduce
over fitting, we use a three-fold cross validation while training our models to
select the ideal hyperparameters. For the support vector classification and
support vector regression, we test both linear and radial basis kernels with
C values of 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10 and 100 and gamma values with logarithmic
steps from 10−12 to 0.1. We sweep over nearest neighbors for k-nearest-
neighbor classification and regression from 10% to 90% of total samples used
as nearest neighbors. Both bagged and random forest decision tree models
are trained sweeping from 10 to 110 base trees. Linear regression is tested
using an alpha value ranging from 10−5 to 10 in log space. Finally, the linear
ridge regression is tested from 10−5 to 10 in log space for the alpha1, alpha2,
lambda1 and lambda2 values.
The goal of the proposed analysis is to select the model most accurate
for each prediction and to produce a cross-validated estimate which more
accurately demonstrates the model’s accuracy against over fitting. For each
target, the nine classification or regression algorithms are first optimized
using three-fold cross validation over all hyperparameters for the selected
model. The optimal hyperparameters are then used to train a ten-fold cross-
validated model. The cross-validated model with the highest classification
score or lowest regression score is then selected as the optimal model for the
prediction.
6.3.2 Choosing the Optimal Model
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 plot the percentage of times each model type is cho-
sen when choosing the optimal model over all classification and regression
optimizations. We see that the random forest classifier and support vector
machine with radial basis kernels are most likely to have the highest accuracy
for classification tasks. For regression, we find that the k-nearest neighbors
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Figure 6.1: Top Classification
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Figure 6.2: Top Regression Methods
and support vector regressions attain the lowest absolute mean error. Over-
all, the classification algorithms have more variation in the selection of top
classifiers. The regression models are less varied with linear, Bayesian and
tree based models having a much lower chance of being selected. It is par-
ticularly interesting that the decision trees, random forest tress, and bagged
trees perform much poorer in regression tasks than classification tasks. This
may be due to the added error of averaging between leaf nodes necessary
during regression tasks.
While the SVM and random forest trees are generally the most accurate
models for each task, the overall difference in accuracies between models for
classification are actually fairly similar. This is unsurprising considering that
many previous works have used each model to create accurate predictions.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 plot the min, average and maximum F1-scores of each
optimized model for all feature selection methods. We see that the methods
all predict activity with fairly high accuracies (F1-score greater than 0.9).
The phone identification performs more poorly with the SVM and random
forest giving the highest F1-scores of 0.8 and other models giving less accu-
racy ranging from 0.6-0.8. The accuracy per model type for speed is plotted
in Figure 6.5. We notice that the Gaussian process regression performs ex-
tremely poor on outliers often returning absurd results. The figure is redrawn
with a more reasonable axes in Figure 6.6. Once again, most models perform
fairly well with the SVR yielding the lowest absolute error of 0.15 m/s. Thus,
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Figure 6.4: Phone Identification
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Figure 6.5: Speed Regression Model
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Regression Model Accuracy
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Figure 6.8: Best Prediction Accuracy
for Speed Estimation
with exception of the GPR most models produce reasonable results when op-
timized; however, we find that support vector regression is most likely to be
the best for regression tasks and support vector classification and random
forest trees are most likely to be the best for classification tasks.
6.3.3 Comparing Feature Selection Accuracy
In Chapter 5, we found that feature selection routines varied widely in the
sets of top features used for prediction. We now test the predictions with
each of the fifteen feature selection techniques previously presented. Figure
6.7 lists the average best F1-score for each classification model over all clas-
sification targets. In general, most filter feature selection techniques appear
to perform similarly. We see small performance gains in the JMI, CMIM and
mRMR filter methods which affirms previous work which recommended the
use of JMI as the default selection method [76]. We see that selecting the top
features using k-means clustering performs worse than other methods which
were tested. We also see that the SVM sequential forward search attains the
highest accuracy overall. Since the scale of absolute average errors varies
among regression methods, we plot a single regression, speed estimation, in
Figure 6.8. In regression, we see more variation with the average performance
in all cases. However, we still see that using the SVMFS wrapper method
produces the lowest error in every model tested. Thus, we recommend run-
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Figure 6.10: Best Prediction
Accuracy for Regressions
ning the SVMFS for the highest accuracy. If computation power is limited,
then we affirm that the JMI method overall produces the most accurate re-
sults for filter methods and recommend against using k-means clustering to
select features.
6.3.4 Prediction Accuracies
After choosing the best feature selection technique and optimizing each ma-
chine learning model with 10-fold cross validation, we can now present an es-
timate of the prediction accuracies for each of our targets. Figure 6.9 demon-
strates the F1-scores of each target. We find that predicting walking/non-
walking activity is the most accurate with close to 99% accuracy over all
samples using an optimized SVM with radial basis kernel trained using the
features from the SVM sequential forward search. Phone identification is
also quite accurate during periods of non-walking with scores above 0.91 for
ten phones. COPD status classification attains an average F1-score of 0.87.
User identification accuracy is quite low with walking identification F1-score
of 0.31. Our sample size of 88 subjects is much larger than most previous
work in subject identification. While previous work in user identification
was conducted in carefully controlled laboratory settings, our walking in-
cludes many samples of free, unconstrained walking. However, we believe
the decrease in accuracy is primarily caused by the ten-fold cross validation.
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When testing so many subjects, the ten-fold cross validation can easily (and
often) leaves out training for a subset of labeled targets. If we add the con-
straint that all ten-fold cross validation must have samples from all users,
we attain F1-scores of 0.87, 0.93, and 0.82 for user identification all, walking,
and not walking respectively (as shown). We find gender attains low predic-
tion scores. Gender prediction with an average of 0.61 barely attains better
than a random binary classification.
Figure 6.10 presents the regression scores for the optimal regression models.
We find that our methodology predicts speed with less than 0.08 meter per
second error. We find that trained step regression models with roughly 1.5
step error over a ten second window perform more poorly than the anomaly
detection techniques used in our own previous work. Our models predict
the age of the subject within a ten-year period and the vital capacity within
11%. Unfortunately, the height had an average accuracy of three inches, the
weight had an accuracy of thirty kilograms and the FEV1% scores roughly
20%. Since the ranges of target height had a standard deviation of 3.7 inches,
weight 40 kilograms and FEV1% 14.7%, each model returns errors roughly
equivalent to the standard deviation in the target’s range making the pre-
dictions from the model statistically of little significance. Thus, we find our
models can return predictions for speed, age, and FEV1/FVC with significant
accuracy but are less accurate when predicting FEV1%, height, or weight.
Steps are significant but less accurate than traditional step detection routines
thus limiting the usefulness of the machine learning step models.
6.4 Estimating Sensitivity
Machine learning algorithms use sophisticated statistical models which of-
ten find underlying correlations in input vectors which are both non-trivial
and non-obvious. While this makes the models useful for prediction, it also
presents great difficulty in designing privacy techniques to protect the data.
In order to protect the targets of the inference, we now present methods
to estimate the amount of sensitivity S of an input vector given a machine
learning model trained to predict a target T . Intuitively, knowing the average
amount of change required in the input feature to affect the prediction target
naturally leads to an intuition of the amount of obfuscation to maintain the
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Result: List of Sensitivities
for training sample ts do
for target t do
for feature f do
Target distance[f] = distance from ts to decision boundary
end
end
Training sample distance[f] = min(target distance[f])
end
Sensitivity[f] = average(training sample distance[f]
Algorithm 4: Average Sensitivity for General Classifier
privacy of the target.
The following sections use the underlying theory of each model to design
algorithms which estimate the sensitivity of the input feature to the predic-
tion target. For classifiers, this is an estimation of the average distance of
the input feature to the decision boundary. The derived algorithms calculate
the distance for an individual feature calculated per training sample with
the average distance over every training sample giving the estimate of sen-
sitivity for each feature per target. In many cases, this can be represented
by an equation giving a closed-form solution for the distance to the decision
boundary. To estimate the sensitivity for the regression models, we estimate
the ratio of change in input feature to change in output feature for each
specific training point. The sensitivity will be defined as the change in out-
put feature per unit change in input feature for each training point with the
overall sensitivity being the average sensitivity per feature and target over
all training points.
Numerous classification models internally use formulas or algorithms which
allow direct calculation of the distance from a specified point to the decision
boundary of the classifier. The general form of the algorithm used to get
the average sensitivity when the distance is known is given in Algorithm
4. The sensitivity is calculated per feature as the average change in the
feature over all training samples to change the classification. Of course, the
amount of change required is the distance to the nearest decision boundary
or the minimum across all possible decision boundaries. Thus the estimated
sensitivity of a given feature is calculated to be the average minimum change
required to cause the classification to differ from the true predicted value.
The following sections will outline how the distances to the decision boundary
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are extracted for each classifier.
6.4.1 Naive Bayes Classification
Recall that the estimator ŷ selects the classification with the maximum score
for a given input point x∀n ∈ N as given in (6.29). Therefore, the deci-
sion boundary is the point at which the score for a given target y1 is equal
to y2 (6.30). Substituting the Gaussian distance metric for the conditional
probability and pi1 and pi2 for the maximum likelihood priors for y1 and y2,
respectively, yields (6.31).
ŷ = max
y
p(y)
N∏
n=1
p(xn|y) (6.29)
p(y1)
N∏
n=1
p(xn, y1) = p(y2)
N∏
n=1
p(xn|y2) (6.30)
pi1
N∏
n=1
1√
2piσ21n
e
− (xn−µ1n )
2
2σ21n = pi2
N∏
n=1
1√
2piσ22n
e
− (xn−µ2n )
2
2σ22n (6.31)
We are only interested in the change per feature f for which we are esti-
mating the sensitivity. Fixing the other features and separating the terms we
get (6.32). Taking the logarithm and re-arranging terms gives (6.33). This
allows us to solve for the point xf which is the distance from the training
point to the decision plane for the feature f from the quadratic equation
given in (6.34). Of course the final distance for feature n is the difference
between the original training point xn and the point on the decision plane
xf (6.35). The minimum distance between the training point xn and each xf
for each available target is then taken as the minimum change required to
cause a misclassification. This is then averaged over all training points for
each feature to get the average sensitivity of each feature.
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pi1
1√
2piσ21f
e
−
(xf−µ1f )
2
2σ21f
N∏
n=16=f
e
− (xn−µ1n )
2
2σ21n =
pi2
1√
2piσ22f
e
−
(xn−µ2f )
2
2σ22f
N∏
n=16=f
e
− (xn−µ2n )
2
2σ22n
(6.32)
(xf − µ1f )2
2σ21f
− (xf − µ2f )
2
2σ22f
= ln
pi1
√
2piσ22f
pi2
√
2piσ21f
−
N∑
n=16=f
(xn − µ1n)2
2σ21n
+
N∑
n=16=f
(xn − µ2n)2
2σ22n
(6.33)
x2f (2σ
2
2f
− 2σ21f ) + xf (4σ21fµ2f − 4σ22fµ1f )+
2σ22fµ
2
1f
− 2σ21fµ22f − ln
pi1
√
2piσ22f
pi2
√
2piσ21f

+
N∑
n=16=f
(xn − µ1n)2
2σ21n
−
N∑
n=16=f
(xn − µ2n)2
2σ22n
= 0
(6.34)
dn = abs (xf − xn) (6.35)
6.4.2 Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
Quadratic discriminant analysis also allows us to derive a distance estimation
from an arbitrary point to the decision boundary. Quadratic discriminant
analysis chooses the classification that maximizes the discriminant function
as given in (6.36) which is equal to the formula given in (6.37) after sub-
stituting the maximum likelihood prior estimate piy, and taking the singular
value decomposition of the covariance matrix to get the singular values S,
the covariance inverse matrix R, and the input point P = x − µ. In this
formula, the summations over the matrices are written out with sums over
all C target classes and F features. Once again, the point of interest is when
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the value of the discriminant is equal for the given points or when P satisfies
(6.38) for arbitrary targets 1 and 2.
δ(y) = −1
2
ln|
∑
|− 12 − 1
2
(x− µy)′(
∑
)−1(x− µy) + ln θy (6.36)
δ(y) = −1
2
 C∑
c=1
ln(S) +
C∑
c=1
(
F∑
f=i
Rfc ∗ Pf
)2+ lnpiy (6.37)
−∑Cc=1 (∑Ff=iR1fc ∗ P1f)2 +∑Cc=1 (∑Ff=iR2fc ∗ P2f)2 = t
t =
∑C
c=1 ln(S1)−
∑C
c=1 ln(S2) + 2 ln
pi2
pi1
(6.38)
Given an arbitrary point x, we are interested in the distance between the
point and the decision plane. Letting P1 = x−µ1 and P2 = x−µ2 and adding
a slack variable xk representing the distance on the k feature axis of interest
yields (6.39). Factoring out the xk terms and defining convenience functions
C1 and C2 yields (6.40). Rearranging terms, yields the quadratic equation
given in (6.41). Once again, the distance is defined to be the difference
between the given point xn and the point on the decision plane xk given in
(6.42).
−
C∑
c=1
(
F∑
f=i 6=k
(R1fc ∗ P1f ) + (xk + P1k)R1kc
)2
+
C∑
c=1
(
F∑
f=i 6=k
(R2fc ∗ P2f ) + (xk + P1k)R1kc
)2
= t
(6.39)
−∑Cc=1 (xk ∗R1kc + C1c)2 +∑Cc=1 (xk ∗R2kc + C2c)2 = t
C1c =
∑F
f=iR1fc ∗ P1f
C2c =
∑F
f=iR2fc ∗ P2f
(6.40)
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x2k
C∑
c=1
(R22fc −R21fc) + xk
C∑
c=1
(2R2fcC2c − 2R1fcC1c) +
C∑
c=1
(C22c − C21c)− t = 0
(6.41)
dn = abs (xk − xn) (6.42)
6.4.3 Decision Trees
Result: List of Windows
extractWindows(node, bounds);
if leaf node then
if bounds != None then
windows.add(bounds, node.target)
end
else
if node.feature == feature then
windows = extractWindows(node.right child, (bounds[0], node.threshold)
windows = extractWindows(node.left child, (node.threshold, bounds[1])
else
if sample[node.feature] < node.threshold then
windows = extractWindows(node.left child, bounds)
else
windows = extractWindows(nod.right child, bounds)
end
end
end
return windows
Algorithm 5: Get Ranges of Feature Values That Predict Each Target
The average sensitivity using a decision tree model is once again calculated
using Algorithm 4 to estimate the average variation per parameter. The
distance or amount of change to change the classification is estimated using
the recursive algorithm given in Algorithm 5. Given a root node in the tree,
the algorithm searches the tree extracting the ranges of values of feature
which predict each target assuming all other features in the given sample are
kept constant. Thus, the algorithm will explore both sub-branches of the tree
if the comparison feature of the node matches feature. The recursion down
the left node sets the decision threshold of the node to the maximum bound
of the window while the recursion down the right node sets the minimum
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bound of the window. If the node does not make a decision based on the
feature of interest, then the algorithm only explores the portion of the tree
which would be selected based on the fixed features in sample. Of course,
if the node is a leaf node, the current bounds and target set are added to
windows. The final output is then the list of every set of bounds that will
predict a specific target. This list is then parsed to determined which target
in the set has the highest number of votes and merges adjacent windows with
different target sets which would provide the same classification. Finally, the
distance of the feature is set to the minimum distance between the original
point of interest and the upper or lower bound of the window which contains
the point.
The decision tree sensitivity algorithm can also be used to estimate the
sensitivities of ensemble methods including bagging and random forest tress.
In both cases, the average sensitivities of all sampled bagged decision trees
and all subsampled random forest decision trees can be determined by taking
the minimum, maximum or average values from the sub-trees in the classifier.
6.4.4 Support Vector Machines
SVMs are a binary classifier which uses a set of support vectors to calculate
a given classification. We consider three popular implementations of the
classifier including the SVC with linear and radial basis kernels which uses a
set of one-versus-one classifiers and the linear SVC library which uses a set of
one-versus-many classifiers. The one-versus-many method strategy used in
the SVC routines creates a classifier which makes a binary decision between
each target class. Thus, the decision point is when the prediction equals zero
(6.43) with y, α and ρ being trained constants from the model and sv being
one of the V support vectors. We calculate the decision point with a linear
kernel by plugging in the formula for the kernel (6.44) into (6.43). Once
again, taking the constants from the trained model and setting all but the
selected feature of interest as constants yields (6.45). Solving this equation
gives the point of the decision plane for the feature of interest for the SVC
model using a linear kernel (6.46). The distance is then calculated as the
distance between the point of interest n and the decision point (6.47).
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0 =
V∑
v=1
yvαvk(sv,x) + ρ (6.43)
k(sv,x) = s
T
v x =
V∑
i=1
svixi (6.44)
V∑
v=1
yiαi
(
F∑
i=16=f
svixi + svfxf
)
+ ρ = 0 (6.45)
xf =
−ρ−∑Vv=1 yvαv∑Fi=16=f svixi∑V
v=1 yvαvxvf
(6.46)
dn = abs (xf − xn) (6.47)
Once the distance from each individual one-versus-one classifier is deter-
mined, it is then possible to determine the minimum change of the feature
value required to change the classification vote. This is done algorithmi-
cally as given in Algorithm 6. First, the current classification for the given
point is determined. The total number of votes is then calculated for all
one-versus-one classifiers. The votes for the current classification are stored
in swingvotes. The list is sorted by ascending by distance. The algorithm
then changes the swingvotes one at a time until the classification changes
and returns the minimum distance necessary to change the vote.
The linear SVM method uses a one-versus-all approach to solve the direct
SVC problem. This method while faster than the SVC method sacrifices some
classification accuracy for speed and computational efficiency. Specifically,
it chooses the class which yields the highest score given by the set of linear
relationships in (6.48). Thus, the distance to each decision boundary is the
value for x which makes the score for a given classification 1 equal to the
score for a given classification 2 (6.49). Plugging in the trained values from
the model for w and b and setting all but the feature of interest to constants
yields an equation for the critical point of decision for a given feature (6.50).
In the case of only two targets, the decision function is binary with only a
single row of values for w and the critical point when the right side of (6.49)
is zero. The decision point for this case is given in (6.51) and the distance
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Result: Sensitivity
votes = array of votes per class
class = argmax(votes)
for each vote do
if vote.winner == class then
swingvotes.add(vote.distance, vote.winner, vote.loser)
end
end
swingvotes.sort(ascending by distance) for each swingvote sv do
votes[sv.winner] -= 1
votes[sv.loser] += 1
distance = sv.distance
if argmax(votes != current) then
break
end
end
return distance
Algorithm 6: Calculate Sensitivity of One-versus-One SVC
between the point of interest and the decision point is again given in (6.47).
maxwTφ(x) + b (6.48)
F∑
i=1
w1ixi + b1 =
F∑
i=1
w2ixi + b2 (6.49)
xf =
b2 − b1 +
∑F
i=16=f xi(w2i − w1i)
w1f − w2f (6.50)
xf =
−b−∑Fi=16=f xiwi
wf
(6.51)
The final SVC model considered is the SVC with a radial basis function
used as the kernel (6.52). Each decision function in this case yields (6.53).
This gives a summation of exponentials and an unsolvable equation. Thus,
the exact distance function cannot be calculated and we must instead use a
generic estimation method as presented in Section 6.4.5.
k(sv,x) = e
−γ|x−sv|2 (6.52)
0 =
V∑
v=1
yvαve
−γ|x−sv|2 + ρ (6.53)
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6.4.5 General Classification Sensitivity Estimation
While some classification techniques allow direct calculation of the sensitivity
of a feature by calculating the distance to the decision point, many other
models are either impossible to solve such as the SVC with a radial basis
kernel presented in Section 5.4.4 or lack a simple way to represent the decision
boundary such as k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN). Recall that k-NN classifiers
work by taking the point to predict and finding the k nearest neighbors to
the point. The output classification is then the majority vote of the k nearest
neighbors. The decision plane between the points is therefore the point at
which the majority vote changes.
To estimate the amount of sensitivity per feature for models which lack
methods to calculate the distance to the decision point, we design Algorithm
7. The algorithm calculates the average change required in each input fea-
ture f required to change the classification over all training points p. It
accomplishes this by first noting the total range difference between the max-
imum and minimum values for the feature. For each training point, it then
recursively searches the positive and negative directions to find the distance
to the decision boundary. The search is conducted by making successively
smaller hops each time hopping half the previous distance until reaching a
hop size less than a minstep, the stopping criteria passed to the algorithm.
The distance for the training sample is taken to be the minimum distance to
a change for both the positive and negative directions. The average required
change is then taken over all changes calculated for all training points. This
gives the average change in each feature which may change the output target
prediction. While simple, the algorithm is unfortunately, slow compared to
the closed-form solutions presented in the previous sections.
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Result: List of Feature Sensitivities
for Each Input Feature f do
range = max(f) - min(f);
for Each Training Point p do
step = range / 2.0;
p’ = p[f] + range;
if model.predict(p’) == model.predict(p) then
s[f][p] = 0;
else
p’ = p[f] + step;
while step > minstep do
step = step / 2.0;
if model.predict(p’) == model.predict(p) then
p’ = p’[f] + step;
else
p’ = p’[f] - step;
end
end
s[f][p] = abs(p[f] - p’[f]);
end
step = range / 2.0;
p’ = p[f] - range;
if model.predict(p’) != model.predict(p) then
p’ = p[f] - step;
while step > minstep do
step = step / 2.0;
if model.predict(p’) == model.predict(p) then
p’ = p’[f] - step;
else
p’ = p’[f] + step;
end
end
sneg = abs(p[f] - p’[f]);
if sneg < s[f ][p] or s[f ][p] == 0 then
S[f][p] = sneg;
end
end
end
S[f] = average(s[f][p] over p);
end
Return S;
Algorithm 7: Calculate Average Sensitivity for General Classifiers
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6.4.6 Regression Sensitivity Estimation
Determining the sensitivity of a regression model to changes in an input fea-
ture is best accomplished by measuring the change in the output variable
for various changes to the input. To determine this sensitivity, we present
Algorithm 8. The function accepts an optional list of steps for manual cal-
ibration. If none is passed, the function will generate a list of steps to test
between the minimum and maximum of each feature with a given minimum
step size as the resolution. The algorithm will then iterate over all given sam-
ple points, over each input feature, and over each step each time calculating
the absolute difference of the output divided by the step size. The algorithm
then averages the value for all steps. This gives an estimate of the sensitivity
per unit change in the input vector for each feature for each sample. The
final sensitivity can then optionally be the minimum, maximum or average
sensitivity over all given samples.
Result: List of Feature Sensitivities
if steps=None then
for each feature f do
steps[f] = range(min(f),max(f),minstep)
end
end
for each sample s do
basepredict = model.predict(s)
for each feature f do
numpredicts = 0
for each step[f ] st do
test = s
test[f] += st
sensitivity[f] += abs(model.predict(test) - basepredict) / t
Test[f] -= 2*st
sensitivity[f] += abs(model.predict(test) - basepredict) / t
numpredicts += 2
end
sensitivity[f] = sensitivity[f] / numpredicts
end
senssamples.append(sensitivity)
end
return sensamples
Algorithm 8: Calculate Average Sensitivity for General Regressors
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6.5 Sensitivity Estimation and Results
We implement the methods presented in Section 5.4 using Python in our sen-
sitivity estimation framework. The framework takes a trained model from
the Scikit learning toolkit [103] and either a target point or set of train-
ing points and estimates the sensitivity of each individual feature. For an
individual point, it returns the amount of change required to change the clas-
sification for classification models or the amount of change of output target
per unit change of input feature for regression models. If a single point is
passed, the framework returns the sensitivity of the single point. If the point
is none, the framework will return the result of computing each training point
with the answer either being the minimum, maximum or average distance
depending on the input flags. Various methods also allow different averaging
of internal distances (for example, the Naive Bayes can average the differ-
ent combination of classifications). While configurable, the default methods
are recommended. The framework automatically chooses the best method
depending on the type of model passed to the calculate sensitivity function.
Each method returns none, if there are no possible change in values for an
input feature that yields a change in target prediction or the sensitivity is
effectively infinite.
6.5.1 Types of Sensitivity
Sensitivity is useful in order to determine the amount of noise necessary to
mitigate the threat of predicting privacy sensitive information. We present
three types of sensitivity estimation. The most conservative sensitivity es-
timation is to introduce noise relative to the maximum difference between
values of the input features. Intuitively, this makes it difficult to distinguish
any two particular values from the input features but requires substantial
noise since features may differ greatly between minimum and maximum val-
ues. Because traditional differential privacy uses this sensitivity estimate to
provide a strong privacy guarantee, we call this noise estimate the differen-
tial sensitivity or diff sensitivity. We can also use our sensitivity estimation
framework to estimate the sensitivity from the trained model but must care-
fully choose the trained models to use for the estimation. We use two types of
models to evaluate the sensitivity. The first is to train SVM or SVR models
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using each input feature individually. We call this the single sensitivity or S
sensitivity estimate because it gives a sensitivity estimate of the individual
feature to affect the output target prediction. Our final method is to train a
SVM or SVR model using each of the top features using our fifteen feature
selection routines and evaluate the sensitivity of each feature used in the
model. We then average the sensitivity per feature to get the sensitivity of
each feature giving an estimate of the amount of change per feature to affect
the output of the prediction. We call this last sensitivity estimate the feature
selection sensitivity estimate or FS sensitivity.
6.5.2 Sensitivity Estimate Testing
We conduct initial testing to demonstrate the different levels of sensitivity
for our prediction targets including phone identification, user identification,
FEV1/FVC, activity, and walking speed. We extract the set of all top fea-
tures found using our fifteen features selection techniques. We train SVM
or SVR models both for each individual feature and all features combined
into one model. The maximum difference between feature values is used to
estimate the differential sensitivity. The sensitivity estimation framework is
used to extract the sensitivities for all individual feature sensitivities and
for all combined models giving the single sensitivity and feature selection
sensitivity estimates respectively.
Figure 6.11 lists the sensitivity values for each of the top features for the
phone identification. We expect the maximum difference between feature
values to be greater than any decision plane in a trained model. As ex-
pected, we see the highest sensitivity scores for the differential sensitivity
estimates. Generally, we see the sensitivities found using the model trained
with all features from feature selection have higher sensitivity than the esti-
mates obtained from the individual models. Since the sensitivity measures
the change required by an individual feature to change the output of the
prediction model, a model with multiple features will require a single feature
to be moved further to affect the decision of the model as a whole. Thus,
the single sensitivity model which predicts the target solely dependent on a
single feature yields the lowest estimate for sensitivity. Figure 6.12 presents
the percentage of the differential sensitivity that is returned from both the
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Figure 6.11: Phone Identification Sensitivity per Estimation Method (Log
Scale)
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Figure 6.12: Phone Identification Sensitivity Fraction of Differential
Sensitivity
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Figure 6.13: Speed Sensitivity per Estimation Method (Log Scale)
single and feature selection sensitivity estimates. We see that many features
return sensitivities around 10% of the differential sensitivity estimates. Thus,
using the sensitivity estimates requires noise roughly an order of magnitude
less than the traditional differential private methods.
Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the results of the three sensitivity estimates on
the speed estimation. We note that the speed estimation has a larger set of
top features returned from the feature selection methods due to less agree-
ment of top features for this prediction. The sensitivity framework returns
the amount of change in the input feature which produces a 1 m/s change
in the output prediction. We see the same general ordering of features as in
the phone classification example with both the single and feature selection
sensitivity estimates returning an average of 20% the sensitivity of the dif-
ferential private estimates. Interestingly, we do see outliers in the analysis,
but find that most estimates with similar sensitivities between the differen-
tial and single/feature selection sensitivity estimates require absurdly high
amounts of noise to change the output by one unit. Thus, features which are
selected but do not greatly contribute to prediction still require high levels
of noise. We surmise this is acceptable since these features can be filtered
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Figure 6.14: Speed Estimation Sensitivity Fraction of Differential
Sensitivity
as unnecessary for obfuscation when protecting privacy because they have
little effect on the regression estimates. The AccMag ACSD which actually
returned a higher single sensitivity value than the differential private value
presents an example of a feature with high noise requirements. We clearly see
that high changes in this input feature caused little change to the output of
the regression. Thus, the feature itself is a low priority for obfuscation since
it contributes little to the speed prediction. Identifying features with high
noise requirements that contribute little to the actual regression estimate is
important to minimize the noise requirement during obfuscation.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have explored the ability of machine learning models to
predict a wide range of targets relating to health, fitness, demographic and
devices using motion sensors from mobile phones. We used the feature selec-
tion techniques presented in the previous chapters to train optimal models
for each target. Each model type was trained with optimized hyperparame-
ters using three-fold cross validation. The prediction scores were evaluated
using a ten-fold cross-validated training algorithm. We found that support
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vector machines and random forest decision trees were most accurate for
classification and support vector regression was most accurate for regression
problems. However, we note that all the difference in maximum accuracy per
classifier was much less than the difference between accuracies for feature se-
lection. We surmise this similarity in accuracy helps drive the diversity of
opinions in the literature in selecting the best machine learning tool. We
find that the sequential forward selection wrapper method produces the best
classification with the top score in nearly every case; however, it is fairly
expensive. If computation power is limited, the JMI gives the best overall
score of all tested filter methods. As a final note, we highlight that using
a k-means clustering algorithm to choose features performed less accurately
than all other feature selection techniques.
We developed a framework to estimate the sensitivity of a machine learn-
ing model’s prediction to changes in an individual input feature. We present
algorithms to estimate the distance to the decision boundary of a variety
of classification and regression models. We implement our algorithms in a
Python library to estimate the sensitivity of machine learning models trained
using the Scikit learn library. We then compare the sensitivity of a machine
learning model trained with the feature of interest and a machine learning
model trained using the top features from feature selection against the tra-
ditional sensitivity estimate used in differential privacy. Overall, we see our
framework giving sensitivity estimates which require substantially less noise
for obfuscation than the differential privacy sensitivity. We will use these
estimates to explore obfuscation techniques in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
PRIVACY BY OBFUSCATING FEATURE
STREAMS
In this chapter we design and evaluate methods to obfuscate feature streams
to mitigate leaking information for specific inference targets. While we have
seen the ability to predict multiple targets, we focus on realistic scenarios
where privacy protection would be useful. We have seen that motion sensor
data can be useful for phone identification and user identification. Phone
identification has been proposed as a way to uniquely identify the device
allowing targeted advertisements to track a specific device across sessions.
User identification would allow a user to be tracked across devices and link
all device activities to a specific individual. Both identifications are poten-
tially sensitive, motivating the need to obfuscate the predictions from both
health and fitness continuous monitoring. Thus, the first privacy scenario
is to protect phone identification while predicting both health and fitness
information. The second privacy scenario is to protect user identification
while predicting both health and fitness information. There is clearly a dis-
tinction between basic fitness monitoring which includes activity recognition
and steps taken and medical monitoring which includes precise speed mea-
surement and medically accepted heuristics. Thus, our final scenario is to
determine if we can hide health metrics while predicting fitness values. We
consider activity using our walking or not walking binary classifier as the
main fitness metric. We use the FEV1/FVC and medically accurate walking
speed as our medical metrics. We note that speed could be considered a
fitness metric; however, most fitness devices record speed with substantially
less accuracy. Since medical studies have found strong correlation between
speed and patient status, we surmise highly accurate speed requires similar
protection as the standard medical measures. We now see which of our five
targets can be obfuscated without significantly affecting the prediction of the
other metrics.
We develop and analyze methods to reduce the ability of inferring various
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targets from motion data based on our identification of private features and
their respective sensitivity to noise. The most obvious way to stop prediction
of sensitive features is to hide all private features for that prediction target.
However, simply blocking features may cause significant collateral damage
to the other prediction targets. By considering individual sensor features,
we can directly apply ideas of differential privacy to determine the appro-
priate level of added noise required to block the ability to infer the private
target without blocking the entire feature. Using the relative sensitivities
determined from our sensitivity estimation framework, we can minimize the
required noise thus minimizing the collateral damage. In the following sec-
tions, we will briefly review the idea of differential privacy and how we use it
to determine the appropriate noise level for both classification and regression
predictions. We will then look at the noise levels required based on the sensi-
tivity estimates in Chapter 6. We will inject the appropriate amount of noise
and verify the privacy produced against inference. We can then test the abil-
ity to infer other characteristics demonstrating how to selectively obfuscate
target inferences while allowing the signal to be useful for other applications.
We will then investigate the resistance of various machine learning methods
to noise. We finish by assuming the attacker has prior knowledge of the noise
levels used to obfuscate the features to determine if such knowledge would
break a privacy system which adds noise. We conclude with a discussion of
which of our privacy scenarios can be realized using the frameworks presented
in this dissertation.
7.1 Obfuscation by Removing Private Features
The most straightforward method to protect privacy is to simply block all
private features identified in the preceding chapters for each target of interest.
However, since each prediction target has various overlapping features, this
method may also significantly decreases the prediction accuracy of other
targets. We evaluate the utility of blocking all private features by comparing
models trained using the full set of features against models trained only
using the non-private features. By comparing the prediction accuracy of
the privacy sensitive target with and without the use of private features,
we can determine the amount of privacy attained by blocking the features.
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Figure 7.1: Phone Identification Accuracy with Phone Identification Private
Features Removed over All Models
Models are then trained to predict the remaining four targets without the
private features to determine the collateral damage of obfuscating the private
target. This allows us to determine if blocking the private features destroys
the ability to use the motion data for other predictions.
Figure 7.1 shows the prediction of phone identification for all classifica-
tion models after removing all private features for phone identification. As
expected, the ability to identify the phone is significantly diminished with
only the bagged tree and SVM (RB) models giving any accurate predictions.
Unsurprisingly, completely eliminating features classified as private signifi-
cantly reduces the ability to predict our targets. We see two outcomes to
remaining prediction targets when blocking all private features to obfuscate
a prediction. For models with low feature overlap we see little performance
difference between the prediction with and without the private features. Fig-
ure 7.2 demonstrates the effect of removing the private features identified for
phone identification before doing the user identification. As expected, there
is little drop in accuracy for the user identification since the removed fea-
tures are not useful for predicting the user. It is important to note that the
user identification has the least private features from our five target predic-
tions. Furthermore, the phone identification is ideal since it favors features
extracted from the gyroscope sensor in the phone while the other four targets
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Figure 7.2: User Identification Accuracy with Phone Identification Private
Features Removed over All Models
favor features extracted from the accelerometer.
Unfortunately, simply blocking the private features significantly decreases
the performance of predictions with overlapping private features. Figure 7.3
compares the error rates for each model both with and without the private
features useful to do phone identification. We see that removing the features
useful for phone prediction significantly increases the error of the speed pre-
diction. Thus, hiding the set of all private features does allow the phone
identification to be protected without affecting targets with different private
features such as user identification. However, for predictions which have
overlapping private features including the speed, FEV1/FVC, and activity,
removing the information causes the prediction to have unacceptable error
rates. Prediction targets with overlapping features motivate the need to also
investigate the sensitivity of the features and develop methods to introduce
noise calibrated to the sensitivity of the features.
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Figure 7.3: Speed Accuracy with Phone Identification Private Features
Removed over All Models
7.2 Sensitivity between Prediction Models
The analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrated that many prediction targets share
features which must be protected to obfuscate prediction. Thus, it is in-
sufficient to simply drop the feature or block it in order to protect privacy
without reducing the ability of other predictions. We expand on this analysis
in this section using our sensitivity analysis framework presented in Section
7.1. We are specifically interested in determining if the features have simi-
lar sensitivity estimates per prediction. If a feature is highly sensitive when
predicting target A but has much less sensitivity when predicting target B,
then we can calibrate our noise level to hide A without significantly affecting
the inference of B. In this case, we say that A and B can be obfuscated
separately.
We refine our estimation of the obfuscation separability of targets A and B
by taking the intersection of all identified private features using the analysis
in Chapter 5. We then estimate the sensitivity using an individually trained
SVM or SVR model with a radial basis kernel using the sensitivity frame-
work presented in Chapter 6. This gives us the individual private sensitivity
estimate for every overlapping private features for targets A and B. We then
calculate the difference between sensitivity estimates as the percentage differ-
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ence of the mean (7.1). Intuitively, features with similar sensitivity estimates
or low scores will adversely affect both predictions when noise is introduced
for obfuscation.
Percentage Difference =
(
abs(S1 − S2)
mean(S1, S2)
)
∗ 100% (7.1)
We look at the difference in overlapping sensitivity estimates for five fea-
tures including the FEV1/FVC, phone identification, user identification,
speed prediction and activity identification. For each target, we calculate
the sensitivity difference for all overlapping features with the other four tar-
gets. Figure 7.4 shows the cumulative distribution function of the difference
across all mutually intersecting private features. We see that the activity has
many intersecting features with the other four predictions. We surmise this
is due to activity being relatively easy to identify in most features extracted
from the signal. Furthermore, these initial estimates imply obfuscating ac-
tivity will most likely require a substantial amount of noise introduced into
the signal which will affect intersecting predictions. Figure 7.5 plots the sen-
sitivity intersection for the FEV1/FVC compared to the four other targets.
We see that the FEV1/FVC shares similar sensitivity with a large number
of features used to predict speed. The intersection with speed is interesting
because it supports the suspected link between a subject’s ability to walk
and health status. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 illustrate the overlapping sensitivity
between the phone identification and user identification to the four other tar-
gets respectively. We see few similar sensitivity estimates for both classifiers.
Figure 7.8 plots the CDF of the relative sensitivity of each feature selection
method to the sensitivity of the activity classification given by (7.2). The
diagram demonstrates that roughly 80% of user identification sensitivities
and 70% of phone identification features sensitivities have lower sensitivity
values and are more sensitive than activity recognition making them both
more sensitive to noise than activity. Conversely, both the FEV1/FVCW
and speed estimation feature sensitivities are generally less sensitive to noise
than activity. We see similar patterns for FEV1/FVCW in Figure 7.9, phone
identification in Figure 7.10 and user identification in Figure 7.11. Overall,
we see that both phone and user identification have the lowest sensitivity
values which should make them easier to obfuscate followed by activity with
both walking speed and health identification having the highest sensitivity
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values requiring more noise to obfuscate them from the signal.
relative sensitivity =
(
S1
ST
)
∗ 100% (7.2)
Initial sensitivity analysis indicates walking ability and health status ap-
pear to share similar sensitivity with overlapping training features. We see
that activity recognition appears to have the greatest number of private fea-
tures with enough sensitivity similarity to imply difficulty to obfuscate ac-
tivity without negatively affecting other classifiers especially with user and
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Classification
phone identification which are more sensitive to a majority of the overlapping
features. Finally, both phone identification and user identification show lower
sensitivity differences to other targets with lower sensitivity values implying
they may be able to be obfuscated without affecting other predictions.
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7.3 Differential Privacy Frameworks
P (A(D1) ∈ S) ≤ eP (A(D2) ∈ S) (7.3)
Differential privacy has been developed to produce strong guarantees of
privacy to an individual when contributing data to a database [104]. The
idea is to define a differential private query A which runs on a set of data
entries Dk to produce a query result. Differential privacy guarantees that
any two database entries that differ by one entry, D1 and D2, cannot allow
an attacker to distinguish the database based on the query (7.3). In other
words, the query will return a result which does not allow an attacker to
determine the exact composition of the underlying database. This protects
the identity of the individual records in the database. The classical way to
design differentially private mechanisms is to introduce noise drawn from a
Laplace definition proportional to the sensitivity of the release mechanism.
The sensitivity is defined as the maximum difference between two sets of
points that differ by one entry (7.4).
|f(x)− f(x′)| ≤ S(f) (7.4)
While not directly applicable to sensor feature streams, the ideas of dif-
ferential privacy have already been extended to other applications by Kifer
and Machanavajjhala [105]. We will therefore use ideas from the differential
framework to calibrate our obfuscation noise depending on the sensitivity of
our classification techniques.
7.3.1 Classification Privacy
We first present the framework we will use to obfuscate feature steams to
carefully decrease the ability to classify target characteristics. We assume we
are measuring a feature x ∈ X. We define an obfuscation routine F that will
release a point given x. Furthermore, we have a classification routine C that
for some x will return a classification c ∈ C. We are interested in bounding
the ability of an attacker to determine the correct classification ck given the
value x. We therefore define the classification privacy condition (7.5).
P (F (x)|C(x) = ci) ≤ eP (F (x)|C(x) = cj) (7.5)
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We state that the probability of our obfuscation function F (x) returning
a value given the classification C(x) being a specific class, is bounded by
at most e. This restriction is dependent on the sensitivity of change in
classification to differences in x. Thus, the definition of the privacy metric
is dependent on the trained model. The maximum sensitivity between any
pair of classifications for a given pair of classifications is given in (7.6).
|(F (x)|C(x) = ci)− (F (x)|C(x) = cj)| ≤ S(x)∀x ∈ X, ∀i, j ∈ C (7.6)
The preceding definition of sensitivity states that F (x) must add enough
noise that any two possible classification outcomes i, j must be equally likely.
We also define a relaxed version of (7.6) where the sensitivity is defined as
the distance required to guarantee at least two classifications are possible
(7.7).
min
j∈C
(|(F (x)|C(x) = ci)− (F (x)|C(x) = cj)| ≤ S(x)∀x ∈ X, ∀i ∈ C) (7.7)
Intuitively, this relaxation may be reasonable to trade off sensitivity versus
privacy. For example, in a database with many distinct users, the motion
data may be able to classify each individual user. However, there will most
likely be subsets in the user population. Perhaps males form a distinct subset
and females form a distinct subset. Equation 7.6 requires that every user has
enough obfuscation to be indistinguishable from every other user which would
require a significant amount of noise. Equation 7.7 allows us to relax this
constraint to forcing the  differential privacy between any two users. Thus,
the user is not uniquely identifiable but is still afforded some privacy. Since
we are dealing with a one-dimensional data set, we maintain the differential
privacy guarantee by adding noise sampled from a Laplace distribution (7.8).
F (x) = x+ n(x), n(x) = laplace
(
S(x)

)
(7.8)
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7.3.2 Regression Privacy
Protecting features from regression analysis is slightly more complicated than
protecting classification. In the most trivial sense, any obfuscation will affect
the output from the regression. However, since most regression algorithms
use some form of continuous estimation function, it is expected that a similar
value in the input feature will yield a similar value in the output feature. We
build and expand on previous work applying the ideas from differential pri-
vacy to obfuscate location privacy in order to protect against values inferred
from regression [106, 107, 108]. Our goal is to define a privacy mechanism
that does not allow an adversary to know the true value of a regression bet-
ter than a certain privacy range. For example, if the regression algorithm
predicts a user’s weight, we may define our privacy distance d as 50. If the
regression outputs the weight in kilograms, this means an attacker should not
be able to be confident that the feature data yields information which the
regression would predict the weight to within 50 kilograms. Thus, the policy
driven value d is selected as the distance to which the attacker is uncertain
about the predicted value. We note that the distance metric has a unit in
this case kg. To make the input of privacy dimensionless, we assume the
unit of  is the inverse of whatever unit of measurement under consideration.
Thus, in the formulations when we multiply  ∗ d, we get a dimensionless
constant.
We begin by defining the distance of uncertainty around the input feature.
We estimated this in Chapter 6 as the amount of change in the feature
required to affect a corresponding change in the output from the regression.
This means that the relationship between the distance of the feature df and
the distance of the output from the regression dr is related by dr =
∆R
∆F
df .
We want to intuitively provide privacy for a change in dr but the units of
x are relative to df . Since we define the sensitivity of the regression to be
change in regression per change in feature, ∆F = 1 and we want our distance
to be df = dr ∗ (∆R)−1. Note that ∆R is a constant of the regression model
being evaluated. We will use this in each of the formulations below.
We first place a limit on the amount of information that releasing a feature
value f can leak about the probability of yielding a specific value. Ideally,
we would like the observation f to not give any further information about
the relative probability of the possibility of two values. In other words, we
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would like P (x|f)
P (x)
≤ e. However, this is far too strong of a condition since
knowing the range of values will give the attacker some information. We
therefore define a function Bd(x) to be the range of all possible values less
than df away from the point x. We are only interested in the ability of an
attacker to distinguish values within this range. Thus, we define our privacy
distance df = dr ∗ (∆R)−1 and say that any two points within this distance
leak a bounded amount of information (7.9). The proof that this condition
is satisfied by a differential private mechanism is defined in [107].
P (x|f,Bd(x))
P (x|Bd(x)) ≤ e
∆Rd−1r ∀ dr > 0 x ∈ X (7.9)
Classical differential privacy has strong guarantees about prior informa-
tion. Ideally, the ability of an attacker to infer one point over another given
a released observation would be bounded P (x|f)
P (x′|f) ≤ e. Unfortunately, the
output from a regression means that the attacker may know certain values
are far more likely than others before any information is released. In other
words P (x)
P (x′) may be large. In this case, we want to guarantee that releasing
f does not significantly change the ability of the attacker to discern x versus
x′ (7.10). We note that this equation is trivially obtained from (7.11) using
Bayes rule.
P (x|f))
P (x′|f) ≤ e
∆Rd−1r P (x)
P (x′)
∀dr > 0 ∀x, x′ : |x− x′| ≤ dr(∆R)−1 (7.10)
Finally, we define the bounds on choosing the output value f to that the
value f does not distinguish between two point x and x′ given that the
distance between the two points are within the range df as shown in (7.11).
Notice that this equation closely resembles the classical differential privacy
form by some simple algebraic manipulation (7.12).
P (f |x)
P (f |x′) ≤ e
∆Rd−1r ∀dr > 0 ∀x, x′ : |x− x′| ≤ dr(∆R)−1 (7.11)
P (f |x) ≤ e∆Rd−1r P (f |x′) ∀dr > 0 ∀x, x′ : |x− x′| ≤ dr(∆R)−1 (7.12)
We add noise to the feature set in order to satisfy the above equations by
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again sampling from the Laplace distribution. We sample with a standard
deviation of
df

= dr
∆R
in order to add the appropriate noise. Thus, we only
need to choose the range of interest dr and the relative privacy guarantee .
DeltaR is a constant estimated from the regression models from Chapter 6.
We then sample noise according to (7.13). We will design experiments and
evaluate this method in the following sections.
f = x+ n(x), n(x) = laplace
(
dr
∆R
)
(7.13)
7.4 Protecting Private Information
We now test our obfuscation techniques to hide five prediction targets (three
classification and two regression models) including phone identification, user
identification, activity recognition, FEV1/FVC, and walking speed. We im-
plement a function to introduce noise drawn from a Laplace distribution into
the feature vector. We obfuscate the ability to conduct each prediction by in-
troducing noise into all privacy sensitive features produced by the sequential
forward selection with clustering and similarity scoring metrics introduced
in Chapter 5. The noise level is estimated using the three sensitivity estima-
tion techniques produced in Chapter 6 including the traditional differential
privacy estimate, the single trained model estimate and the feature selection
model estimate.
We first evaluate and compare the various sensitivity estimation tech-
niques. We then look at the overall ability to obfuscate prediction targets
without affecting the other predictions by adding noise using the single model
method with various privacy  values. After adding noise, the ability of all
five models is then re-evaluated to determine the accuracy reduction to pre-
dict the private feature as well as the effect on the prediction accuracy of the
other models. In our final test, we investigate the ability of alternate predic-
tion models to resist our obfuscation techniques by comparing the reduction
in accuracy for each model type after adding noise. We also train the models
using a noisy signal to simulate the ability of an attacker to improve models
by taking the privacy obfuscation into consideration.
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Figure 7.12: Phone Identification Accuracy with Phone Identity Obfuscated
with Various Sensitivity Estimates
7.4.1 Estimating Sensitivity
We first use our testing to compare the three sensitivity estimation techniques
presented in Chapter 6. Figure 7.12 plots the best case classification accuracy
across all trained models of phone identification after obfuscating the private
features according to the sensitivity estimates needed to hide the identity of
the phone with an  value of 1.0. As expected, the pure differential privacy
which introduces noise proportional to the maximum difference between any
two feature values produces the lowest classification score when trying to
identify the phone after obfuscation. We see that both sensitivity estimates
derived from the single sensitivity model and feature selection sensitivity
models yield similar levels of privacy. Overall, we see some variation in
the effectiveness of the noise to provide privacy guarantees across feature
selection techniques. In the phone classification, the various noise estimates
produce prediction scores which are proportionally similar. All three methods
do significantly decrease the F1-scores and decrease the ability to predict
phone identification.
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Figure 7.13: Speed Identification Accuracy with Speed Obfuscated with
Various Sensitivity Estimates
Figure 7.13 demonstrates the best case prediction of speed over all re-
gression models when the speed is obfuscated with a distance of 1 and 
of 1. Once again, the differential sensitivity estimate provides the greatest
amount of obfuscation providing the most obfuscation. The single model and
feature selection sensitivity estimation methods again provide similar predic-
tion scores after obfuscation. While the baseline error is on the order of 0.1
m/s, the minimum error after obfuscation is on the order of 1 m/s. Thus,
the method appears to satisfy (7.12) by making the points difficult to predict
within a 1 m/s interval. This implies that in this test, the error in the regres-
sion estimate is relatively low. We finally note that the maximum amount of
obfuscation is introduced in the two most accurate feature selection routines,
the JMI and SVMFS.
We note that both graphs demonstrate that the methods work across var-
ious feature selection even though the feature obfuscation is estimated from
the private feature identification algorithm. This algorithm does not contain
the same set of features as most of the filter method selection algorithms.
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This can explain some of the variation in prediction results across feature
selection algorithms. We find that obfuscation is most effective when the set
of features in the feature selection are contained in the privately identified
features. This should not be problematic as long as the features not iden-
tified as private cannot predict above the threshold used to identify private
features. We see this working especially in the speed identification example
where the ICAP, KMFS, and KMI identify fewer than three private features.
Since the remaining features do have predictive usefulness, albeit less than is
required to be classified as a sensitive feature, the prediction score is higher
than the feature selection routines which choose all obfuscated features. But,
since the features are less predictive the speed prediction is still within the
bounds of the privacy mechanism. We finally point out that both the sin-
gle sensitivity models and feature selection models produce similar levels of
degradation in the privacy predictions; however, the single sensitivity model
requires significantly less noise per feature as was demonstrated in Chapter
6.
We have seen that the three sensitivity methods can obfuscate a prediction
target with various levels of effective privacy. In the classification case, we saw
the differential sensitivity giving better privacy, but in the speed regression,
many feature selection methods actually had similar privacy even though the
differential method introduces an order of magnitude more noise. Figure 7.14
shows the obfuscation from all three sensitivity methods when used on the
optimally trained phone classification model only. We see that each method
reduces the accuracy of phone classification to roughly 50% using an epsilon
value of 2. It is noteworthy that once again, privacy is maintained using
the single sensitivity estimate which requires significantly less noise. Figure
7.15 demonstrates that using too much noise can lead to interference when
classifying other targets. This figure shows the classification accuracy of user
identification when the same noise is introduced into the features that was
used to generate Figure 7.14. We see that the accuracy of user identification
is least affected when using the single sensitivity estimate with the classifier
almost being useless when using the diff sensitivity estimate. Thus, we use
the single sensitivity estimate for the remainder of this chapter.
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7.4.2 Effectiveness of Obfuscation and Collateral Damage
We now investigate the effect on each model’s predictive power when we
obfuscate a prediction target. To keep the experiments tractable, we only
consider the optimized top model returned from the model optimization from
Chapter 6. This means that each model uses the top scoring cross-validated
model with the top-rated feature selection method. The base score is the
score returned from the fully trained model. We then sweep over each op-
timized model predicting the output target with various values of epsilon
including 2.0, 1.0, 0.5 and 0.1. We repeat the testing for each obfuscation
target giving five targets and five assessments totaling twenty-five tests.
Figure 7.16 compares the effects on activity prediction using various sensi-
tivity levels to obfuscate against activity classification. We see that without
noise, activity classification is nearly perfect. With a large  value, the ac-
curacy of activity classification is hardly affected. With a low value of , we
see activity classification drop to nearly random guessing for the binary clas-
sifier. Figures 7.17 and 7.18 show the effects on predicting both phone and
user classification with activity obfuscated. We see that phone identification
is not diminished when hiding activity but user identification is significantly
decreased. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 list the error rates of the regressions with
activity obfuscated. We see a significant increase in error for both regres-
sions with activity obfuscated even at low levels. Thus, we see activity as
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difficult to hide without significantly decreasing all classifiers except phone
identification which seems to have a disjoint set of predictive features.
Table 7.2 presents the relative speed regression accuracy with various levels
of obfuscation for speed. We see the effect of varying the distance param-
eter most clearly in the speed regression. A change in  is equivalent to
the inverse of the distance. Thus, epsilon values of 2, 1, 0.5, and 0.1 cor-
respond to distance values of 0.5, 1, 2, and 10. We see this directly in the
mean noise estimates with the speed obfuscation returning a mean error of
0.53, 0.98, 1.90, and 7.20 respectively. Thus, we see that obfuscation working
well for our privacy levels. Obfuscating speed significantly hinders our other
predictions. Figures 7.19, 7.20 and 7.21 demonstrate that obfuscating speed
significantly decrease classification accuracy for activity, phone identification
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Table 7.1: FEV1/FVCW Accuracy with Various Obfuscations
Obfuscated Privacy  Values
Target .1 .5 1 2
FEV1/FVCW 33.30 15.69 13.58 12.55
Activity 46.74 18.44 14.85 13.00
PhoneIDNW 20.93 12.78 11.76 11.21
SpeedW 37.84 16.68 13.94 12.47
UserIDW 10.58 10.54 10.52 10.50
Table 7.2: SpeedW Accuracy with Various Obfuscations
Obfuscation Privacy  Values
Target .1 .5 1 2
SpeedW 7.20 1.90 0.98 0.53
Activity 7.85 2.20 1.20 0.63
FEV1/FVCW 5.99 1.45 0.76 0.43
PhoneIDNW 1.60 0.63 0.34 0.20
UserIDW 0.52 0.24 0.15 0.11
and user identification respectively. We also see significant error introduced
to FEV1/FVCW prediction as seen in Table 7.1. Thus, obfuscating speed
also obfuscates the other targets of prediction. We also see that speed and
FEV1/FVCW are linked with both being difficult to obfuscate without neg-
atively affecting the remaining predictions.
We find that both phone and user identification require lower levels of noise
to hide the signal than activity, speed and health estimates. Figure 7.22
shows the relative phone prediction accuracy with the phone identification
obfuscated. We see that both activity and user identification predictions
are hardly affected with the introduction of noise to obfuscate the phone
identification as shown in Figures 7.23 and 7.24. We see that both speed
estimates and FEV1/FVC are adversely affected with the introduction of
obfuscation; however, the introduced error is roughly half of the introduced
error from both activity and speed obfuscation. Figure 7.25 presents the
user prediction accuracy after obfuscating the user identification. For user
identification, we see a decrease in phone identification accuracy in Figure
7.26 but almost no effect on activity recognition as shown in Figure 7.27.
We also see the least effect on both regression estimations with Table 7.1
showing almost no effect on FEV1/FVC prediction and the smallest effect of
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Figure 7.19: Activity Accuracy with
Speed Obfuscated
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Figure 7.20: Phone Identification
with Speed Obfuscated
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Figure 7.21: User Identification with
Speed Obfuscated
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Figure 7.22: Phone Identity Accuracy
with Phone Identity Obfuscated
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Figure 7.23: Activity Accuracy with
Phone Identity Obfuscated
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Figure 7.24: User Identification with
Phone Identity Obfuscated
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Figure 7.25: User Identification with
User Identity Obfuscated
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Figure 7.26: Phone Identification
with User Identity Obfuscated
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Figure 7.27: Activity Accuracy with User Identity Obfuscated
any obfuscation on speed as seen in Table 7.2.
The analysis in this section have demonstrated the utility of our privacy
obfuscation techniques calibrated to noise estimated on the privacy sensitive
features. The techniques present promise to hide both user identification and
phone identification while inferring walking speed, FEV1/FVC and activity
corresponding to success with our first and second scenarios. We see more
difficulty when trying to hide health information while maintaining activity.
While a negative result for privacy, our results do support the link between
activity and health status which is currently being studied in the medical
community.
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Figure 7.28: Activity Accuracy with Activity Obfuscated over All Models
7.4.3 Obfuscating Features by Model Type
In Section 7.4.2, we demonstrated the ability of our noise models to protect
privacy when using the most accurate prediction models. We now repeat the
tests using all nine classification and nine regression models to determine if
adding noise provides privacy for all model types. We again focus on the
activity, user identification, phone identification, FEV1/FVC, and walking
speed. We first train the most accurate model by both model type and feature
selection as the baseline model. We again introduce speed with various values
of  and test the ability of all model types to predict the classifier. To keep
the experiments tractable, we only consider the top features from the JMI
and SVMFS feature selection methods.
After obfuscation, we generally see decreased prediction performance for
all model types with each private target. For example, Figure 7.28 presents
the accuracy of predicting the activity after obfuscating the activity. The
random forest classifier was originally the most accurate classification model
for this prediction. We see that the random forest and decision tree models
lose accuracy with lower privacy values more quickly than the bagged tree
model. Since the bagged tree model is designed to decrease over fitting
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Figure 7.29: Phone Identification Accuracy with Activity Obfuscated over
All Models
compared to the decision tree and random forest models, models with less
over fitting seem to be less sensitive to our input noise. Intuitively, this is
probably due to decision trees having tighter boundaries when incorrectly
splitting at leaf nodes due to noise in the training data. Since the bagged
tree is more resistant to this training noise and the decision thresholds have a
higher range, the bagged tree model is less prone to obfuscation. Overall, we
see that all models respond to the added noise with a privacy level of  = 1.0
reducing the maximum F1-score from nearly 1.0 to 0.8 and a privacy level
of  = 0.01 reducing all models’ F1-score to a mere 0.5 or random guessing
accuracy. Encouragingly, we see the same pattern of decreased prediction
accuracy over all private targets tested. Thus, no model tested resists our
noise allowing prediction for the private target.
We see the same trends when looking at the ability of various model types
to perform predictions on collateral targets. In general, all tests return sim-
ilar patterns with results either showing the collateral feature can still be
predicted with reasonable accuracy or the collateral target is no longer able
to be predicted. Figure 7.29 shows an example of a collateral classification
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Figure 7.30: User Identification Accuracy with Activity Obfuscated over All
Models
which can still be predicted after obfuscation by obfuscating the activity
while identifying the phone. Figure 7.30 shows an example of a classification
which has decreased accuracy after obfuscating the private target by obfus-
cating the activity and predicting the user identification. Once again, the
best models for prediction have a tendency to be more accurate for predic-
tion after adding noise. We see relatively little decrease in accuracy for the
k-NN, random forest, and SVM (RB) for less strict noise thresholds with
severe penalties in phone identification once  = 0.1. We notice a less pro-
nounced sensitivity in the random forest classifier. We surmise the model is
able to maintain higher accuracy since only the input features which overlap
with the private activity features get obfuscation noise. Thus, the model still
chooses the correct path in the tree for the non-obfuscated features. The user
identification models all see substantial decreases in accuracy when noise is
added. The relative drop in accuracy for both phone and user identification
seems relative to the initial prediction accuracy of the models without noise.
The effects of adding noise to regression estimates are shown in Figures
7.31 and 7.32. The FEV1/FVC prediction with activity obfuscated demon-
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Figure 7.31: FEV1/FVC Accuracy with Activity Obfuscated over All
Models
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Figure 7.32: Speed Accuracy with Activity Obfuscated over All Models
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strates a regression with similar accuracy after adding the noise. The speed
prediction with activity obfuscated demonstrates a regression with significant
error added after adding the noise. Once again, we see that obfuscating the
activity affects both the FEV1/FVC and speed error rates, but certain mod-
els for FEV1/FVC resist the noise much better especially the bagged tree
and SVR models. We notice that certain regression techniques are prone to
massive error rates with the introduction of noise including Bayesian ridge
regression, linear regression, and ridge regression. The other models perform
with similar accuracy. Once again, both random forest and regression trees
perform well without noise, but attain high error rates with even a small
amount of obfuscation. All models perform with similar degradation due to
noise for the speed estimation. Overall, linear models can produce unrealis-
tic predictions with noise obfuscation while models such as SVR and bagged
trees seem most resistant to noise. Both regression trees and random forest
produce low errors but lose accuracy quickly with noise indicating a tighter
fit within the model itself to the training data.
Over all prediction targets, we see the most accurate models for each pre-
diction tend to continue to be the most accurate after noise is added to the
training data. We do see an exception for the random forest, decision tree,
and regression tree classifiers since they have a tendency to predict with high
accuracy with no noise but quickly lose accuracy when noise is added to the
input features of the model. We see that linear regression models often pro-
duce values with unrealistically high error rates when tight privacy values are
used. Optimistically, we see that all models are affected by obfuscation noise.
We also see that collateral damage appears in all predictions we tested; how-
ever, the SVM/SVR appears overall to be a good model to assess the impact
of obfuscation noise since it maintains high initial prediction accuracy and is
less prone to the over fitting of random forest tree models.
7.4.4 Resistance to Further Training
We now test the ability of our noise obfuscation to hide private information
even if the attacker trains the machine learning model on noisy data. We
do this by repeating the experiment in Section 7.4.3 after retraining all nine
classification and regression models using data which is obfuscated using our
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Figure 7.33: Activity Accuracy with Activity Obfuscated over All Models
(Noisy Training)
randomly drawn noise. To model realistic conditions, the attacker trains the
models on an obfuscated data set. The models are then tested on the same
data with the same obfuscation parameter but with the noise resampled.
Thus, this models the situation where the attacker trained the models on
noisy data and subsequently attempts to predict the private information
using samples which have been obfuscated using the same privacy algorithms.
Figure 7.33 illustrates the results of obfuscating the activity and predicting
the activity when the models are trained on noisy data. As expected, models
trained on data which has been obfuscated with the correct level of noise will
predict with higher accuracies then models trained on clean data. However,
the added noise is still effective at reducing the prediction accuracy of the
activity especially with strict privacy thresholds. For example, we see an
average F1-score of 0.6 with  = 0.1 over all models. We see the same
increased resistance to noise in all tested obfuscations which demonstrate
increased accuracy for inference with models trained on noisy data when the
noise level is known. We note that knowing the exact level of noise for each
feature is the best case scenario for an attacker. We would suggest privacy
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Figure 7.34: Phone Identification Accuracy with Activity Obfuscated over
All Models (Noisy Training)
obfuscation mechanisms limit the availability of such information but leave an
exploration of varying the noise level randomly to disrupt such improvements
in inference accuracy as a topic of future work.
While training on noisy data does slightly decrease the privacy introduced
by obfuscation, our testing indicates that it significantly reduces the collat-
eral damage to other predictions. As an example, Figure 7.34 presents the
prediction accuracy of the phone when each model is re-trained using noisy
data. We see that each model resists noise much better than the models
trained on clean data. Recall that only features considered private to activ-
ity receive obfuscation. The models trained on noise effectively place more
weight on the features which receive no obfuscation. Since these features
do not change, the models appear more resistant to obfuscation noise. We
see much less resistance for regression models trained on noise. Figure 7.35
shows the output from the speed models after obfuscating activity. We see
that training on noisy data eliminates the unrealistic outliers in the linear
models; however, all models give similar error rates when introducing noise
compared to non-linear models trained without noise.
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Figure 7.35: Speed Accuracy with Activity Obfuscated over All Models
(Noisy Training)
In general, using models trained on noisy data increases the accuracy of
making predictions using data with the same level of noise. However even
with models trained on noisy data, strict privacy levels still significantly re-
duce the ability of all model types to make a prediction. The increase in
accuracy of models trained with noisy data help to reduce the collateral
damage when predicting alternate targets. While all models again perform
similarly with obfuscation, we again see tighter fits with random forest and
decision trees. We see striking examples where random forest performance
significantly decreases such as Figure 7.36 which indicates the random forest
model having significantly reduced performance when adding a little noise.
Our testing indicates knowing the exact level of noise used to obfuscate the
data could be useful for an attacker attempting to infer private information.
Conversely, we see knowing the noise could help a legitimate user infer col-
lateral information. Both observations could be useful for the future design
of a motion sensor privacy mechanism.
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Figure 7.36: Phone Identification Accuracy with Phone Obfuscated over All
Models (Noisy Training)
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter used the feature selection methods, optimized models and sen-
sitivity estimates to investigate the ability of hiding specific target features
independently of others. As anticipated, significant obfuscation to a single
prediction target often causes degradation in the ability to predict other tar-
gets. We see three primary tiers of features in our testing. The easiest to
obfuscate are the phone and user identification targets which appear to be
more sensitive to noise. When we introduce noise according to their sensi-
tivity, we can still predict activity, speed, and FEV1/FVC with reasonable
accuracy. Obfuscating activity does not seem to affect phone identification
but affects the other classifiers. We finally find that obfuscating speed and
FEV1/FVC are challenging without affecting the other targets. We also note
that regressions seem to be more sensitive to noise as they return a contin-
uous distribution of values while classification seems to absorb more noise
before affecting a change.
We conclude by investigating the ability of each type of model to predict
targets when adding obfuscation noise. We find that noise degrades the per-
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formance of all model types. Generally, the most accurate model for each
prediction type continues to be the most accurate for each noise threshold.
Tree-based models including random forest, binary decision, and regression
trees which internally contain tight prediction boundaries are more sensitive
to over fitting and obfuscation noise. Thus, they see bigger reduction in ac-
curacy for similar noise levels than SVM/SVR models. We finally investigate
the effectiveness of noise if the prediction models are trained on obfuscated
data. As expected, prediction accuracies increase for all models, but more
so for the models predicting alternate targets than the one protected by the
obfuscation. Thus, knowing the level of noise could help an attacker gain
private information, but would be significantly more helpful to increasing
prediction accuracy of collateral targets.
The analysis in this chapter demonstrates the design and testing of pri-
vacy obfuscation to hide phone identity while conducting health and fitness
monitoring and the ability to hide user identification while conducting fit-
ness and health measurements, two useful scenarios for motion privacy. Our
third scenario, predicting fitness while hiding health information, is difficult
since our results indicate health and fitness metrics are strongly correlated.
We believe our results support the studies indicating fitness metrics could be
useful to infer health status and conclude fitness metrics may warrant more
careful privacy protection.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
The widespread adoption of mobile devices including fitness devices, medical
devices, and smartphones introduce novel threats to users’ privacy. We have
found mobile devices are collecting continuous traces from motion sensors in-
cluding accelerometers, gyroscopes and magnetometers. Previous work has
demonstrated the usefulness of motion sensors to predict sensitive user infor-
mation including fitness metrics, user identification and phone identification.
This leads to serious privacy concerns since motion sensors are not currently
considered sensitive information and are thus fairly easy to access from a
malicious phone application. Recently, the use of fitness devices and phones
to conduct continuous health monitoring has begun to attract attention. The
prospect of monitoring health through a smartphone significantly increases
the privacy risk of motion sensors since health information is generally con-
sidered high risk data which must be protected. Thus, users must be warned
and educated about the information they are leaking by giving apps access
to their motion data. Once educated, we expect users will demand systems
to provide greater access control to limit the threats to their privacy. How-
ever, such access control requires greater analysis and understanding of the
sophisticated machine learning techniques used to infer private information
from the sensor signals.
To understand the ability of phones to monitor a user’s health, we designed
and developed software to collect raw motion data with medical grade sensor
quality on Android smartphones. We then demonstrated that the motion
sensors contained in smartphones could be used to accurately monitor pa-
tients and infer health status. With three studies conducted on eighty-eight
patients, we presented models to predict unconstrained walking speed useful
to conduct the equivalent to a standard six-minute walk test which is used
to diagnose chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and congestive heart fail-
ure, two serious chronic diseases. We also built models to predict FEV1%,
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COPD status and blood oxygen saturation. The trials and predictive mod-
els demonstrate the usefulness of using mobile sensors to predict health and
provide strong motivation the need for privacy against malicious inference of
sensitive information.
The three studies provide a unique data set to both analyze the ability of
motion data to be used to predict sensitive information and test the ability
of obfuscation to mitigate these threats. The tests collected data from every
type of sensor available from our set of ten phones giving thirty-one raw
sensor streams including nineteen sensors directly recorded from the phone.
Our thirty-one sensors contained the standard set of motion sensors including
the accelerometer, gyroscope, orientation, and magnetometer. The remaining
twelve sensors were calculated with different reference frames for motion as
well as estimation of the user’s walking direction and direction of maximum
acceleration. For each sensor stream, we use the LibXtract tool kit combined
with custom code to extract 74 statistical features giving a total of 2,294 total
sensor features in our analysis with roughly 2 GB of raw data.
We demonstrate the ability to predict a comprehensive set of thirty targets
including the prediction capability of user identification, phone identification,
demographics including age, height, weight and gender. We also looked at ac-
tivity recognition (walking/non-walking), walking speed, and step counts. Fi-
nally, we considered heath status including FEV1%, FEV1/FVC and COPD
classification. We split each target classification into periods of walking,
non-walking, and a combination of both activities to measure the predic-
tion accuracy both when the user’s activity is stationary or unknown and
when the user is conducting a known activity such as walking. Our analysis
encompasses over forty hours of continuous readings from ten phones and
eighty-eight test subjects allowing use to analyze the predictability of our
targets.
We explored feature selection for our machine learning models. We eval-
uated both filter and wrapper methods to predict the top features to train
models for each prediction target. We find that filter methods run quickly,
but return a different subset of top features than wrapper methods using
sequential forward selection with SVM, SVR and k-means models to score
features. Understanding the variation in top features is important to under-
stand which features actually need to be obfuscated to protect privacy. The
difference in top features returned from feature selection led to the investi-
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gation of how to select the set of privacy sensitive features or features which
must be hidden in order to diminish the ability of an attacker to infer the pri-
vate target value. We find that while related to optimal feature selection, se-
lecting the private features is a significantly different problem. We developed
three algorithms to identify the private features with the most accurate being
a brute force method which conducts a sequential forward feature selection
search and classifies the top feature as private per round. Unfortunately, we
find that this algorithm takes substantial computational power to run. We
found that certain features with high correlation measured by normalized
mutual information can be clustered allowing the search to eliminate multi-
ple features per round; however, this led to a high false positive rate. We
therefore only clustered features with high normalized mutual information if
the features also had similar predictability scores in the first round of the
sequential forward top feature search. We found that this method reduced
the number of false positives while still significantly reducing runtime.
We evaluated the private feature selection using the subset of features in-
cluding the magnitude of acceleration, magnitude of gyroscope, and phone
orientation. We found that the private feature identification with mutual in-
formation and first round SFS scoring completed in roughly half the time of
the brute force search while returning fairly low false positive and negatives.
We also found that various features had differing numbers of private features
with user identification having a relatively low number of private features
and activity having a high number of private features. We evaluated with
various privacy thresholds for F1-score predictions and mean absolute errors
in the sequential forward search identifying the number of private features
per privacy threshold. Finally, we evaluated the ability of top feature selec-
tion routines to identify the private features finding that the raw normalized
mutual information score with the target actually identifies the private fea-
tures with highest accuracy. We make special note that using the wrapper
with k-means clustering to choose private features performed more poorly
than other methods considered.
We run the private feature identification with normalized mutual infor-
mation and first round similarity scoring on the entire data set identifying
the private features for all 30 prediction targets. We use the midpoint be-
tween the noise threshold or prediction score with random training vectors
and the maximum prediction accuracy using an un-optimized SVC or SVR
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model. We find that many target predictions contain overlapping features
with many correlated features especially between transformations of the mo-
tion data. We do see two main clusters of important sensor features with
one corresponding to predicting raw motion encompassing data from the ac-
celerometers and another corresponding to rotation being extracted from the
orientation and gyroscope sensors. We do eliminate 13 features and 3 sen-
sors which are not useful for prediction from our comprehensive set of sensor
features.
We next investigated the ability of machine learning models to predict each
target feature and the relative sensitivity of the predictions to changes in the
input sensor features. We evaluated nine classification machine learning mod-
els and nine regression models with optimized hyperparameters and ten-fold
cross validation to accurately measure how well the models can predict the
target without significant over fitting. We find that the models themselves
do not differ significantly in their ability to predict the target; however, ran-
dom forest and SVM perform best for classification and SVR performs best
for regression. We find that the forward sequential search gives the best in-
put sensor features overall. The filter method giving the highest accuracy
is the JMI method. We find that phone and activity identification can be
conducted with high accuracy. User identification suffers with ten-fold cross
validation due to dropping training targets but performs with leave-one-out
validation motivating the need for an individually trained model. We find
that COPD status and gender identification have lower accuracy. For re-
gressions, speed, steps, and FEV1/FVC show promise with speed and steps
giving the highest accuracy. Age, height, and weight are not predicted with
high statistical significance.
We developed strategies to estimate the amount of sensitivity present in
sensor features when predicting a target. We develop a library capable of
estimating the sensitivity of sklearn machine learning models. We use this
to estimate the sensitivity of models trained with both a single input feature
to each target and combinations of top features from the feature selection to
each target. We compare these sensitivity estimates to the standard sensi-
tivity in differential privacy (the maximum difference between sensor feature
values) and confirm that the sensitivity to the decision plane of a classifier
and amount of change to the sensor feature per unit change of regression is
substantially lower than the worst case differential method. Our methods al-
171
low us to calibrate noise for obfuscation to lower levels reducing the collateral
damage to other prediction targets.
Finally, we tie together the analysis methods presented in the dissertation
by taking the top features, the sensitivity estimates and the clinical data
set, developing obfuscation strategies, introducing noise, and evaluating the
ability to predict the targets while obfuscating specific targets. We compare
the sensitivities of five targets including three classification and two regression
models. We compare the user identification, phone identification, activity
identification, speed prediction, and FEV1/FVC. We first analyze the relative
sensitivity of the overlapping features noting that activity has a significant
number of overlapping features, speed and FEV1/FVC have low sensitivity
and phone and user identification have relatively high sensitivity. We then
present obfuscation techniques based on  differential privacy and obfuscate
each target using various values for epsilon. We compare the prediction
accuracy of each prediction target with the obfuscation yielding twenty-five
sets of experiments.
We find that activity, speed, and FEV1/FVC obfuscation significantly di-
minishes the ability to accurately predict the other targets. Conversely, ob-
fuscating both the user’s identity and phone identity can be done with less
interference to the other targets. Thus, our framework allows us to design
feature level noise capable of hiding individual prediction targets as unobtru-
sively as possible to protect the usefulness of the signal for other predictions.
This allows us to design privacy for two useful scenarios including hiding
phone identity during health and fitness sensing and hiding user identity dur-
ing health and fitness sensing. Our results indicate that health and fitness
are closely related motivating the need to have more strict privacy policies
with fitness data.
We have presented frameworks to identify private features in motion data
and to estimate the sensitivity for each identified private feature. We have
also implemented and analyzed a framework to introduce calibrated noise
based on differential privacy to obfuscate prediction targets. The next step
to this research is to design signal processing techniques to introduce appro-
priate noise into the sensitive features. For example, we see that the phone
identification in particular is sensitive to many features extracted from the
rotational rate of the gyroscope. We therefore propose to investigate raw
obfuscation into the gyroscope signal in order to affect the gyroscope’s fea-
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tures. Such analysis will allow the raw signal to be obfuscated in real time
and lead the way to the development of privacy frameworks in the firmware
which can guarantee privacy.
8.1 Final Thoughts
In this dissertation, we have developed a comprehensive framework to iden-
tify, quantify, and analyze private features as well as their sensitivity to
prediction. We believe this is a useful first step toward designing privacy
frameworks for motion data in real time. The ability to determine private
features will allow better policy to protect sensitive features. The framework
to determine the sensitivity of the features allows the noise to be carefully
calibrated in order to leave a useful signal for other applications. These con-
tributions combined with principles from differential privacy allow sensitive
features to be obfuscated with noise producing the least possible damage to
unrelated predictions. We hope the work in health prediction in this dis-
sertation can raise awareness to the dangers of releasing raw motion data.
We hope the libraries for private feature identification and sensitivity esti-
mation will provide a framework for further analysis to implement privacy
frameworks giving users greater control over their private motion data.
We believe the current trend to collect health data from mobile devices is
dangerous without access control for a user’s data. It is important for users
to understand what information both attackers and legitimate companies
can obtain from their mobile devices. Furthermore, it will be important for
users to be able to protect their personal information without completely
blocking access to the motion sensors for every app they may not trust. By
understanding the private features necessary to make private predictions and
the sensitivity of each feature, we can take the first steps to secure the privacy
of users against threats to motion sensor data.
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